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In examining whether corporate agriculture can be replaced by small-scale agriculture 
undertaken through the nucleus estate-out grower model after land reform in Zimbabwe‟s sugar 
estates in the south eastern Lowveld, there is need to answer the following critical questions: 
„Has the unbundling of formerly large–scale corporate plantations to much smaller scale farming 
units destroyed the once vibrant sugar estate? Is the participation of ordinary farmers without 
experience in sugarcane-production a wise move and does that initiate new modes of 
accumulation from below? Can contract farming arrangements with corporate processors or 
buyers provide a more viable support model than involving state support in kick-starting small-
scale farmers‟ entry into sugarcane production? Who currently owns what, who does what, who 
gets what and what do they do with it? Despite the negative perception being peddled in the local 
and international media about the dramatic transformation of the three sugar estates in 
Zimbabwe‟s south eastern Lowveld, land redistribution in the sugar estates had to be done to 
redress the colonial disparity in land ownership. This study therefore examined the subdivision 
of one of the sugar estates (Mkwasine Estate) into small-scale farming units, against the 
backdrop of tensions and conflicts between a South African multinational firm-Tongaat Hulett 
Zimbabwe (THZ) and the resettled black farmers. This is done to determine the changes that 
have occurred in the land ownership structure, land tenure system as well as contestations that 
arose over input accessibility, utility provision and sugar pricing after the reconfiguration of the 
estate. To achieve this, a stratified random sample of 45 farmers from three broad farmers‟ strata, 
namely the high, middle and low producer categories was used to collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data that described what unfolded in the estate in the aftermath of land reform. 
Overall, the results highlighted significant land ownership and tenure system changes in the 
estate after the transformation. The results also established tenure insecurity in the estate as 
freehold tenure paved way to leasehold tenure after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP). There was gender disparity in the land allocation exercise as only 31.1% of the sample 
who benefited is women compared to 68.9 % men. Of the same sample73.3% of the beneficiaries 
had no sugarcane farming experience against 26.7% who had it prior to receiving farms on the 
estate. The former are A2 farmers who were resettled under the FTLRP and came from the civil 
(35.5%) as well as the security services (37.8%) and are farming on a part time basis. The term 
„A2 farmers‟ refer to a new class of black commercial farmers introduced by government under 
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the FTLRP to deracialise commercial farming. The latter (26.7%) came from the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme and are into full-time sugarcane farming and are former THZ employees. 
Since their incorporation in the industry, the resettled farmers‟ contribution to total sugar output 
rose from 17% in 2011 to 33% in 2016. The study also established that two formulas are used by 
Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) to procure the farmers‟ sugarcane namely the milling 
agreement (MA) and the cane purchase agreement (CPA). The MA allows farmers to enjoy 
proceeds from byproducts of sugar whereas the CPA does not allow farmers to enjoy those 
benefits. Of the sample 26.7% indicated they use the MA and 73.3 % used the CPA raising 
questions as to why two procurement formulas were used by THZ for farmers on the same estate. 
Lastly, further evidence from the study also shows the benefits of land reform going beyond 
sugar production as all the resettled farmers in the estate engage in a diverse range of livelihood 
portfolios like petty trading, livestock farming and natural resources extraction to augment their 
family incomes. The study recommends farmer capacity and capability building since over 70% 
of the sample had no prior sugarcane farming experience. It also recommends the standardization 
of land sizes and tenure system as well as the adoption of one procurement price for all the 
farmers‟ sugarcane in the estate. The formation of a sugar council by all the stakeholders to 
regulate the industry by government is also recommended as it does to other crops under its input 
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1.1.The research problem 
 
This study assessed the reform of Mkwasine Estate and the transformation thereof that resulted 
after land reform in Zimbabwe. In the process it also explored tensions and conflicts between a 
South African multinational firm-Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) and black farmers in 
Chiredzi District in Masvingo Province. The major questions addressed by the study were „Has 
the unbundling of the formerly large–scale corporate estate to much smaller scale farming units 
destroyed the once vibrant sugar estate? Is the participation of ordinary farmers without previous 
experience in sugarcane-production viable and can it initiate new modes of accumulation from 
below? Can contract farming arrangements with a corporate processor or buyer provide a more 
viable support model than involving state support in kick-starting small-scale farmers‟ entry into 
sugarcane production? Who currently owns what, who does what, who gets what and what do 
they do with it in the sugar estate after land reform? These questions are partially addressed by 
existing literature need to be subjected to empirical analysis. 
 
This study therefore provides a broad sketch of the transformation of Mkwasine Estate as well as 
the livelihood activities beyond sugar production that emerged in and around the estate in the 
aftermath of land reform. The study examined changes in the land ownership structure, tenure 
system as well as operational relations between THZ and the resettled black farmers after the 
transformation of the estate. It argues that the unbundling of the formerly large corporate entity 
into smaller farming subdivisions destroyed the once vibrant sugar estate is wrong as the 
resettled farmers‟ productivity is improving on an annual basis. Their contribution towards total 
sugar output has been improving over the years despite a marked decline in sugar production in 
the initial years of their resettlement. The study further argues that the linking of the resettled 
farmers to a corporate processor mills enabled them to participate in an industry that had high 
barriers to entry due to its capital intensive nature while at the same time meeting their 




The inclusion of black farmers in the sugar industry broadened the sugar production base which 
was previously confined to white farmers in the colonial period. The transformation therefore 
culminated in the current tensions and conflicts bedeviling the sugar estate. Despite its spreading 
of economic benefits to a wider section of society, any understanding of the structural changes 
that took place in Mkwasine under the government‟s broad land redistribution exercise rolled out 
after independence in 1980 needs therefore a detailed analysis. The transition of the estate from a 
corporate entity under THZ‟ sole ownership and control alongside a few local white commercial 
sugarcane farmers to decentralized 20 hectare subdivisions owned and controlled by 
approximately 450 black farmers brought a variety of changes that culminated in tensions and 
conflicts between THZ and the resettled farmers as THZ continued to process and market the 
resettled farmers‟ sugarcane after land reform.  
 
Alongside the reconfiguration of the estate, a diverse range of livelihood portfolios emerged in 
and around the sugar estate. This study is by no means exhaustive and it may contain some 
omissions or gaps as it might only scratch the surface of very complex issues. The study does not 
enter into a discussion of whether the current politicization of the land issue in Zimbabwe by the 
ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party is being carried out 
altruistically, or is simply being done in the pursuit of self-preservation. 
 
1.2.Background to the study 
 
The current nucleus estate-out grower model in Zimbabwe‟s three sugar estates of Triangle, 
Hippo Valley and Mkwasine in the south eastern lowveld was first adopted in the colonial era. 
The model linked the sugarcane out growers to the core estates‟ processing mills. This 
arrangement spilled into the country‟s post-independence land reform programme. During the 
land reform Mkwasine Estate was wholly acquired by the government for the resettlement of 
black farmers to produce sugarcane alongside THZ.  
Globally, the out grower scheme or contract farming model is polarized between two schools of 
thought with one school viewing it as a pro-poor method of incorporating small-scale farmers in 
agribusiness with high barriers to entry (Minot, 1986; Glover and Kusterer, 1990) on one hand 
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while on the other hand, the agricultural model is viewed as oppressive and exploitative 
(Sachikonye, 1989; Watts, 1994). This tension between the two schools of thought has also been 
ever present in Zimbabwe‟s sugar estates in the south eastern Lowveld since the inception of the 
sugar out grower scheme in Triangle in the colonial era in 1954. However, over the years, the 
sugar out grower model in the sugar industry has gone through significant changes as the 
corporate ownership and control of Mkwasine Estate paved way to individual black farmers‟ 
ownership and control in the aftermath of the country‟s land reform.  
The Zimbabwean government‟s broad Land Reform and Resettlement Program (LRRP) was 
started after independence in 1980. The LRRP under which the transformation of Mkwasine 
Sugar Estates falls comprises three phases: firstly, the willing seller willing buyer (WSWB) 
phase, sometimes referred to as the „state-centred market based‟ land reform which spanned from 
1980 to 1990.The second phase, commencing with the compulsory acquisition of land started 
from 1990 to 1999. Although land was designated for redistribution to black farmers, this phase 
dictated that compensation be made to the white farmers whose land was taken away by the 
government. Lastly, the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (FTLRP) phase implemented 
in the year 2000 and beyond expropriated land from white commercial farmers and foreign firms 
for redistribution without compensation. 
 
The purpose of the LRRP in general and in the sugar estates in particular was to redress past land 
alienation which was inherited from the colonial era. It aimed at creating equal access to land for 
the wider section of the population. The LRRP‟s major goals were therefore twofold; firstly, to 
create political stability by promoting economic growth through wider equitable land 
redistribution and secondly to foster national food security, self-sufficiency and agricultural 
development through labor-intensive small-farm production (Moyo, 2011). 
 
1.2.1. Willing Seller, Willing Buyer phase 
 
Despite the extensive financial assistance from the United Kingdom (UK) after independence, 
the first phase of Zimbabwe's land reform programme was widely regarded as unsuccessful due 
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to the insignificant amount of land acquired for resettlement. Despite the first resettlement 
phase‟s orderliness, the government was only able to acquire 3 million hectares for redistribution 
instead of the intended target of 8 million hectares (Masiiwa and Chipungu, 2004).During this 
period, land purchasing by the government for resettlement purposes was guided by the willing 
seller-willing buyer (WSWB) clause of the Lancaster House Constitution (LHC) and then 
redistributed to beneficiaries. Under the LHC which ushered the country‟s independence in 1980, 
the private sector influenced the identification of land and controlled the supply available for 
resettlement, while the government only played the role of buyer. The major weakness of the 
WSWB clause is that it had not the legal instrument to force the private sector to release land on 
the market for purchasing by the government. 
  
Once the land was available, the government, in turn, made it available to beneficiaries who were 
selected mainly by its district officials under the direct supervision of central government 
officials. Because of the constraints of the WSWB, the government was unable to redistribute 
land on any significant scale across the country. The land ownership structure in Mkwasine 
Estate was first altered when approximately 2 000 hectares of sugarcane plantations were 
acquired by the government from Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwein 1982. This initiative by the 
government managed to resettle only 191 black farmers on 10 hectare plots each under the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme (CSS). 
 
During the first phase of land reform, the government cited financial constraints, a severe 
drought that occurred in 1986, in addition to the WSWB constraint as the three overriding factors 
that influenced the slow progress of land reform during in that phase. However, Moyo et al 
(2009) cite lack of initiative and trained personnel within the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, 
and Rural Development (MLRRD) itself, to plan and implement mass resettlements. It is in that 
context that parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1986, which gave the government the 
first right to purchase excess land for redistribution to the landless people. That Act also 
empowered the government to claim tracts of land adjacent to the former Tribal Trust Lands 
(now known as "Communal Areas") and mark them for resettlement purposes provided the 
owners of such land could be persuaded to sell. 
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Alongside these developments, Triangle Estate introduced the Mpapa Settlement (MSS) Scheme 
in 1988 for its former managers who had demonstrated exceptional sugarcane management 
skills. This private sector initiative was not part of the government‟s land redistribution efforts 
benefited only nine former employees, the majority of whom were white and allocated thirty 
hectares each. 
 
Apart from the above two developments, significant enclaves of the large-scale agro-industrial 
estates continued to be owned by THZ despite unfulfilled popular and domestic demands for 
land (Moyo, 2011). Such vast enclaves were preserved and encouraged by the state to produce 
agro-fuel (ethanol from sugar) and sugar for domestic and export markets. 
 
1.2.2. Compulsory land acquisition (with compensation) phase (1990-1999) 
 
After the expiration of the entrenched constitutional provisions of the WSWB clause mandated 
by the LHC in the early 1990s, Zimbabwe outlined several ambitious new plans for land reform. 
A national land policy was formally proposed and enshrined as the Zimbabwe Land Acquisition 
Act (LAA) in 1992, which empowered the government to acquire any land as it saw fit, although 
only after payment of financial compensation (GOZ, 1992). While powerless to challenge the 
acquisition of the land itself, the affected white landowners were permitted some lateral to 
negotiate their compensation amounts with the state.  
 
The British government continued to help fund the resettlement programme, with aid specifically 
earmarked for land reform reaching £91 million by 1996 (Moyo, 2011). Another £100 million 
was granted for "budgetary support" and was spent on a variety of projects related to land 
reform. During that phase, Zimbabwe also began to court other donors through its Economic 
Structural Adjustment Policies (ESAP), which were projects implemented in concert with 




The diversion of acquired farms for personal use by Zimbabwe's political elite began to emerge 
as a crucial issue during the mid-1990s (Moyo, 2011). Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, who 
assumed an executive presidency in 1987, had urged restraint on land grabbing by the ruling elite 
by enforcing a leadership code of conduct which barred members of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, 
from monopolizing large tracts of farmland and then renting them out for profit. Local media 
outlets soon exposed huge breaches of the very code by Mugabe's family and senior officials in 
ZANU-PF (Masiiwa and Chipungu, 2004). Despite calls for accountability, the party members 
were never disciplined. Instead of being allocated to landless peasants, several hundred 
commercial farms acquired under the Land Acquisition Act continued to be leased out to 
politically connected individuals. In 1994, a disproportionate amount of the land being acquired 
was held by less than 600 black landowners, many of whom owned multiple properties (Moyo, 
2011). One study of commercial farms found that over half the redistributed land that year went 




 of November 1997, Britain's then Secretary of State for International Development, 
Clare Short, described the new Labour government's approach to Zimbabwean land reform 
programme. She said that the UK did not accept that Britain had a special responsibility to meet 
the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the Lancaster House commitments, 
Short stated that her government was only prepared to support a programme of land reform that 
was part of a poverty eradication strategy. She had other questions regarding the way in which 
land would be acquired and compensation paid, and the transparency of the process. Her 
government's position was spelt out in a letter to Zimbabwe's agriculture minister, Kumbirai 
Kangai: 
I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the 
costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without 
links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and, as you know, we were colonized not 




The letter concluded by stating that a programme of rapid land acquisition would be impossible 
to support, citing concern about the damage this might do to Zimbabwe's agricultural output and 
its prospects of attracting investment. 
 
In June 1998, the Zimbabwe government published its "policy framework" on the Land Reform 
and Resettlement Programme Phase II(LRRP II), which envisaged the compulsory purchase over 
five years of 50,000 square kilometres from the 112,000 square kilometres owned by white 
commercial farmers, public corporations, churches, non-governmental organizations and 
multinational companies. Broken down, the 50,000 square kilometres meant that, the 
government intended to purchase 10,000 square kilometres for redistribution every year between 
1998 and 2003 (Masiiwa and Chipungu, 2004). In September of the same year (1998), the 
government called a donors conference in Harare on the LRRP II to inform the donor community 
and involve them in the program. 
 
According to Masiiwa and Chipungu (2004), forty-eight countries and international 
organizations attended and unanimously endorsed the land program, saying it was essential for 
poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth. They agreed that the inception phase, 
covering the first 24 months, should start immediately, particularly appreciating the political 
imperative and urgency of the proposal. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) freely offered to 
sell the government 15,000 sq. kilometres for redistribution, but the white landowners once again 
dragged their feet. 
 
In response to moves by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)-a group of academics, 
trade unionists and other political activists, the government drafted a new constitution in 
1999.The constitutional draft was discussed widely by the public in formal meetings and 
amended to include restrictions on presidential powers, limits to the presidential term of office, 
and an age limit of 70 for presidential candidates. This was not seen as a suitable outcome for the 
government by the ruling ZANU PF party, so the proposals in the draft constitution were 
amended and replaced with one to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without 
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compensation. The opposition political parties boycotted the drafting stage of the constitution 
claiming that this new version was to politically entrench Mugabe. 
 
Guerrilla veterans of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe 
People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) began to emerge as a radical force in the land issue 
around this time (Chaumba et al., 2003). The former guerrilla fighters forcefully presented their 
position that white-owned land in Zimbabwe was rightfully theirs, on account of promises made 
to them during the Rhodesian bush war. Calls for accelerated land reform were also echoed by an 
affluent urban class of black Zimbabweans who were interested in making inroads into 
commercial farming with public assistance (ibid). 
 
Under this phase, no reform took place in the sugar estates as THZ continued to own huge 
enclaves of sugar plantations. Despite the financial, constitutional as well as climatic constraints, 
the government seemed reluctant to disturb the sugar industry due to its strategic importance as a 
source of foreign currency due to the increased demand of sugar and its byproducts on the 
international market. 
 
1.2.3. The Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (2000 and beyond) 
 
The period from the year 2000 was a period of intense occupations of land belonging to white 
commercial farmers by a war veteran led movement in Zimbabwe (Chaumba et al. 2003; Moyo 
2013). The pro-Mugabe Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) 
organized several people (including but not limited to war veterans; many of them were their 
children and grandchildren) to march onto white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song 
and dance (ibid). This movement was officially termed the "Fast-Track Land Reform Program" 
(FTLRP) signaling the official takeover of the land allocation by the government through 
compulsory land acquisition without compensation (Moyo, 2011). With this development, the 
government introduced the A2 agricultural model to incorporate black farmers (known as A2 
farmers) into the commercial farming sector previous dominated by foreign firms and white 
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farmers. The size of an A2 farm varied from 20 hectares to 200 hectares per farmer across the 
country depending on the agro-climatic conditions and agricultural activity of a specific region. 




 of September 2005, the parliament, dominated by ZANU-PF, passed a constitutional 
amendment, signed into law that nationalized farmland acquired through the "Fast Track" 
process and deprived original landowners of the right to challenge in courts of law, the 
government's decision to expropriate their land (Masiiwa and Chipungu, 2004). The 
Zimbabwean courts were instructed by the government to rule against legal challenges to this 
amendment. This left some white farmers to approach the SADC Tribunal (Campbell v Republic 
of Zimbabwe) for redress in 2008, the Tribunal ruled that the Zimbabwean government violated 
the SADC treaty by denying access to the courts and engaging in racial discrimination against 
white farmers whose lands had been confiscated and that compensation should be paid. 
However, the High Court of Zimbabwe refused to register the Tribunal's judgment and 
ultimately, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Tribunal in August 2009 (Moyo, 2011). 
 
It was during this period that approximately 16 000 hectares of the sugarcane plantations that 
previously belonged to Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe and white commercial farmers were 
compulsorily acquired and redistributed to A2 farmers, leading to a significant change in the 
ownership structure in the sugar estates (Scoones et al. 2010; Moyo, 2011).During this period, 
the whole of Mkwasine Estate-co-owned by Triangle and Mkwasine was compulsorily acquired 
from Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) by the government for the resettlement of A2 farmers on 
a 99 year leasehold tenure. An A2 farmer refers to a new breed of a commercial farmer who was 
allocated land by the government for commercial farming purposes under the FTLRP. In the 
sugar estates each A2 farmer was allocated 20 hectares under a 99 year leasehold tenure resulting 
in over 900 black farmers resettled across the three estates under the A2 sugar scheme/model. 
 
The 99 year lease is an agreement between the state, through the Ministry of Lands, Land 
Reform and Resettlement (MLLRR) and the A2 farmers, that provides for the A2 farmer to 
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occupy and use a certain piece of land for an agreed rental period of 99 years (MLLRR, 2006). 
The lease agreement provides a 99-years guarantee of land use if the farmer continues to meet 
the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. Land use under leasehold is limited by the 
purpose of the lease and land legislation. Lease conditions, for example, may set stocking limits, 
or land use options. The system imposes high levels of care on the leaseholder and any lease 
transfer may require state approval. There are no rights to subdivide or aggregate land. The state 
retains the power to acquire leases or withhold leases when the leasing period expires 
(Murombedzi and Gomera, 2004). 
 
Just like the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme of 1982 the A2 sugarcane modelintroduced under the 
FTLRP also linked the A2 farmers in the estate to THZ, which, apart from also having vast 
enclaves of sugarcane plantations of its own, owned two sugar processing plants at Triangle and 
Hippo Valley. Under this arrangement, THZ was expected to provide inputs and extension 
support to the farmers and in extreme cases managed the farmers‟ sugarcane plantations in order 
to ensure that the right quality and quantity of sugarcane was supplied. The rationale behind the 
arrangement entailed the provision of an assured market outlet as well as access to critical 
production resources such as credit, technical and related assistance to the farmers by THZ. The 
A2 farmers, in turn, undertook to supply sugarcane to THZ for processing and marketing. In the 
process the farmers were expected to adhere to harvest and/or delivery date quotas in accordance 
with grading standards, pricing agreements and credit recovery arrangements. 
 
With time the newly resettled farmers failed to perform to expectation due to various reasons 
ranging from lack of commitment to failure in securing loans from commercial banks because of 
lack of collateral security over the land on which they were resettled. With no security of tenure 
on the farms, banks were reluctant to extend loans to the new farmers, many of whom did not 
have much experience in commercial sugarcane farming, nor assets to provide alternative 
collateral for any borrowed money. This culminated in the introduction of the Successful Rural 
Communities Charter (SusCo) between THZ and the resettled farmers to rehabilitate sugar 




1.3. Study aim 
 
Following the dramatic developments that unfolded in Zimbabwe‟ agricultural sector in general 
and Mkwasine Estate in particular together with the heated debates associated with the outcomes 
of Zimbabwe‟s land reform, the major aim of the study was to assess the reform at Mkwasine 
Sugar Estate and the transformation that resulted amidst the tensions and conflicts that arose 
between THZ and the resettled black farmers after the reconfiguration of Mkwasine Estate‟s land 
ownership structure. 
 
1.3.1. Objectives of the study 
 
To achieve the above aim, the specific objectives of study were; 
1. To establish who benefited in the sugar estate in terms gender, socio-economic 
background as well as changes in the land tenure system after the reconfiguration of the 
estate. 
2. To establish areas of contestation between Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe and the resettled 
black sugarcane farmers after land reform. 
3. To establish milling levies as well procurement formulas by Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe 
for resettled farmers‟ sugarcane and how sugar and its byproducts are priced and 
marketed after land reform. 
4. To establish livelihood activities beyond sugarcane production by the resettled farmers in 
Mkwasine Estate. 
 
1.4.Justification of the study 
 
This study provides an insight into the land and agrarian reforms in Mkwasine Sugar Estate 
largely missing in existing literature on the sugar industry in Zimbabwe after land reform. 
Interestingly, the popularity of out grower schemes in southern Africa as a land reform strategy 
to incorporate small-scale farmers in agribusiness makes this study very relevant. Lessons drawn 
from this study would greatly inform other countries on their land redistributive endeavors to 
redress the historical imbalances inherited at independence. Land reform, the world over, has 
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been viewed as an important vehicle in the transformation of rural people‟s lives as it 
incorporates notions of both material and non-material welfare aspects of the human conditions. 
It is a process that creates environments in which the beneficiaries could expand their capabilities 
and opportunities, both for current and future generations. Such an optimistic perspective is best 
illustrated by Scoones etal. (2010) who points out that any purposeful redistribution of land must 
entail the redistribution of wealth, income, status and capacity for saving which not only will 
provide incentives for increased agricultural production and labour productivity but strengthens 
the socio-economic position of the resettled people. 
 
Empirical studies carried out in some parts of Africa, and elsewhere on land and agrarian reforms 
particularly with reference to out grower schemes (OGs hereafter), appear to show positive 
results for small farmers in terms of income (Warning & Key, 2002; McCulloch &Ota, 2002; 
Bolwig et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012) and subjective well-being but the general consensus from 
a variety of case studies is that outcomes are highly-varied (Oya, 2012). Empirical findings on 
Zimbabwe‟s sugar estates before and after independence (Saunders, 1980; Jackson and Cheaters, 
1994; Watts, 1994; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996; Scoones et al. 2010 and Moyo, 2011) have 
highlighted some salient points in the development of Zimbabwe‟s sugar estates in the south 
eastern Lowveld but largely ignored to subject the dramatic reconfiguration of Mkwasine 
Estatewhich was most affected by land reform to a detailed and systematic analysis. This study 
therefore filled this gap by nuancing the land redistributive efforts by the government in the 
estate. 
 
While redressing the racial imbalance in land ownership in the sugar estates and economic 
empowerment for the initially disadvantaged black people of Zimbabwe, have been evoked as 
major reasons for the transformation of the sugar estates the link to rural livelihoods and 
development also makes this study very relevant particularly Chapter 6 which discusses 
livelihood activities beyond sugar production which emerged in and around the sugar estates 
after land reform. Rural development refers to the process of improving the quality of life and 
the economic well-being of the people living in the three sugar estates. Traditionally, rural 
development centred on the exploitation of land-intensive natural resources such as agriculture 
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and forestry (http://www.geo.mtu.edu). Over the years, the need by rural communities to 
approach development from a wider perspective has focused more on a broad range of 
development aspects rather than merely agricultural or natural resource extraction activities. 
Education, entrepreneurship, physical and social infrastructure are all now considered to play 




The findings of this study are based on data collected in Mkwasine Estate. The estate is located 
30 kilometres north east of Chiredzi Town in Chiredzi District. The estate is 50 and 70 
kilometres respectively from Hippo Valley and Triangle sugar mills where its sugar is processed 
and marketed. Of the three sugar estates in Zimbabwe‟s south eastern lowveld, Mkwasine was 
selected for the following reasons; the estate has approximately 50% of all the resettled black 
farmers in the three estates. The estate is also home to both; the first group of 191 black farmers 
resettled in the sugar estates under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme in 1982 and the second group 
of 259 „A2‟ farmers who were resettled under the FTLRP in the year 2000 and beyond. This 
makes it the only estate from the three that captures the complete transformation that has 
occurred in the sugar estates. 
 
Secondly, Mkwasine Estate was selected ahead of the other two estates because of the three 
estates it is the one which was wholly acquired by the government to resettle black farmers. Also 
before the FTLRP, the estate was co-owned and co-managed by THZ‟s subsidiary estates of 
Triangle and Hippo Valley. For that reason the estate was deemed to represent the characteristics 
of both Triangle and Hippo Valley. 
 
Thirdly, given the limitations imposed by the researcher‟s limited budget, it was affordable for 
him since he had been given lodgings by a relative who worked as an extension manager in the 
estate for Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe. It was relatively easy to visit all corners of the estate from 
there. Also, Mkwasine was chosen due to its proximity to Chiredzi Town where government 
officials in the ministries of lands and agriculture resided. The researcher needed also to 
interview these officials to triangulate the data he got from the farmers. 
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Fourthly, Mkwasine lies adjacent to some communal lands. An important dynamic worth noting 
is how the histories of forced removals in the colonial era and autochthonic claims influenced the 
way the land allocations unfolded in the estate. Some beneficiaries of the sugarcane farms such 
as Chief Gudo and Chief Chilonga from the adjacent communal lands claim to have been evicted 
from the area in the colonial era by the Rhodesian government. They have utilized the FTLRP to 
return to their ancestral lands that was lost during that time. 
 
Lastly, unlike Triangle and Hippo Valley, Mkwasine does not have a sugar processing mill of its 
own, hence its farmers send their sugarcane to the Hippo Valley and Triangle about 50 and 70 
kilometres away by either road or rail. The farmers in this estate incur the highest operating costs 
due to long distances from the processing mills and when acquiring inputs from suppliers than 
other farmers in Triangle and Hippo Valley. For that reason it was deemed the most suitable to 
give a credible description of the reforms that took place. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Study area map 
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1.6. Scope and limitations of the study 
 
The study‟s focus is limited to the transformation of Mkwasine sugar estates in Chiredzi District 
of Masvingo Province. The whole estate was wholly acquired and redistributed to black farmers. 
However the farmers continued to be linked to THZ‟s processing mills and Hippo Valley and 
Triangle sugar estate. The major constraints were limited time and lack of funding as the 
researcher was a full time university student who was expected to meet university deadlines. In 
order to make do with a limited budget in the absence of a sponsor and cut expenses the 
researcher went an extra mile to collect data over weekends and public holidays. This deprived 
the researcher the opportunity to observe all the activities from cane planting right up to 
harvesting. However the constraints provided important lessons to the researcher. 
 
Unlike in quantitative studies where a researcher makes use of a pre-designed instrument such as 
a set of questions to be asked to the interviewees such as a questionnaire, qualitative interviews 
proceed differently. Building rapport with the farming community was highly crucial since the 
researcher was an outsider which meant spending a considerable amount of time to establish that. 
The engagement of a research assistant from the estate dispelled the suspicion the farming 
community had for the researcher. The research assistant helped the researcher to conform to the 
cultural forms of local greetings. Therefore discipline, humility and patience were key qualities 
that the researcher and his assistant had to have. 
 
The land redistribution exercise in the sugar estates created many authority structures in the 
estates. All these structures exercised some form of authority over land and operations in the 
estates. That meant getting the clearance to interview research informants was a daunting task. 
Thus, securing clearance to undertake fieldwork was a rather complicated process that was also 
time-consuming. Care was also critical so that the researcher did not end up being embroiled into 
political discussions with the participants since land reform in Zimbabwe is a very sensitive 
issue. This left the researcher facing ethical dilemmas as he did not want to expose his 
informants to political victimization. As a result, it took him longer than expected to establish 




Some farmers feared that certain aspects of their responses could be misinterpreted and/or 
misused. Kvale (1996) and Grenier (1998) have also noted concern about the unwillingness of 
participants to share knowledge with outsiders. The fear of misinterpretation was addressed by 
assuring the participants that information synthesized after the data collection process would be 
availed back for their verification and validation. Besides, willing respondents were also asked to 
participate at a later stage of group preliminary data analysis. Skepticism about misuse of 
extracted information was addressed by patiently explaining to them the objectives of the study 
and how it was supposed to benefit the farming community. 
 
Of late, the sugar estates have attracted intense research attention from some researchers because 
of the heated debates on the outcomes of the FTLRP in the sugar industry. As a result some 
farmers felt that their area had been „over-researched‟ and that we were wasting their precious 
time. It was therefore necessary to adequately communicate the purpose of the study to the 
respondents, its uniqueness, the existing knowledge gaps, their role in the investigation, and how 
it was expected to benefit them or contribute in transforming their community. This meant 
knowledge about previous studies and the gaps thereof had to be known by the researcher. Such 
a challenge was fully tackled by establishing a good rapport with the community gatekeepers 
who were mostly quick in appreciating the potential role of research as a tool for community 
development. 
 
Some farmers wanted to assume superiority and unmatched knowledge about their farming 
experience. This happened in instances where some farmers felt they were the most successful 
and had all the answers to my research questions. If not handled properly, such farmers would 
have influenced the researcher to exclude other potential respondents who could also contribute 
meaningfully in the research. This was addressed by asking these particular farmers to name 
other farmers in the estate who could share a similar or closer account of the details they had 
already provided. Another way the researcher went around the problem was asking those farmers 
to name a respondent of different sex with the view that other details could be gender specific. 
 
Qualitative interviews embrace gender-sensitivity. One respondent felt that he could account 
better the details of his farming experiences when his wife assisted him. Such a practice enriched 
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the information given by addressing the problem of loss of memory on some key periodic events 
that deserve detailed narration. Interviewing women during social occasions proved to be a rather 
difficult process as it involved some situations of negotiating with their husbands before 
clearance was granted.  
1.7. Ethical Considerations 
 
This study embraced appropriate ethical principles meant to protect and respect the rights of the 
community studied and individuals. In interview research, Johnson (2001) said that “ethical 
issues are meant to protect the interests and rights of both the researcher and the respondents”. 
Social science related research invokes some critical ethical issues particularly when the topic of 
rural development is incorporated (Smith, 1999). This study was subjected to rigorous scrutiny 
by the Committee for Ethics in the School of Agriculture, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
(SAEES) at University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN). Ethics clearance was sought before 
commencement of field work. 
 
It was necessary to get the informed consent of the farmers before they would be involved in the 
research. Before they consented to the interviews, an adequate judicious disclosure on these 
issues was given as to who was carrying out the research; the nature of the research, that is, what 
was being researched on; why participants were required to express their knowledge and views; 
and what the researcher intended to do with the information provided? 
 
During the interviewing process respondents were also informed at the outset that they had the 
liberty of withdrawing from participating at any moment whenever they deem it expedient. 
Confidentiality of information and anonymity was assured in which the identities of the 
participants would not be disclosed and would not be linked to the views expressed. Pseudonyms 
were used for those respondents who wanted anonymity except for respondents in official 





Finally, the full identity and contact details of the researcher was given to all participants. It was 
specified that the researcher was a postgraduate candidate registered at the School of Agriculture, 
Earth and Environmental Sciences (SAEES) in the University of KwaZulu Natal in South Africa. 
This was meant to facilitate the process of contacting the researcher in the event that they would 
wish to do so. The use of name cards or business cards bearing the researcher‟s name, contact 
details and name of the university was highly useful in revealing the details of the researcher 
without doubt. 
1.8. Organization of the study 
 
The remainder of this thesis is segmented into six chapters informed by the broad aim and 
specific objectives presented in Section 1.4 and sub-section 1.4.1 of this chapter respectively. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the sugar industry in Zimbabwe in the colonial era. The purpose of this 
chapter is to identify the gaps in the existing body of knowledge on out grower schemes in 
general and the sugar industry in Zimbabwe in particular. The gap emerging from the literature 
review is the transformation that occurred in the sugar estates after independence in 1980 hence 
this study. The study also gives the contextual background to the transformation that occurred to 
the sugar estates in the aftermath of land reform 
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the research findings. Chapter 3 examines post-independence 
reforms in the sugar estates. These reforms entailed changes to the land ownership structure 
tenure system in the sugar estates. It does so through discussing beneficiaries of land in the sugar 
estate in terms of their gender, and socio-economic backgrounds as well their relationship with 
Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe- a South African multinational firm owning vast enclaves of sugar 
plantations in the country‟s south eastern lowveld. The chapter also discusses the resettled 
farmers‟ production trends and contribution to sugar output in the estate. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the contestations between THZ and the resettled farmers over input 
accessibility, water allocation, and electricity provision among other issues as sources of conflict 
in the sugar estates. The chapter concludes by proffering possible measures that could be adopted 
by the stakeholders to address the constraints hence sustain the lucrative industry. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the two pricing formulas used by THZ to procure the resettled black 
farmers‟ sugarcane. It highlights the inconsistencies in the two formulas offered by THZ‟s two 
milling companies at Triangle and Hippo Valley. The chapter views the pricing formulas as 
sources of mistrust between THZ and the resettled farmers hence the need for their revisiting. 
The chapter also discusses the marketing of sugar as well as the economic benefits of the 
industry to the farmers and the nation at large.  
 
Chapter 6 examines a range of some livelihood activities by some resettled farmers beyond 
sugarcane production in the sugar estates. It discusses how access to land culminated in 
sugarcane farmers straddling across livestock farming, sole trading, natural resource extraction, 
cross boarder trading as other sources of income apart from sugarcane production. The chapter 
concludes by suggesting the strengthening of diversification options by the farmers as a 
contingency measure to ease cash flow constraints faced by the farmers between the planting and 
harvesting of the perennial sugarcane crop. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by restating the problem that was under investigation and 
presents some findings of the preceding chapters. It draws mainly from the literature review-the 
evolution of the sugar industry as well the out grower schemes in the three estates(Chapter 2), 
post-independence reforms in the sugar estates(Chapter 3), operational changes after the 
reconfiguration of the land ownership structure in the sugar estates (Chapter 4), pricing 
formulae used by THZ to procure the resettled farmers‟ sugarcane(Chapter 5) and other 
livelihood activities that have emerged in and around the sugar estates after land reform 
(Chapter 6). These findings are used as a premise for giving insightful recommendations to 
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The introduction of colonial rule in Africa marked an important turning point, not just in the 
administration of land, tenure forms and ownership types, but also modes of accessing it. .In 
Zimbabwe‟s south eastern Lowveld, colonial rule introduced not just a different system of 
statutory land tenure including its administrative structures but also significantly changed the 
local people‟s perception and relations to land. After the indigenous people were forcibly 
removed in Chiredzi District by the colonial regime to pave way for commercial sugarcane 
farming in Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwasine they began to perceive land as a commodity 
that could be bought and sold like any other commodity on the market as they saw the land they 
once believed was theirs changing hands from time to time. All along to them, land as an 
inheritance from their ancestors was communally owned. 
 
From the colonial era, the three sugar estates developed into a vertically integrated agro-
industrial concern spanning from sugarcane growing, processing and marketing stages. Over the 
years, the sugar estates vacillated between private and public ownership and control. Individual 
effort by MacDougal from the inception of the sugar industry gave in to state control in 1945 
(Saunders, 1980; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). After ten years of state ownership and control the 
industry reverted to private hands after the state realized the sugar industry could best be 
developed through private initiative. This opened sugar production to multinational firms 
alongside a few white sugarcane farmers who were linked to the core estates‟ processing mills at 
Triangle and Hippo Valley respectively. 
 
Currently, a South African firm-Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) controls the sugar industry in 
Zimbabwe through its Triangle and Hippo Valley operations. As at 31 March 2013, the firm 
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owned 44 519 hectares of land with a potential to produce in excess of 3 million tons of 
sugarcane annually (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2015).Alongside THZ are the resettled black 
farmers who are linked to its two processing sugar mills. These farmers comprise of the „settler‟ 
farmers of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme established in Mkwasine in 1982 and more recently 
the A2 farmers who were resettled under the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme 
implemented in the year 2000 and beyond. From its inception in the 1920s to 1979 the sugar 
industry in Zimbabwe went through phenomenal changes. 
 
This chapter therefore examined the evolution of Zimbabwe‟s sugar industry in Triangle, Hippo 
Valley and Mkwasine sugar estates of Chiredzi District in the south eastern lowveld of the 
country. After the forced removals of indigenous people, vast tracts of land were sold by the 
colonial government to multinational firms and a few local white farmers for sugar production in 
the district. The three sugar estates lie within Natural Regions IV and V. These natural regions 
are classified as those areas whose soil fertility and water sources are too poor to permit cropping 
except on a limited scale. The objective of this chapter is threefold; firstly, to contextualize the 
sugar industry in general and the sugar estates in particular to the reforms that were introduced 
by the government after independence in 1980, secondly, to analyze the provisions of the 
colonial legislation  and how it contributed to the unequal power relations between the core 
estates on one hand and the sugarcane out growers on the other and finally to analyze the 
implications of the out grower scheme on the autonomy and economic well-being of the out 
growers. 
 
The chapter contributes a critical review of the evolution of the sugar industry in Zimbabwe 
during the colonial era which is critical to our understanding of the transformation that occurred 
in the sugar estates after independence. As a second contribution, the chapter analyses the 
provisions of the colonial statutes to argue how they were instrumental in creating the current 
unequal power relations between Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe and the resettled black farmers. The 
provisions of the Hippo Valley Act of 1957 and the Sugar Control Act of 1962 by the colonial 
government which later spilled into post-independence land reform in the sugar estates require a 
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detailed review for us to understand the source of the current contestations between Tongaat 
Hulett Zimbabwe and the resettled black farmers in the aftermath of land reform. 
 
The chapter also highlights the implications of the out grower model to the socio-economic well-
being of smallholder farmers. Besides an analysis of empirical findings on Zimbabwe‟s sugar 
industry, some archival materials on the history of the sugar industry in Zimbabwe were also 
analyzed. That entailed paying visits to Triangle Museum as well the National Archives in 
Harare where a perusal of some colonial statutes was done, particularly the Hippo Valley 
Agreement of 1957, and the Sugar Control Act of 1962. These pieces of colonial legislation 
contributed to current state relationship between THZ and the resettled farmers in Mkwasine 
today. It was hoped that a combination of empirical and archival material improved the quality of 
the data and more importantly the objectivity of this chapter‟s findings. 
 
2.2. Conceptual Framework: Transformation, the out grower model, land reform and 
agrarian reform 
 
The above concepts inform this study and will generally be used or referred to in the study hence 
their discussion in the following sub-sections;  
2.2.1. Transformation 
 
The term refers to the unbundling of formerly large–scale corporate plantations to much smaller 
scale farming units. It also refers to the participation of ordinary farmers with no previous 
experience in sugarcane-production beginning new modes of accumulation from below. It also 
refers contract farming arrangements with corporate processors or buyers in kick-starting small-
scale farmers‟ entry into sugarcane production. Lastly it also deals with questions of who 
currently owns what in the estate, who does what, who gets what and what do they do with it?‟ 
2.2.2. The out grower model 
 
The terms “out grower” or “contract farming” are often used interchangeably owing to the 
diversity of the contract farming phenomenon (.Bijman, 2008:3) Although this study sometimes 
uses these terms interchangeably, its focus is on a specific model of out grower -the core/nucleus 
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estate –out grower model that was adopted in Zimbabwe‟s three sugar estates in the colonial era 
and spilled into post-independence land reform programmes. 
 
The „out grower‟ or „contract farming‟ model (OG or CF model hereafter respectively)refers to 
the contractual arrangements whether oral or written, between farmers and processing firms, 
specifying one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of an agricultural product 
(Roy, 1972). Both terms embrace a variety of institutional arrangements which differ according 
to the partners in the contract‟s inputs and management obligations. The definitions of these 
terms are mired in contemporary debates due to the diversity of contracting arrangements 
between farmers and contracting firms (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
According to Singh (2002:1622); 
“There is so much diversity in the type of firms, farmers, contracts, crops and the socio-economic 
environment that it is better to focus on a specific situation than the generic institution of 
contracting.” 
The terrain in the diversity is further complicated by the existence of a variety of players in the 
contractual arrangements that include the farmers, contractors, service providers, producer 
associations and donors hence some observers of contract farming or out grower schemes have 
developed a host of definitions that contain the same subject matter but expressed differently. 
 
Taking from the various elements from the definitions abound this study is informed by the 
following inclusive definition by Prowse (2012:10-12); 
 
“A contractual arrangement for a fixed term between a farmer and a firm, agreed verbally or in 
writing before production begins, which provides resources to the farmer and/or specifies one or 
more conditions of production, in addition to one or more marketing conditions, for agricultural 
production on land owned or controlled by the farmer, which is non-transferrable and gives the 
firm, not the farmer, exclusive rights and legal title to the crop” 
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From Prowse‟s definition the OG or CF model involves the linking of the processing firm (THZ 
in this particular case) and the small farmers (the resettled farmers) through production and 
marketing contracts by which the processing firm provides an assured market outlet, as well as 
access to critical production resources, such as credit and technical related assistance to the 
resettled farmers in return for the supply of a specified agricultural produce. 
 
The core/nucleus estate-out grower model entails the linking of individual farmers (resettled 
farmers) to a core estate (Mkwasine Estate) under processing and marketing contracts. Under the 
arrangement the core or nucleus estate undertakes to process and market farmers‟ produce. The 
core estate might go an extra mile to provide inputs and extension support and in some cases 
manage the farmers‟ plantations in order to ensure that the right quality and quantity were 
guaranteed. The farmers, in turn, undertake to supply their produce to the core estates for 
processing and marketing. The contract requires them to adhere to harvest and/or delivery date 
quotas, in accordance with grading standards, pricing agreements and credit recovery 
arrangements. 
 
James and Kinsey (2013) also view the OG or CF model as being characterised by one or more 
of the following features: 
 
 the commitment, whether written or oral, in advance by a buyer or processor to purchase 
from a grower a given crop area or volume, of a stipulated quality, at a stipulated time 
and often (but not always) at a predetermined price; 
 the linkage of factor and product markets based on specific production practices and the 
provision of inputs and/or services by buyer-processors; and 
 a contractual distinction in the apportionment of production and marketing risk. 
 
The debate surrounding contract farming is a polarized one. One school of thought asserts that 
contracts provide small-scale farmers with much-needed inputs and link them to global-agro-
food systems (Davis &Goldberg, 1957; Goldberg, 1974; Austin, 1974; Williams & Karen, 1985), 
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while another school points to the diversion of inputs away from food production and into the 
production of high-value cash crops for export markets(George, 1976; Lappé & Collins, 1982; 
Dinham & Hines, 1983; Rosset, et al., 2006; Rosset, 2008). Yet another school of thought points 
clear power imbalances between small-scale farmers and large-scale agri-businesses, which tend 
to undermine whatever benefits small farmers might receive (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Little & 
Watts, 1994; Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1997). 
 
Despite the polarization, out-grower systems have significant benefits for both farmers and agro-
industrial firms (investors). However, it can also cause certain problems. A well-managed out-
grower system through contract farming is an effective way to coordinate and promote 
production and marketing in agriculture. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is an agreement 
between unequal parties: companies, government bodies or individual entrepreneurs on the one 
hand and the economically weaker farmers on the other. It is, however an approach that can 
contribute to both increased income for farmers and higher profitability for agro-industrial firms. 
When efficiently organized and managed, out-grower schemes can reduce risk and uncertainty 
for both parties as compared to buying and selling crops on the open market. 
 
While critics of the out-grower system in general tend to emphasize the inequality of the 
relationship and the stronger position of agro-industrial firms with respect to that of the farmers, 
the model is viewed as essentially benefiting firms by enabling them to obtain cheap labour and 
to transfer risks to the farmers. The advantages, disadvantages and problems arising from OG 
schemes system will vary according to the physical, social and market environments. More 
specifically, the distribution of risks will depend on such factors as the nature of the markets for 
both the raw material and the processed product, the availability of alternative earning 
opportunities for farmers, and the extent to which relevant technical information is provided to 
the contracted farmers. The following two sub-sections look at both advantages and problems 




2.2.1.1. Advantages to the farmers 
 
The advantages for farmers include:  
• Markets are known and more or less secured.  
• The agro-industrial firm usually provides inputs and production services, often on credit.  
• Out-grower system often introduces new technology and also enables farmers to learn new 
skills.  
• Farmers‟ price risk is often reduced as many contracts specify prices in advance. (pre-planting 
price)  
• Out-grower system opens new markets, which would otherwise be unavailable to small-scale 
farmers.  
• A central buying place close to the out-growers. • Donors use out-growers as a tool for 
targeting vulnerable groups of farmers. 
The problems faced by farmers include: 
• Particularly when growing new crops, farmers face the risk of both market failure and 
production problems.  
• Agro-industrial firms may be unreliable or exploit a monopoly position. 
• The staff of an agro-industrial firm may be corrupt, particularly in the allocation of quotas. 
• Farmers may become indebted because of production problems and excessive advances. 
• Out-growers may be made dependent on the agro-industrial firm, after which exploitation can 
occur. 
• If production of the same crop is on the estate as well, first preference will be given to the 




2.2.1.2. Advantages to the agro-industrial firm 
 
The advantages include: 
• Out-grower system with small-scale farmers is more politically accepted than, for example, 
production on estates. 
• Working with small-scale farmers overcomes land constraints. 
• Purchase is more reliable and sustainable compared to an open-market purchase and the 
company faces less risk by not being responsible for production. 
• A strong business relation can be build up through the earlier mentioned services. 
• More consistent quality can be obtained compared to purchases made on the open market. 
•Significant quantities can be purchased. 
The problems faced by agro-industrial firm include: 
 •Contracted farmers may face land constraints due to lack of security tenure, thus 
jeopardizing sustainable long-term operations. This is especially a problem when organic 
production and certification is involved. 
 Social and cultural constraints may affect farmers‟ ability to produce to managers‟ 
specifications, e.g. in some communities it is not accepted to use pig manure on the 
fields. 
 Adequate research, staffing finance and management skills are required. Poor 
management and lack of consultation with farmers may lead to farmer discontent and 
results in a long and expensive learning process for the firm. 
 Farmers may sell outside the contract (extra-contractual marketing) there by reducing 
processing factory input. 
 Farmers may divert inputs supplied on credit to other purposes, thereby reducing yields. • 
Poor recovery rates and problems with defaulters. 




2.2.3. Land reform 
 
In the study, land reform is broadly viewed as the reconfigured land ownership structure that 
took place in the sugar estates when THZ and a few white farmers lost some sugarcane 
plantations to the government for the resettlement of black sugarcane farmers. Literally, land 
reform involves the changing of laws, regulations and customs regarding land ownership. It also 
refers to transfer of land ownership from the more powerful to the less powerful, for example, 
from a relatively small number of wealthy owners with extensive land holdings (for example, 
plantations, large cattle ranches, or agribusiness plots) to individual ownership by the landless or 
those who work the land (Cousins, 2010). Such transfers of ownership may be with or without 
compensation. Compensation for the land may vary from token amounts to the full value of the 
land acquired for redistribution (Moyo, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, land reform also entails the transfer of land from individual ownership-to 
government-owned collective farms. At times and in other places it may refer to the exact 
opposite-that is, the division of government-owned collective farms into smallholdings (Rukuni, 
2003). The common characteristic underling all land reforms, is the modification or replacement 
of existing institutional arrangements governing possession and use of land (Moyo, 2011). Thus, 
while land reform may be radical in nature, such as through large-scale transfers from one group 
to another, it can also be less dramatic, such as regulatory reforms aimed at improving land 
administration (Masiiwa and Chipungu, 2004).  
 
2.2.3. Agrarian reform 
 
Agrarian reforms, on the other hand, refer an overall redirection of the agrarian system of the 
country, which often includes land reform measures covering such aspects as credit facilities 
available to players, training workshops, provision of extension services, and so on. In this study 
these reforms refer changes in land sizes and tenure regimes as well as to operational changes 
that were put in place by the government to regulate the relations between THZ and the resettled 
black farmers. The core estate-out grower model between THZ and the resettled black farmers is 
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an arrangement between parties with conflicting motives hence the need to regularize issues 
input accessibility, utility provision as well as pricing and marketing dynamics for the benefit of 
all the stakeholders in the industry. Examples of other issues concerning agrarian reforms include 
such aspects as security of tenure for the beneficiaries of land reform, labour laws, which govern 
the operations of the beneficiaries and their farm workers. It also extends to cover other aspects 
as private-sector loans and support services as well as government support that is complementary 
to agriculture. 
 
Ben Cousins (2015:39) explains the difference between agrarian reform and land reform as 
follows: 
Land reform is concerned with rights in land, and their character, strength and distribution, while 
agrarian reform focuses not only on these but also a broader set of issues: the class character of 
the relations of production and distribution in farming and related enterprises, and how these 
connect to the wider class structure. It is thus concerned with economic and political power and 
the relations between them. 
 
Along similar lines, a 2003 World Bank (WB) report states that: 
A key precondition for land reform to be feasible and effective in improving beneficiaries' 
livelihoods is that such programs fit into a broader policy aimed at reducing poverty and 
establishing a favourable environment for the development of productive smallholder agriculture 
by beneficiaries. 
Nonetheless, any revision or reform of a country's land laws can still be an intensely political 
process, as reforming land policies serves to change relationships within and between 
communities, as well as between communities and the state. Thus, even small-scale land reforms 






2.3. Out grower schemes in Southern Africa 
 
Historically, sugar production in southern African has been associated with multinational firms 
such as Illovo, Tongaat Hulett in such countries as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia Malawi and 
Tanzania and Companhia de Sena in Mozambique. Alongside these large corporations were 
minority groups of local white sugarcane out growers who were later joined by the indigenous 
black population when the countries gained their independence. Out grower schemes were seen 
as a viable option to incorporate those initially marginalized sections of society into the lucrative 
commercial activity in a bid to redress the colonial imbalances. 
 
A small but growing number of studies on the sugar industry in Zimbabwe (Jackson and Cheater 
cited in Little and Watts, 1994; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996; Scoones et al.2010; Moyo, 2011) 
indicate increasing participation of black out growers in the sugar industry as the post 
independent state tried to address the colonial imbalance in the sector. In Zambia studies by 
Palerm et al., 2010; Richardson, 2010b; Kalinda and Chisanga, 2014 and Matenga, 2014 depict 
the sugar industry driven by a South African multinational corporation-Illovo-alongside a 
number of out grower schemes, as an employment generator to complement copper mining 
which has been the country‟s economic engine for decades. 
 
In Malawi the thrust has been to promote the cultivation of sugarcane by small farmers on a 
sustainable basis (Philips, 1999; Chasukwa, 2013). Sugarcane out grower or contract farming in 
Tanzania gained prominence after the structural adjustment programme in that country (Oya 
2012; Key and Runsten, 1999; Divern 1996; Schejtman, 1996 Sulle, 2014). As for South Africa 
and Swaziland their sugar industries have long been established by their large number of small-
scale sugarcane farmers on communal land and peculiarly private owned commercial estates 
(Bembridge, 1986; Cousins & Lahiff, 2005, p. 128; Eweg, Pillay, & Travailleur, 2009; SASA, 







The sugar industry in Zambia is largely private sector driven with Illovo Sugar Company of 
South Africa having a controlling stake alongside a myriad of out growers. Zambia is one of the 
world‟s lowest cost producers of sugar behind Malawi, Brazil, Swaziland and South Africa 
(Liberty International Consortium, 2011). Sugarcane is a high value agricultural crop with a 
significant contribution to the national economy in Zambia due to its multiple uses and is seen as 
a significant foreign exchange earner,  only second to the copper industry (Palerm et al., 2010; 
Richardson, 2010b; Kalinda and Chisanga, 2014. In a country with a very high unemployment 
rate, the sugar sub-sector is hailed as a major formal ,wage employment generator in the country 
offering around 11 000 jobs  with a total number of dependents exceeding 75 000 (Palerm et al., 
2010). 
 
Zambia‟s development objectives prioritized the commercialization of smallholder sugar sector 
throughout grower schemes as a way to integrate the majority of the poor in rural areas in the 
national economy (Matenga 2014). Contract farming particularly the nucleus estate –out grower 
model has been implemented in the sugarcane growing district of Mazabuka. In its quest to 
integrate smallholder sugarcane growers into the commercial value chain, the Zambian 
Government scaled up the nucleus estate-out grower in the country‟s ten provinces.  
 
Despite the above strides in the development of Zambia‟s sugar industry the potential to deliver 
rural development has been perverted as the major player in the industry –Zambia Sugar- 
controlled by Illovo Sugar Company continued to pile excessive economic concessions from the 
government under the Investor Promotion and Protection Act [IPPA] (Benson2010). The Act 
allowed Illovo to import machinery without paying duties and to access finance at reduced 
prices. This culminated in limiting benefits to the public purse thus compromising the operations 
of out grower schemes which also benefited from the purse in the form infrastructural provision. 
 
In addition to securing IPPA Illovo has also been able to reduce its national and local tax burden 
(Benson 2010; Matenga, 2014).  In 2009 the Zambian state allowed Zambia Sugar to be 
reclassified from an industrial enterprise into an agricultural undertaking with a view to reduce 
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its corporate tax. Furthermore at the end of the same year Zambia Sugar also benefitted from the 
decision by the Zambian President Rupiah Banda to scrap-off the crop levy to both commercial 
and smallholder farmers (Matenga, 2014). 
 
Above the developments cited above, a striking inability by the Zambian government to control 
the influence of monopolies has been evident. According to Benson (2010) Illovo used its 
leverage as a valued customer among Zambia‟s dominant banks to prevent the emergence large-
scale domestic rivals by urging the banks to withhold finance to them.  
 
From the foregoing, the nucleus estate-out grower model undertaken by Zambia Sugar is overly 
concerned with maximization of corporate profits as opposed to improving the livelihoods of 
thousands of out growers located on the outskirts of its sugar estates. While favoured for 
generating increased yields, irrigation-based sugarcane cultivation fails to absorb the mass of 
poor smallholders who are in desperate need to improve their livelihoods. For all intent and 
purposes, sugarcane production involves a very limited number of smallholders due to expensive 
capital outlays and irrigation technologies. 
 
While the Zambian out grower system appears to be locally empowering the participating out 
grower communities based on the increment of income indicator, the power to control the out 
grower schemes lies with the contacting agribusiness firm-Zambia Sugar (Matenga, 2014). 
According to Matenga decision-making on benefit sharing is still a top-down process with the 
out grower schemes‟ activities externally driven. The out growers are simply informed on what 
will happen and how it will happen they are never at all empowered. 
 
The extent of out grower/contracting farming schemes in Zambia varies according to types of 
crops being grown. Smallholders out grower schemes are concentrated in more favourable 
regions with road and rail infrastructure and electricity (Siegel, 2008; World Bank, 2007). Cotton 
tobacco and paprika are nearly 100 percent produced through the out grower system in Zambia 
(Tschirley et al, 2009 while on the other hand, 40 percent is grown through smallholder out 






Like in Zambia, Illovo Sugar Company is the dominant sugar player alongside numerous black 
out growers.  Following the launch of the Green Belt Initiative (GBI) in 2010 by the Malawi 
Government, the country embarked on a massive sugar production expansion drive to ensure 
food security. While the sugarcane expansion drive was formally justified as a means of 
promoting the livelihoods of the small holder farmers in the beneficiary areas as well as bringing 
about development in those areas, the major drive was the desire to find a replacement of 
tobacco as a principal foreign currency earner. 
 
The out grower model of sugar cultivation in Malawi is directly linked to the privatization of the 
Smallholder Sugar Authority in 1999 as  a strategy to promote the cultivation of sugarcane by 
smallholder farmers on a sustainable commercial basis (Philips 2009).  Incorporating local 
communities „socializes‟ sugarcane growing as the economic benefits of this lucrative activity 
became widely spread to the society. 
 
Instead of bailing the country out of a foreign currency crisis predicament, the implementation of 
the sugar expansion drive, has totally disenfranchised the smallholder farmer whose land has 
been taken away through deceptive strategies. Chasukwa (2013) argues that the out grower 
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challenges associated with outright acquisition of land. The contracting companies access land 
by entering into contracts with smallholder farmers that bind these farmers to cultivate 
sugarcane. Under the contract the smallholder farmers can only sell their sugarcane to the 
contracting companies. In return, the contracting companies support the smallholder farmers 
both financially and technically. This arrangement enables the management companies to entice 
the smallholder farmers to commit their land to sugar cultivation by securing long-term supply 
contracts with the contracting sugar company, which would have been almost impossible if they 
attempted outright land acquisition (Philips 2009). 
 
In the majority of cases smallholder farmers are not getting much from their sugarcane 
cultivation due to manipulative and exploitative tendencies of contracting sugar companies. 
 36 
 
Chasukwa (2013) further points out that some smallholder farmers are coerced into supporting 
expensive lifestyles of the executives of contracting firms through exorbitant charges prompting 
that the promises of transformative and sustainable rural development are a mere rhetoric. 
 
Although the Malawian sugar out grower model does not involve outright acquisition of large 
tracts of land by contracting sugar companies, it clearly has all the signs of land grabbing. 
Although the land is not registered in the name of the contracting sugar companies, they 
nonetheless, have full access and control over the same. It can in fact be argued that the out 
grower model is more than just a land grabbing mechanism. In addition to the land, this model 
allows the contracting sugar company to also grab all business opportunities associated with 
sugarcane cultivation such as the selling of inputs, provision of farm labour, sugarcane haulage, 




In Tanzania, the main sugar producer, Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (KSCL) started with 
donor funding in 1962. The company was nationalized in 1967 and subsequently privatized in 
1998 (Sulle, 2014). Today KSCL is owned by Illovo Sugar Company of South Africa, ED&F 
Man and the Tanzanian government, with Illovo having the controlling stake. The company has 
sugarcane plantations of its own and also receives sugarcane for processing and marketing from 
approximately 8 000 out growers who produce sugarcane on unirrigated plots within a radius of 
60 kilometres (ibid). According to Sulle (2014), out growers supply 43% of the cane crushed at 
KSCL‟s two sugar mills. These out growers range from communal smallholder out growers 
cultivating less than one acre to a handful of large private estates (ibid). KSCL pays out growers 
for the weight and sucrose content of their delivered cane, minus the cost harvesting, transport, 
processing, marketing and distribution. 
 
The cultivation of sugarcane in Tanzania was commercialized by the Indians in the Kilombero 
Valley in the 1920s (Baum, 1968). The Indians introduced better cane varieties, cultivated them 
on plantations and manufactured brown sugar. Since then local farmers planted the new varieties 
next to the old ones in their garden plots but hardly any smallholders took advantage of the 
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opportunity of planting more sugarcane than was needed by the household and of selling it to the 
Indians. 
 
Sulle (2014) points out that the drastic reconfiguration of production and ownership structure of 
the Tanzanian sugar industry should be understood in the context of life after the structural 
adjustment programme in the late 1990s.  This culminated in the mobilization of a large number 
of out growers and decentralization of services to out grower associations.  According to Sulle 
the investments of private capital into KSCL since 1998 invigorated sugar production in the area 
increasing the area under cane and the number  of out growers resulting in more associations of  
cane growers being formed and  more business being generated more opportunities for local 
business being availed.  All these have led to increased income from sugarcane farming hence 
improved living standards for some.  In some cases some out grower have reinvested in 
businesses and some villages have benefited from the benefits of spillover effects in terms of 
collective farms. And while the number of employees in the sugar industry was reduced after 
privatization spillover effects in terms technology transfer appear to be limited, there have been 
positive economic linkages through the growth of ancillary businesses and out growers hiring 
farm labour. 
 
On the other hand, the changes since privatization have contributed to land scarcity both in 
absolute terms of the land available for food crops (ibid). This scarcity has been created not by 
the acquisition of land for estate production but mostly buy the expansion of out grower areas 
and the rising demand for land by migrants.  As land is becoming scarce and sugarcane 
profitability declining, and influential actors in the system are alleged to be resorting to bribery, 
poor and newcomer households are finding it difficult to participate in the sugar industry. The 
KSCL has raised questions as to what form out grower schemes should take and how to make it 
socially inclusive and manage contradictions within the model. These are a microcosm of the 
broader debates about appropriate roles for states, the market, the private sector and producer 
organizations in the era of globalization as well as about the position for the small-scale farmers. 
The Tanzanian sugar brings these debates alive as it illustrates both potential benefits (increased 
access to credit, technology and markets) and shortfalls (poor wages, decreased land for other 
crops) of out grower schemes (Key and Rustern, 1999; Polton et al, 2010; Smalley, 2013). 
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2.3.4. South Africa 
 
Sugar represents one of South Africa‟s most prominent agro-industries (Dubb, 2013). Located 
primarily in the province of KwaZulu-Natal but stretching into Mpumalanga, the R12 billion 
industry is the sixth largest agricultural sub-sector, accounting alone for between 0.6% and 0.7% 
of the national Gross Domestic Product, and 79,000 direct jobs and indirectly supports an 
estimated 350,000 jobs (SASA, 2012, p.4; Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 
2010, p. 1). The sugar industry in South Africa generally attributes its achievement in fostering 
small-scale production to its provision of a range of financial and agronomic support services. 
One core distinguishing feature of the South African agro-industries sugar industry is that unlike 
the bulk of its sector that underwent an aggressive process of liberalization in the 1990s, the 
South African sugar industry remained subject of statutory self-regulation under the Sugar Act of 
1978 and enjoyed a protective tariff.  
 
The sugar industry also stands out in the composition of its sugarcane supply base and 
contributions to land reform. While government has struggled to meet its market-based land 
reform target of transferring 30% of white agricultural land to black South Africans, the sugar 
industry has proactively facilitated the transfer of 21% of land under cane, proportionately far 
ahead of the government‟s general transfer of around 8% to date (SASA, 2012, p. 5; Kleinbooi, 
2011, p. 1). Yet perhaps most remarkable is that, of the industry‟s 27,036 sugarcane growers, 
25,200 are accounted for by small-scale sugarcane growers farming predominantly under 
customary tenure in South Africa‟s former Bantustans.  
 
Though accounting for only about 9.31% of overall cane supply, the integration of small black 
farmers into the circuits of „formal‟ agro-commodity markets remains a fairly uncommon 
phenomenon in South Africa, with landed production in customary areas typically characterized 
as being limited to subsistence or „informal‟ markets. Although the economic contribution of 
crop and livestock production and sale in South Africa‟s customary areas is regarded by many to 
be chronically underrepresented in many aggregate measures, the approximate R1.21 billion per 
annum generated in small-scale sugarcane production is considerable (SASA, 2012, p. 17; 
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Cousins & Lahiff, 2005, p. 128; Bembridge, 1986, pp. 24-9; Eweg, Pillay, & Travailleur, 2009, 
p. 371; Alcock, 2013). 3  
 
South Africa‟s sugar industry has long been established by its large number of small-scale 
sugarcane farmers on communal land and peculiarly private owned commercial estates 
(Dubb2015).According to Dubb the number of   small scale sugarcane growers has declined over 
the years due to long-term drought. With this development, the sugar industry cited widespread 
fraud; default and writing off of millions of rands in unrecovered loans to smallholder farmers as 
having caused closure to the much lauded credit scheme and shifted the emphasis of its support 
to large and medium scale 
 
From the above cases it has been observed that contract farming is an agreement between 
unequal parties: contracting firms in the form of individual entrepreneurs, corporate or 
government bodies on the one hand and economically weaker farmers on the other. The model is 
synonymous with expanding agribusiness in the era of globalization and market liberalization 
trends introduced by the International Monetary Fund‟s structural adjustment programmes. This 
farming arrangement has not been without problems as parties to the contract try to manipulate 
each other. Sometimes the contracting firm may exploit their monopoly position by offering 
lower prices to the out grower knowing that there are no other takers of the produce. Also if the 
staff of the contacting firm is corrupt, the allocation of quotas may be given to those out growers 
who pay kickbacks to the staff.  
 
Out-growers may be made dependent on the contracting firm, after which exploitation can occur 
and a result the out growers may become indebted in the event of excessive advances. If 
production of the same crop is done by the contracting firm as well, first preference will be given 
to the contracting firm‟s produce resulting in late buying and transportation of the out grower‟s 
produce.  
2.4. The inception of the sugar industry in Zimbabwe 
 
Although the sugar industry started late in this country, it rapidly developed over the years into 
an agro-industrial concern it is today. According to Scoones et al. (2010) by 2010 the sugar 
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industry employed approximately 15000 people. The south eastern region in which Zimbabwe‟s 
sugar estates are located is characterized by very low rainfall and high temperatures. Colonial 
settlers considered the region as both inhospitable and devoid of any economic potential because 
of the arid nature of the area (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). Until whites settled in the Chiredzi 
District, the area was inhabited by indigenous people: mostly the Shona, the Bahlengwe and 
Shangaan people (Saunders, 1980; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). The latter were the descendants 
of Soshangane who migrated from Zululand in the early 19
th
 century as part of the massive South 
African outward migration known as Mfecane (ibid). 
 
These people‟s major economic activities included hunting, cattle rearing and trading in such 
commodities as salt, dried fish, palm wine and clay pots (Saunders, 1980). The colonial settlers 
established a number of cattle ranches in the area until Thomas Murray MacDougal successfully 
experimented with sugar cultivation at Triangle in the 1920s (Saunders, 1980; Mlambo and 
Pangeti, 1996). It was only after that development that the colonial society turned full attention 
towards the region and began to exploit the area‟s potential for sugarcane cultivation and other 
economic advantages. The successful sugarcane experiment at Triangle led to the subsequent 
opening of Hippo Valley in 1954 and Mkwasine in 1968 respectively (ibid). 
2.4.1. Triangle Estate (1920s) 
 
Triangle Sugar Estate was founded in 1919 by Tom Murray MacDougall as a cattle ranch but a 
severe downturn in the economy during the post-World War 1 recession forced him into crop 
production in the late 1920s(Mlambo and Pangeti 1996). The economic recession which had 
resulted into a decline of cattle prices compelled MacDougal and his partner Spraggen, to 
abandon their cattle ranching venture by selling off most of their herd and tried their hand at crop 
cultivation. Before they embarked on this successfully, they needed to find a way of harnessing 
the waters of the nearby rivers for irrigation since rainfall levels were too low to sustain crop 
farming hence the diversion of water from Mutirikwi River into Jatala Weir where it was later 




The main crop initially cultivated in the estate was wheat and by 1934 eighteen hectares of 
sugarcane were under irrigation in the estate culminating in the opening of the first sugar-
processing mill in Zimbabwe on the estate on 11 September 1937 (Saunders, 1980).From these 
humble beginnings, Triangle expanded into the 1940s when the financial burden of running the 
estate by MacDougal proved too much for one man (Mlambo and Pangeti 1996). The then 
colonial government of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) which had lent a lot of money to 
MacDougal for his sugar project took over Triangle Estate in 1944 and put it under the Sugar 
Industry Board enacted by the Sugar Industry Act of 1944 (Saunders, 1980). After a decade of 
ownership and control of Triangle Estate, the government became fully convinced that the sugar 
industry could best be developed through private initiative hence selling it to the Natal Syndicate 
of South Africa in 1954 (ibid). 
2.4.2. Hippo Valley Estates (1956) 
 
Hippo Valley was first established as a citrus estate by Raymond Stockil in 1956 (Mlambo and 
Pangeti, 1996). Most of the citrus trees planted were uprooted in the 1970s when the company 
lost most of its market due to the United Nations sanctions imposed on Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) after it had unilaterally declared independence from Britain.. Raymond who was the 
former leader of the Dominion Party (DP) in the then Rhodesia had given up politics to 
concentrate on farming. Together with six other white farmers, they formed Hippo Valley 
Estates Limited. The company soon diversified into other crops like wheat and cotton and the 
first sugarcane crop was planted three years later in 1959. In 1960, Stockil went to Mauritius to 
purchase a sugar mill which arrived at Hippo Valley in 1961. From Mauritius, he brought 
Mauritian sugar farmers to help him develop Hippo Valley into a major sugarcane producer. 
These Mauritian farmers later bought shares in the company and in 1963, Hippo Valley 
embarked on an expansion program designed to increase sugar production on the estates. 
 
The expansion saw Hippo Valley borrowing money from overseas and selling some of its shares 
in 1964 (ibid). Anglo American Corporation and Tate and Lyle limited bought 40% and 10% of 
the shares respectively with the latter selling its shares to various Rhodesian financial institutions 
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and pension funds (ibid). This soon transformed Hippo Valley into a sugar growing giant which 
by the early 1980s had one of the most efficient sugar processing mills in Southern Africa 
(Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2015). 
2.4.3. Mkwasine Estate (1968) 
 
Mkwasine Estate started as the Nandi Estates around the same time as Hippo Valley but was 
owned by a partnership which included some Mauritians. According to Mlambo and Pangeti, 
(1996) Nandi Estates initially belonged to Essanby Ranch which was owned by Stanley Stockil-a 
brother to Raymond Stockil. Stanley sold the land to his brother Raymond due to financial 
problems that had befallen him. Raymond in turn sold the estate to the Nandi partnership. 
  
The Nandi venture was later plagued by financial problems and was taken over by a government 
parastatal in 1965-the Sabi (now Save) Limpopo Authority (SLA).The SLA had emerged out of 
the recommendations of the Sabi Development Committee (SDC) which was set up by the 
colonial government to investigate the irrigation potential of the south eastern Lowveld of 
Zimbabwe (ibid). The committee recommended that for irrigation in the area to be undertaken on 
a substantial scale it required a big financial risk on the part of the government. 
 
The committee recommended the establishment of the Sabi Valley Authority to be modeled after 
the Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) created in the United States in the 1930s. The authority 
would plan, coordinate and administer all development in the Sabi Area, maintain and operate 
the main water works, control cropping systems and carry out research into various crops. In 
1965 the colonial government enacted the Save Limpopo Authority Act (SLA).The board of 
directors of the SLA was mandated to ensure investment and development in the Lowveld 
(ibid).The Act also empowered the SLA to exploit, conserve and utilize the water resources of 
the area with the aim of promoting its economic development in the national interest and also to 
promote, establish, operate and coordinate undertakings for the economic and social 
development of the area. 
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Irrigation was the major focus of the Lowveld development. As such, one of SLA‟s major 
responsibilities was in civil engineering; identifying possible dam sites, conducting basic surveys 
and carrying out site exploration works and canal alignment. To facilitate this role to the 
Authority, the Ministry of Water Development of the colonial government transferred the 
ownership and operation of Kyle Dam( now Mutirikwi-completed in 1961), Bangala Dam ( 
completed in 1963) and Manjerenje Dam (completed in1966), as well as the Chikwerengwe Weir 
and the main water distribution canals to SLA. 
 
To run the estate which was later named Mkwasine the SLA created a subsidiary, the South 
Eastern Development Company (later known as the Mkwasine Division). The division was 
meant to utilize water from Manjerenje Dam. Mkwasine Estate was first used to grow wheat to 
supply the country which was facing a wheat shortage as a result of the sanctions. Wheat was 
rotated with cotton, ground nuts, maize and rice. Since the SLA was meant to demonstrate the 
viability of the Mkwasine project, the estate was later sold to private enterprise as part of 
government policy to involve private players in the estate. 
 
As was the policy with Triangle and Hippo Valley, the settlement of private landholders was part 
of the Mkwasine scheme. As a result 40 percent of the irrigation water from Manjerenje Dam 
was earmarked for the use of these landholders who were popularly referred toas „settlers‟. The 
first eight white settlers were allocated land in 1971 in Mkwasine, each settler receiving 300 
acres (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). When the SLA felt that it had proved the viability of the 
wheat scheme at Mkwasine it sold the estate to a private enterprise. Mkwasine Estate was sold to 
Triangle and Hippo Valley in a 50-50 partnership (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2015). The two 
sugar estates intended to grow sugarcane at Mkwasine but had initially to shelve the idea due to 
lack of sufficient markets because of UN sanctions and the sharp fall in the world sugar price. 




The conversion from wheat and cotton to sugarcane production began in 1976 (Mlambo and 
Pangeti, 1996) and was accompanied by a change from overhead to flood irrigation as well as the 
extension of the railway from Nandi Siding to Mkwasine Estate to facilitate the transportation of 
sugarcane to the mills at Triangle and Hippo Valley. The two companies started growing 
sugarcane at Mkwasine in 1980 using seed cane from Hippo Valley. In 1980 at Zimbabwe‟s 
independence the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme was started to settle black sugarcane farmers on 
10 hectare plots. This was premised on two considerations; firstly as part of the obligation to use 
40 percent of the available irrigation water to private landholders and secondly; as part of the 
newly independent state of Zimbabwe to involve black farmers in those economic activities that 
were exclusively white under colonial governments. 
2.5. The inception of the out grower scheme in the sugar estates 
 
When the Natal Syndicate (NS) of South Africa bought Triangle Estate from the government .in 
1954 it proposed to set up a settlement scheme on the estate involving the immigration of young 
white farmers from Natal in South Africa who would supply the bulk of sugarcane processed by 
the syndicate at Triangle Estate (Saunders, 1980). The „syndicate‟s proposal coincided with a 
motion that was earlier mooted in the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia in 1944 advocating for a 
„post war settlement scheme‟ in Triangle for white veterans of World War Two (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1957). 
 
The first group of out growers to benefit from the proposition by the Natal Syndicate comprised 
of South African whites who were resettled in Triangle in 1955. They were allocated 150 acres 
of land each by the „Syndicate‟ (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). They had title to the land they were 
farming but were linked to Triangle sugar mill. As more out growers were incorporated into the 
estate, the NS narrowed their sugarcane growing operations and focused more on sugar 
processing and marketing by virtue of owning a processing plant. That development left the bulk 
of sugarcane production to out growers around Triangle sugarcane plantations hence the birth of 




From Triangle the out grower scheme spread to Hippo Valley in 1955 where eight white farmers 
were allocated 100 hectares each on a pilot scheme. Likewise these farmers were linked to the 
Hippo Valley processing mill. In 1964 a further thirty nine (39) more farms of 100 hectares each 
were offered to white farmers (ibid) in the estate. In Mkwasine Estate, it was only in 1971 that 
the first eight out grower farms of 100 hectares each were introduced. Since Mkwasine Estate 
which is 50 and 70 kilometres from Hippo Valley and Triangle respectively has no sugarcane 
processing mill, its sugarcane was transported to the processing mills by either road or rail for 
processing and marketing. 
 
2.6. Legislation of the out grower model in the sugar estates 
 
The core estate-out grower model thus established in 1954 in Triangle was later formalized by 
the Hippo Valley Act (HVA) of 1957 and the Sugar Control Act (SCA) of 1962. In addition to 
these two pieces of legislation; the Government of Southern Rhodesia went further to stipulate 
that part of the land and irrigation water for each estate had to be set aside for a settlement 
scheme for private landholders in the three estates (Saunders, 1980). 
  
2.6.1. The Hippo Valley Act (1957) 
 
This was the first piece of legislation to regularize the out grower scheme in the three sugar 
estates. It regulated all the operations of out growers and core estates in the region. The Act 
empowered the core estates to: 
 Consider prospective out growers on the estates 
 Determine the number of out growers on each estate. 
 Allocate the half of the total water made available to it from the major irrigation works to 
the out growers. 
 Provide housing, educational, medical and financial facilities to the out growers. 
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 Prescribe to the out growers the agricultural crops and the minimum areas to be devoted 
to each crop. 
  determine the basic terms and conditions under which the out growers were to occupy 
the holding; and 
 Regulate the handling, marketing and processing of the out growers‟ main products. 
The above provisions gave the core estates a lot of leverage over the out growers. Being given 
the power to determine the prospective out growers including the number that could be 
accommodated in each estate allowed the core estates to influence the operations of the out 
growers in one way or the other. Experience in sugarcane growing and financial capacity as pre-
conditions for would-be beneficiaries of sugarcane farms automatically excluded black farmers 
as they did not have the requisite experience nor the collateral security to access loans from 
banks. 
 
The beneficiaries of the farms in the sugar estates were required to sign an agreement which 
enabled them to receive bank guarantees from the core estate in which they were operating in the 
event of borrowing. These out growers were also required to adhere to planting and harvesting 
schedules set by the core estates as well as to the sugarcane cultivars they were supposed to 
grow. The core sugar estates also distributed irrigation water to the out growers, provided 
extension support as well as credit facilities in some cases. 
 
2.6.2. The Sugar Production Control Act 
 
A sequel to The Hippo Valley Act of 1957 was the Sugar Production Control Act of 1962. This 
Act further entrenched the core estates‟ control over the operations of the out growers. It addition 
to upholding all the provisions of the Hippo Valley Act , it further empowered the core estates to 
determine the out growers‟ annual quota to be delivered to the processing plants, calculated on 
the basis of the company‟s ability to export sugar. One of the provisions of this Act was the 
milling agreement clause which stipulated that out growers get 40% of the value of their 
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sugarcane processed at the core estates‟ processing plants, thus giving 60% to the core estates 
which owned the processing mills. 
 
Hullet and Sons of South Africa, which later bought Triangle from the Natal Syndicate of South 
Africa in 1957 agreed to accommodate the three out growers who had been incorporated by the 
Syndicate. The firm did not, however, entertain the idea of accepting more out growers in the 
estate (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). When Tongaat took over from Hullets in 1962, six more out 
growers were taken in Triangle in the 1963/64 period. 
 
The unequal power relations legalized by the above two statutes caused significant disquiet 
between the out growers and the core estates culminating in the formation of the Rhodesian Cane 
Planters Association in 1962 to negotiate milling agreements with the core estates. However 
some of the provisions of these colonial pieces of legislation spilled into post-independent 
Zimbabwe. 
 
2.6.2.1. The Mpapa Settlement Scheme in Triangle 
 
Eight years after Zimbabwe‟s independence, Triangle Estate introduced the Mpapa Settlement 
Scheme (MSS) in 1988, for its former employees. The beneficiaries of this scheme needed to 
show a proven record of sugarcane farming and management skills. This privately initiated 
scheme was not part of the government‟s redistributive thrust but one of THZ‟s efforts to reward 
top management personnel who had served the company loyally for a long period of time. The 
MSS culminated in only nine former managers being allocated 30 hectares each which was three 
times bigger than what the Chipiwa farmers in Mkwasine got. Under the MSS, these farmers 
were assisted financially by Triangle to procure agricultural inputs and start operations as well as 
harvesting their sugarcane (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). Triangle also expected the farmers to 
cooperate with each other in the cutting of their cane and offered milling and marketing services 
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to the farmers. The farmers were promised freehold title to their farms once they finished 
repaying their loans to Triangle. 
 
2.7.  Out grower schemes as a rural development strategy 
 
While many reasons for the sugarcane out grower scheme in southern Africa have been evoked 
such as redressing the racial imbalance and economic empowerment for the initially 
disadvantaged black people, it is the purported link to rural development which is central in this 
study. In attracting foreign investment into their domestic sugarcane industries, it is hoped that 
the governments of southern Africa would increase their agro exports culminating in economic 
growth and poverty reduction in the region. Benson (2010) argues that the sugar and ethanol 
exports would facilitate rural development in the region as business growth is enhanced. 
Earnings from exports improve the country‟s balance of payment. And, last of all government 
revenue in the form of corporation tax, income tax, and tariffs levied on industry imports would 
all increase, thereby allowing further state investment in public goods such as transport 
infrastructure, health and education. Following on from this foreign investment bring with it 
managerial and technical expertise that help to increase labour productivity and lower the cost of 
agricultural products (ibid).  
 
Traditionally, rural development  centred on the exploitation of land-intensive natural resources 
such as agriculture and forestry (http://www.geo.mtu.edu) but over the years, the need by rural 
communities to approach development from a wider perspective has focused more on a broad 
range of development goals rather than merely agricultural or natural resource extraction 
activities. The proposition that small-scale land investments are potential catalysts for 
transformative and sustainable rural development can only be attractive hence the out grower 
strategy. Education, entrepreneurship, physical and social infrastructure are all considered 
important role in the rural development discourse. 
 
Despite the centrality of rural development to the land reform thrust in post-independent Africa, 
empirical academic analysis on the land reform initiative and its influence of on the improvement 
of the quality of life and economic well-being of people among agrarian communities 
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particularly in the sugar sector has been thin on the ground hence this article. As such 
SADC1996, Lamy, 2008 as cited in Benson (2010) point out that many policy-makers are 
advocating for  sub-Saharan Africa to be integrated into the world economy if it is to attain 
higher economic growth and allow its poor to move out of poverty. To this end the opportunities 
afforded in sugar out grower schemes in southern Africa could be seen as a means to diversify 
the economy, transfer technology across the agricultural sector and bring prosperity to some of 
the poorest in the region. The purpose of the next section is to suggest ways this vision will be 
brought to fruition. 
 
2.8. Beyond the out grower partnership with the core estates 
 
As has been established by the above discussion there has always been inter-dependence 
between the core estates and the out growers since the colonial times. Although the core estates 
provided an assured market for the out growers by processing and marketing their sugarcane the 
operating relations were skewed in their favour thereby undermining the socio-economic 
integrity of the out growers. The provision of extension as well as technical related services to 
the out growers compromised the out growers‟ autonomy in decision making. In the majority of 
cases the out growers were expected to operate in accordance to the standards quantity and 
quality as prescribed core estates. That operating environment spilled into the post-independence 
land reforms in the estates. 
Although the white farmers in this study differ from those resettled after independence, the 
implications on the socio-economic well-being of both groups of farmers are predominantly the 
same. The scale of contract farming was very low in the colonial era and confined to a particular 
racial group. This means that we cannot ascertain its full impact on the black communities who 
were totally excluded except to provide labour to the core estates and white farmers around them. 
Despite empirical findings by Saunders (1980) and Mlambo and Pangeti (1996) that the white 
farmers were linked to the core estates in return for extension and some inputs some studies have 
established a myriad of motivations behind contracting out (Masakure and Henson, 2005). 
Changes in prevailing market conditions produce a situation where the lack of affordable inputs 
is almost the sole factor driving small farmers into contract farming arrangements. 
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 This leads to the first of the two major concerns that potentially have important ramifications for 
smallholder farmers in commercial sugarcane farming in the sugar estates-exploitation. The 
white out growers in the colonial often complained about unequal power relations with core 
estates as was provided for by the law hence the formation of the sugarcane planters association 
in 1962 to lobby the interests of the out growers. The main aim of the association was to 
negotiate milling agreements with the core estates. When the settlement started in the colonial 
era the arrangement was that the core estates who owned the processing mills and the sugarcane 
out growers would receive 40 % and 60% respectively from the value of the out growers‟ 
sugarcane processed at the core estates‟ mills. Through constant engagement through the 
Division of Proceeds Committee by the out growers the new ratio was pegged at 28-72 % as of 
1993 (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2015).Some studies carried elsewhere. (SNV, 2007; James, 
2015) indicate companies failing to provide the inputs promised to the farmers or that the inputs 
are delivered late in the season. According the findings, sometimes the quality of the inputs is 
also sub-standard, for example, many farmers complain that the agro-chemicals they receive 
would be out of date. Following the harvest some contractors also fail to collect the produce, 
leaving it to rot or collecting it later when the quality is not as good. This, along with arbitrary 
changes to quality parameters and suspect grading, means that prices paid to farmers  are often 
much lower than expected. 
 
On the other hand, contract companies also complain about input diversion, side-marketing and 
side-harvesting by small farmers (SNV, 2007). However, while the former have the power to 
withdraw contracts, for the latter there is very little recourse in the event that private contractors 
break the terms of the contract. As Dzingirai (2003) asserts, small farmers tend to be unorganised 
and their grievances are often ignored because the terms of agricultural contracts are heavily 
weighted in favour of large agri-businesses. He writes: 
 
While acknowledging the inevitability of risk in growing perishable crops, the contracts 
are vague, if not silent, about what the role of the company should be in the event of 
problems arising. Thus the contracts do not commit the company to compensate the 
farmer when a proffered crop variety fails under severe or unfamiliar weather conditions 




The exploitative nature of some contracts can therefore lead to increased indebtedness, 
dispossession and the loss of wealth. The loss of agricultural tools and equipment, which can be 
expensive and are not easily replaced, both undermines the ability of the farmer to meet the 
terms of any future contract and the family‟s ability to manage the land through well-timed 
tillage. 
 
The second concern is related to the exclusion from participation of some sections of society in 
this very important economic activity. While in the colonial era the exclusion of black farmers 
was determined by race, in post-colonial Zimbabwe it is based on class. The capital intensive 
nature of sugar production has made it difficult ordinary people to enter the sugar hence the elite 
from the civil and military services benefitting in the aftermath of land reform. 
 
During the colonial period sugarcane contracts and other crops of better agro-economic potential 
marginalised black households that were confined to poor and drier natural regions. If contract 
farming does indeed lead to higher incomes as some case studies suggest, for example some 
tobacco farmers resettled under land reform in Zimbabwe would testify that it does–then there is 
a clear risk of exacerbating local and regional patterns of social differentiation within and 
between rural communities in Zimbabwe. In Malawi, for example, Peters (2006) has shown that, 
during the 1990s, small-scale tobacco farmers saw their income rise by some 72 per cent, while 
at the same time the gap between families in the top and bottom income quartiles increased 
significantly as a result. We may already be seeing similar developments in the south eastern 
Lowveld with the possible emergence of a new class of black commercial farmers in the sugar 
estates. The question is not whether this should be allowed to happen, but how the benefits from 
sugarcane farming can be more evenly distributed. 
 
On the whole from its inception from the 1920s to 1979, the sugar industry has contributed 
significantly to the national economy. The industry has become a major employer of skilled and 
unskilled labour in both cane fields and ancillary activities. In 2015 the two major sugarcane 
growing estates of Triangle and Hippo Valley were employing 7 500 and 6 000 people 
respectively (Tongaat-Hulett Sugar report, 2015). Together with the population of Mkwasine 
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Sugar Estate‟s out growers and their employees‟ dependants the total population supported by 
the three estates amount to approximately 120 000. In addition, through its various processing 
and diversification activities, the sugar industry is also producing a wide variety of both 
intermediate and finished products for the local market. Among its by-products are ethanol, 
industrial and potable alcohol, stock feeds, carbon dioxide, electricity and many other products. 
 
While the out grower scheme in the sugar estates in the colonial era largely appeared attractive to 
outsiders and enabled the white farmers access to inputs and higher income it contributed to their 
manipulation in milling quotas and agreements by the core estates. In light of this the 
Government‟ of Zimbabwe‟s Agricultural Investment Plan after independence has recognised the 
need for certain protection in as far as contract farming is concerned; 
 
“In order to ensure the continued growth of contract farming, an appropriate legal and institutional 
framework is needed to minimize violation of contractual obligations” (GoZ, 2013, p. 32).  
 
Still, this leaves unchallenged the premise that the “continued growth of contract farming” is, in 
fact, the best option (Dzingirai, 2003). In addition to legal and institutional frameworks imposed 
by government, Dzingirai asserts that small farmers need to get organised and form alliances 
with other community organisations, including NGOs, in order to insist on clearly written 




The chapter explored the evolution of the sugar industry in Zimbabwe as well as the inception of 
the nucleus estate-out grower scheme in the three sugar estates in the colonial era. The chapter 
established that the sugar industry started as a sole initiative by Murray MacDougal in Triangle 
Estate. When the financial burden of running the estate became too much for him he lost 
ownership and control of the estate to the government of the day which lent him a lot of money. 
After a ten year stint of mixed fortunes in Triangle comprising losses due to droughts and 
diseases on one hand and profits on the other, the government felt convinced that sugar 
production in the country could best be developed through private initiative. On its part it had 
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demonstrated that sugar production could be carried out in the Lowveld and had invested heavily 
in water and transport infrastructure. 
 
The decision witnessed Triangle being sold to the Natal Syndicate of South Africa in 1954 hence 
the birth of the out grower model that have existed up to this day. The out growers were linked to 
the core estate‟s processing mill. From Triangle the out grower scheme spread to Hippo Valley 
in 1959 and then Mkwasine in 1971. Colonial legislation such as the Hippo Valley Agreement of 
1957 and the Sugar Control Act of 1962 formalized the out grower arrangement in the three 
estates. The provisions of these colonial statutes empowered the core estates to consider 
prospective out growers and also to determine the number of the out growers to be 
accommodated in each estate 
 
Also the chapter established the out grower model or contract farming entails contractual 
arrangements whether oral or written, between farmers and processing firms, specifying one or 
more conditions of production and/or marketing of an agricultural product. This agricultural 
model has been polarized in two schools of thought with one school portraying it as pro-poor 
strategy of incorporating  small-scale farmers into agribusiness on one hand and the other school 
portraying the model as oppressive and exploitative hence the merits and demerits the model as 
discussed in that chapter. 
 
While the chapter portrayed the out grower scheme in the sugar estates in the colonial era as 
largely attractive as it availed large tracts of land to white farmers as well as access to loans from 
financial institutions the chapter downplayed the manipulation by the core estates in milling 
quotas and agreements which leaves unchallenged the premise of out grower schemes or contract 
farming as a viable option of spreading the economic benefits to a wider section of the society. In 
addition to legal and institutional frameworks imposed by government, the chapter also asserted 
that small farmers need to get organised and form alliances with other community organisations, 
including NGOs, in order to insist on clearly written contracts and increase their bargaining 




While the discussion presented in this chapter points to the exclusiveness of the commercial 
sugarcane farming as a white economic activity it is unequivocal also on the risks that these 
farmers faced in their operations. There are concerns of increased indebtedness, dispossession 
and income inequality among the white farming community in the sugar estates. The chapter 
therefore is in agreement with the current government‟s Agricultural Investment Plan (GIP) 
which recognizes the need for reforms in the sugar estates to redress the colonial imbalance in 
land ownership in the estates. 
 
This dramatic development of this important industry has not been subjected to a detailed 
analysis, although the writings of Saunders (1980) and Mlambo and Pangeti (1996) and others 
have done much to highlight the salient points on the development of the industry. A 
comprehensive analysis of this industry‟s transformation is thus necessary, not because the story 
of Zimbabwe‟s „white gold‟ is an interesting story worth telling but because the sugar industry 
looms large in the recent economic history of Zimbabwe. Any comprehensive understanding of 
the present economic situation of Zimbabwe must therefore include an appreciation of the role 
the sugar industry has played or continue to play hence the following chapter traces the land and 
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This is a qualitative study where data was collected over a period of six months in the Mkwasine 
Estate. This period was long enough and afforded the researcher ample time to observe some 
sugarcane farming operations which were carried out by the farmers like planting, fertilizer 
application, weeding, irrigation and harvesting, just to mention but a few. It also afforded the 
researcher to meet his informants formally at their workplaces and informally at social occasions 
like sporting events, weddings and sometimes funerals. Carter and Little (2007) opine that 
qualitative research as that which utilizes text data (not numerical one), analyzed in their textual 
form (rather than converted to numbers for analysis), with the aim of understanding human 
action and behaviour. Creswell (20013:16) also points out that qualitative research is legitimate 
in its own right and Rapley (2011), concurs that this approach does not impose a prior theoretical 
position on data but remains open to knowledge generation.  
 
Unlike quantitative research, which is restricted to artificially created phenomena, this research 
adopted a naturalistic perspective in order to remain faithful both to the knowledge generators 
and to the phenomenon investigated. This means the reform of Mkwasine Estate and the 
transformation thereof had to be understood in a natural setting where participants were given 
room to openly and freely express themselves. In this view, qualitative research is a scientific 
enquiry that appreciates the complexity of a social science. In this instance the transformation of 
Mkwasine Estate was adequately captured through detailed narrations and descriptions by the 
farmers. It is hoped that this study‟s findings can be generalized to approximately 450 farmers in 
the sugar estate. 
3.2. Research design 
 
The case study research design was adopted for this study. As Morse and Richards (2002) and 
Creswell (2013) point out that the design chosen has to be in line with the demands of the 
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research questions and objectives. Therefore the case study was deemed to address the research 
questions and objectives stated in Chapter 1. 
 
According to Yin (1984) a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon with the real-life contexts which are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources are used. The case study method was deemed as the most appropriate for this study. This 
was because case studies provide an opportunity to conduct in-depth examination of the 
phenomenon under study (the reform and transformation of Mkwasine Estate after land reform. 
In this study, multiple sources of data i.e. interviews, observation as well as secondary data were 
employed in providing answers to the research questions. The Chipiwa Scheme and A2 farmers 
were the key respondents with government officials from ministries of land and agriculture as 
well as Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe participating in this study.  
 
Also Creswell (2013:73) points out a case study as “a qualitative approach in which the 
investigator explores a case(s) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information (observations, interviews, audio-visual material, documents and 
reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes.” This case study used a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data from interviews, conversations, and participant 
observation. Unlike quantitative data which imposes a prior theoretical position, qualitative 
increases knowability (Creswell, 20013:16) since it remains open to knowledge generation. 
Since quantitative research is restricted to artificially created phenomena, qualitative research 
allowed the participants who experienced and witnessed the reforms to openly and also freely 
express themselves.  
 
However, Yin (2009) cites definitional flaws characterizing case studies as methodologies. 
Possibly, this is the reason why this approach tends to be conveniently ingrained into other 
methodologies. To him, a case study is an empirical enquiry that looks at the following:  
 It investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context 
especially when;  
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 The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.  
  It copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result;  
  It relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result; and  
  It benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis.  
 
3.3. Sample size and sampling techniques 
 
This study draws from a stratified random sample of 45 resettled farmers drawn from three broad 
categories of resettled farmers compiled by the Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of 
Zimbabwe (CSFAZ).Stratified random sampling is a method of sampling that involves the 
division of a population into smaller groups known as strata. In stratified random sampling, the 
strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample from 
each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the 
population. These subsets of the strata are then pooled to form a random sample. The main 
advantage with stratified sampling is how it captures key population characteristics in the 
sample. Similar to a weighted average, this method of sampling produces characteristics in the 
sample that are proportional to the overall population. Stratified sampling works well for 
populations with a variety of attributes. 
 
The CSFAZ is an association that represents the resettled sugarcane farmers in Triangle, Hippo 
Valley and Mkwasine sugar estates to lobby their interests to THZ, the government and other 
stakeholder in the sugar industry. The association periodically categorizes its membership 
according to their output levels in the estate. The categories range from the high, middle and low 
producer categories, respectively. According to CSFAZ 2015records which was used as the 
sampling frame there were 99 farmers under the high producer, followed by the 149 farmers in 
the middle producer and 202farmers in the low producer category respectively. 
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Apart from the categories the sample also included two groups of farmers resettled in the estate 
under the government‟s land reform programme that was rolled out after independence in 1980. 
The two farmer groups include the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme of 1982 and the A2 farmers of 
the FTLRP of 2000 and beyond as discussed under sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. The land sizes 
allocated to the two groups are 10 and 20 hectares respectively. 
 
According to the CSFAZ, a high producer was farmer whose sugarcane output was 100 tonnes 
per hectare and above, the medium producer- 70 to 99 tonnes and the low income producer- less 
than 70 tonnes per hectare. The output per hectare depended on a number of factors which 
among them included the type of soil, the adequacy of the inputs, and the farming skill of the 
farmer and the location of the field. The location of the field was important in that those fields in 
the periphery are sometimes vandalized by wild animals. Also the further away the field is from 
the loading zone the greater the loss of cane as it is transported. 
 
Creswell (2013) points out that 10 percent of the population would represent a reasonable sample 
size in phenomenological studies involving long in-depth interviews. This being a 
phenomenological study examining the transformation of the sugar estates and the resettled 
farmers‟ perceptions, perspectives and understanding of what has transpired in the sugar industry 
settled for a sample total of 45 farmers which is equivalent to 10% of the of 450 resettled black 
farmers in Mkwasine. 
 
In coming up with the sample size the first step was to first work out 10% of 450 farmers. The 
next step was calculating the ratio of categories (i.e. 99:149:202) which translated into 2:3:4. The 
next step was calculating the number of farmers representing each category in the sample which 
gave 10 farmers for the high producer category, 15 farmers for the middle producer and 20 




The sample results are as follows; Table 3.1 shows the composition of the sample according to 
farmer group and Table 3.2 show composition of the sample according to the category of farmer. 
 
Table.3.1. Farmer group 




A2 farmers (2000 and 
beyond) 
33 73.3 
Total 45 100 
 
Table 3.1 shows 26.7% of the farmers are from the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme who were 
resettled in 1982 and 73.3% are from the A2 scheme implemented in the year 2000 and beyond. 
 
Table 3.2. Farmer Categories 
Category of farmer No. of farmers Percent (%) 
High producer 10 22.3 
Middle producer 15 33.3 
Low producer 20 44.4 
Total 45 100 
 
Table 3.2 shows 22.3% for the high producer, 33.3 %for the middle producer and 44.4 % for the 
low producer categories respectively. Of interest is that all the 12 farmers from the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme are in the middle and high producer category with the A2 farmers falling 
across the three categories. In addition to the 45 farmers, the following key informants were also 






3.4. Gaining entry into the area 
 
The Masvingo Provincial Governor was the first person to be approached.  The Governor gave 
the researcher a letter authorizing the research and introducing the researcher to the various 
government constituencies linked to the A2 sugarcane scheme in the estates; namely the Chiredzi 
Rural District Administrator, Chiredzi District land resettlement and agriculture officials. The 
district administrator linked the researcher to the district officials connected to the A2 out grower 
scheme. From the political angle the researcher also approached the local member(s) of 
parliament. 
 
Preparations for fieldwork had already been made. Preliminary contacts with the Commercial 
Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (CSFAZ)- the A2 farmers‟ representative, as well 
as THZ and resettlement officials have been established at an agricultural show in Chiredzi in 
2012. The show was organized by the Lowveld Agricultural Society with the aim of showcasing 
what is offered by the region and also providing the basis for the exchange of viewpoints among 
stakeholders in the sugarcane farming fraternity.  
 
During the agricultural show the researcher visited the stands of the Commercial Sugarcane 
Farmers Association of Zimbabwe, THZ as well as resettlement officials from the Ministry of 
Lands and Land Resettlement. At each of the stands the researcher the researcher briefed the 
officials of his intended research and asked them if he would be allowed to carry out his 
fieldwork. The response was in the affirmative. The farmers‟ representatives were very happy to 
learn that there were academics who were interested in what they were doing. The Public 
Relations Manager at THZ stand also said the researcher was welcome provided that he informed 
them of the date of his visit at least two weeks before the visit. They all gave the researcher their 











The study used in-depth interviews as a tool for data collection from the three categories of the 
farmers. The 45 farmers were used as anchors around which the in-depth interviews and informal 
conversations were held. They were able to provide answers to the research questions. Neuman 
(2006) points out that informants help to reconstruct conditions that existed in an area 
(2006:408). These farmers also referred the researcher to other people they considered 
knowledgeable about the area. For instance, they helped the researcher in identifying an A2 
farmer, who was also an extension manager for THZ. The manager gave the researcher an 
electronic copy of the Successful Rural Communities Charter between THZ and the resettled 
farmers which helped to provide the much sought THZ insight that had been denied the 
researcher by the Chief Executive Officer. The manager insisted on anonymity for fear of 
victimization.  
 
Government officials, especially those from local government, land resettlement and agriculture 
ministries were also interviewed. The initial interest was to explore their interpretation of the 
reconfiguration of the sugar estates as well as to find out how they saw the transformation 
contributing to the livelihood portfolios of the resettled farmers. In addition, there was a need to 
gain an understanding of the nature of the support systems that are available within the 
government for land reform beneficiaries. Furthermore, information was also solicited from the 
Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (CSFAZ) an organization 
representing the farmers  
 
3.5.2. Conversations and interactions 
 
As a way of establishing a rapport with the informants and farmers in Mkwasine Estate the 
researcher also attended social occasions such as country club meetings, other community 
meetings and workshops if there happened to be some. During the process of immersion in the 
farming community, he had informal conversations with some farmers. In one instance the 
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researcher listened to conversations of some A2 farmers during a party at Mkwasine country club 




The researcher‟s interaction with research informants from diverse backgrounds and of both 
genders helped him to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics that shaped the way the 
land occupations unfolded in the sugar estates. This helped him to trace the life histories of my 
informants; the majorities of who were elite from the civil service and had either a war 
background or were politically well connected. Spending time resident in the estates helped him 
to develop closer relationships with his informants and to improve his understanding of their life 
histories and how such histories had shaped their livelihoods. It also helped him to understand 
the broader meanings attached to land and how the farmers conceptualized the benefits of land 
reform.  
 
The researcher‟s social interactions and personal relationships with the farmers improved his 
understanding of how the land reform programme shaped the resettled farmers‟ livelihoods. 
Social interaction at formal and informal meetings allowed him to observe the normal daily 
activities in the estates. This afforded him the opportunity to gain “direct, face-to-face social 
interaction with „real people‟ in a natural setting” (Neuman, 2006:379) and to put himself “in the 
actor‟s place and see reality as he or she sees it” (Bilton, Bonnet, et al., 1987). Participant 
observation therefore offered the researcher the opportunity of being part of the “social world” 
(Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994:249). 
 
3.5.4. Focus group discussions 
 
Two focus group discussions were conducted to follow up on the respondents‟ answers which 
were given during the one to one interview surveys. They were also meant to draw upon 
respondents' attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way which was not 
feasible using in other methods. The size of each focus comprised of 6 to 8 farmers and l was the 
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moderator. My role was to guide, monitor and record the respondents‟ answers to the research 
questions. 
3.6. Methods and Procedures for Recording and Storing Data  
 
The data capturing process in a social science generates contention. Alvesson (2011) posits that 
the procedure should be a non-technical view where there is no single recipe for doing it. In this 
study, unstructured, open-ended conversations with the respondents‟ people were audio-taped 
and later transcribed. This method was supplemented by taking interview notes in notebooks, in 
case the audio recording gave problems. 
  
The people in the study area use Shona as a vernacular. This means Shona was the language of 
communication in conducting field interviews, including capturing and recording interview 
statements. In order to manage the difficulty of simultaneously asking questions and writing 
responses, one of the research assistants was assigned the responsibility to write down the notes. 
This was intended to make sure that all the statements are accurately captured and at the same 
time facilitate the interview process. Even though audio-taping conversations were with relative 
ease, certain aspects of the interview process such as non-verbal expressions and post-interview 
comments could be missed. Therefore, the idea of writing complementary notes that also 
captured non-verbal expressions deserves emphasis.  
 
Descriptive notes were recorded about the interview setting and expressions that were equally 
useful yet cannot be captured by the audiotape. The advice given by Murphy et al (1998) on the 
need to also record field notes on comments made by informants once the audio recorder is 
switched off was also embraced. At the end of some interview sessions, notes were read out to 
the participants to verify if all statements had been accurately captured. This procedure also 
ensured more insights were given (where necessary) as the respondents reviewed and analyzed 




Data from observations was captured in the form of field notes, descriptions of sites and features 
of interest. Where appropriate, photographs were also taken to complement observation notes. 
These photos were later used to illustrate some important practices and features. It was also 
necessary to take descriptive notes on experiences, hunches and lessons learnt during the 
observation protocols.  
 
With A2 farmers‟ in-depth interviews, data was captured as audio-taped transcriptions. Quickly 
inscribed short notes were used where necessary. These were then used for focused probes. 
Unlike the practice with field interviews, spoken texts and transcriptions were in English since 
all the informants are expected to be able to fluently speak the language.  
 
Creswell (2013) bemoans the little attention given in literature about storing qualitative data. In 
this study, the filing system of the digital voice recorder (Olympus Digital Voice Recorder, VN-
7600 with 1GB storage space and 573 hours recording time) was utilized. Each recorded audio 
transcript was saved as a unique file in a specific folder and was identifiable by a file number, 
recording time and date. This information was also written down in a notebook. Handwritten 
interview notes (after some translations) and observation notes were typed and stored as word 
files in a computer. Then, each transcription was merged with the respective written notes so that 
the same data source identity would be maintained during analysis. Each interview had its own 
file with backup copies of computer files to ensure adequate security of collected data.  
 
3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Quantitative data was analyzed by the SPSS software. Like other statistical packages mostly used 
in analyzing quantitative data, the SPSS has good data storage and organization of data, ability to 
generate queries, flexibility in coding and generating themes, and measuring relationships among 
segments as well as hierarchical analysis, concept mapping and generation of templates within 




For qualitative data, the study used an inductive analytic method to analyze interview and 
observation data. Thomas (2006) defined this approach as a systematic procedure for analyzing 
qualitative data where the analysis is guided by specified objectives. In qualitative analysis, the 
approach enables the analyst to organize and deduce meaning from large amounts of data. 
Nakapipi et al (2011) opined that this method can be appropriately deployed in 
phenomenological methodological designs. According to Nakapipi et al (2011), data can be 
analyzed inductively, where the focus would be to allow meanings to emerge from the 
interviews. They examined statements from the interviews by clustering them to form common 
themes that enable understanding of meanings attached to the data. 
 
3.8. Lessons learnt 
 
Important lessons were drawn from the process of interviewing the sugarcane farmers, THZ 
officials as well as government officials about their lived experiences after the FTLRP. The 
seven issues that unfolded during the data collection process can be summarized thus: researcher 
as a learner, dealing with a politically-sensitive environment, skepticism of participants, the 
problem of „over-researched‟ cases, knowledge as power and the problem of exclusion and 
issues of gender-sensitivity. 
 
3.8.1. Researcher as a learner 
 
Unlike in quantitative studies where a researcher is assumed to be all knowing and makes use of 
a pre-designed instrument such as a set of questionnaires to be asked to the interviewees, the 
interviews in this study proceeded differently. Here the researcher was the „learner‟ and the 
farmers the „teachers‟. This approach as cited by Alvesson (2011) and Mararike (2011) should 
start from how the researcher builds rapport. The issue of building rapport was highly crucial 
because the researcher was an outsider. A considerable amount of time was spent in establishing 
rapport with the informants before interviews actually began. Local people can treat outsider 
researchers with suspicion and contempt if they fail to confirm to the cultural forms of local 





3.8.2. A politically-sensitive environment 
 
During the data collection period, there were fresh political developments in people‟s minds in 
Zimbabwe including the Mkwasine Estate. The ruling party, ZANU-PF had just won the 
previous general elections in 2013. Land ownership and redistribution in the sugar estate was 
used to garner support by the politicians. As a result of the promises made to the electorate, fresh 
occupations were taking place in the sugar estate on the remaining hectares owned by THZ as 
part of the nucleus estate concept. The land occupiers wanted pre-election promises of land to the 
people fulfilled. The environment was highly politicized and, as a result, the farmers were highly 
suspicious of outsiders wanting to ask questions about land. Such outsiders were generally 
viewed as a security threat as people were never sure if one was a spy or a supporter of 
opposition political parties who were opposed to how the FTLRP was implemented.  
 
The proliferation of authority structures in the country, all exercising some form of authority 
over land meant that getting the clearance to access research informants was a daunting task. The 
Fast track land reform program reconfigured authority structures, despite it being already a 
multi-layered authority structure. Thus, securing a clearance to undertake fieldwork was a rather 
complicated process which was also time-consuming. The researcher had to get permission from 
Masvingo Provincial Governor, Chiredzi District Administrator and other district officials in the 
land and agriculture ministries. 
 
The victory of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections was topical and most interviews proceeded after 
congratulatory messages were given by the participants, which was indicative of their allegiance 
to the party. Consequently, the research team had to appropriately reciprocate. This does not 
necessary mean that the researcher should take political sides, but remain apolitical throughout 
the research process. The main objective was to make sure that the researcher fits into the study 
context to attract the full liberty and participation of the participants engaged. Care had to be 
taken so that the researcher would not end up being embroiled into political discussions with the 
participants. Furthermore, the participants might be belonging to different political parties and 
their concerns about such political developments also needed not to be underestimated. To 
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address this tricky situation, the research team only shared the congratulatory message after the 
participants themselves introduced it. 
 
Thus, research informants were very suspicious of me in the beginning despite the fact that the 
researcher had clearance from higher authorities and that he was a local student. People were 
afraid that they might give out information that might portray land reform negatively and thus 
attract the attention of authorities. Since there was a general perception that security of tenure 
was associated with supporting ZANU PF, many people feared that interviews might leave them 
vulnerable to losing their land after being suspected of colluding with foreign interests. This left 
the researcher facing ethical dilemmas as he did not want to expose his informants to political 
victimization. As a result, it took him longer than expected to establish some rapport before he 
was welcome in the estates. 
 
There were also other problems associated with being a local researcher. One might have thought 
being a Zimbabwean could have made the job of data gathering easier. However, due to local 
political dynamics, it turned out that the researcher‟s Zimbabwean identity worked against him. 
He did not expect that his presence in the sugar estates would threaten some local politicians. For 
example, the local Member of Parliament (MP) suspected that this research might be a form of 
information gathering which the researcher would use in the long term to campaign in local 
future parliamentary elections. His activities and social interactions with research informants 
were thus continuously monitored.  
 
After addressing the suspicions and misinformation about why he was in the area, it became 
relatively easy to spend time with many farmers from all the three estates and to arrange 
interviews with other key informants such lands and agriculture officers, farmers‟ 
representatives, chiefs, and Chiredzi Rural District Administrator.  
 
3.8.3. Skepticism of participants 
 
Some farmers feared that certain aspects of their responses could be misinterpreted and/or 
misused. Kvale (1996) and Grenier (1998) have also noted concern about willingness of 
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participants to share knowledge with outsiders. The observation by Wenger (2001) that 
interviewing people in volatile situations invites some unique challenges was also experienced in 
this study. The fear of misinterpretation was addressed by assuring the participants that 
information synthesized after the data collection process would be availed back for their 
verification and validation. Besides, willing respondents were also asked to participate at a later 
stage of group preliminary data analysis. Skepticism about misuse of extracted information was 
addressed by patiently explaining to them the objectives of the study and how it was supposed to 
benefit the farming community as it would inform policy implementation by the government. 
The engagement of locally based mature research assistants also assisted in the trust-building 
exercise. After trust was established, participants were passionately co-operative in sharing their 
knowledge. Meyiwa and Ngubentombi (2010) also found that respondents were enthusiastically 
generous about sharing their experiences with phenomena. 
  
3.8.4. The problem of over-researched cases 
 
Of late the three sugarcane growing estates have  attracted intense research attention (Scoones et 
al. 2010; Moyo, 2011) because of the propensity to the heated debates on the outcomes of the 
FTLRP In the sugar estate some farmers felt that their area has been „over-researched‟. So a 
typical challenge that emerged was on on how to address this perception held by the people. The 
researcher therefore adequately communicated the purpose of the study, its uniqueness, the 
existing knowledge gaps, the role of participants in the investigation, and how it is expected to 
benefit them or contribute in transforming the community. This meant knowledge about previous 
studies and the gaps thereof had to be known by the researcher. Such a challenge was fully 
tackled by establishing a good rapport with the community gatekeepers who were mostly quick 
in appreciating the potential role of research as a tool for community development. 
 
3.8.5. Knowledge as power and the problem of exclusion  
 
Some farmers wanted to assume superiority and unmatched knowledge about their farming 
experience over others. This happened when in cases where some farmers felt that they were 
more successful than others and wanted to dominate both formal and informal discussions. If not 
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handled properly, such participants would end up excluding other potential respondents who 
could also contribute meaningfully in the research. Mararike‟s (2011) argument that knowledge 
is power can be used to explain this situation. The researcher addressed this challenge by 
requesting the respondent to name other potential people who could share a similar or closer 
account of the details already provided. Another way that was used was to ask for a respondent 
of different sex with the view that other details could be gender specific. 
 
3.8.6. Addressing gender-sensitivity  
 
Qualitative interviews embrace gender-sensitivity. Some respondents felt that they could account 
better the details of their farming experiences when their spouses assisted them. Such a practice 
could enrich the information given by addressing the problem of loss of memory on some key 
periodic events that deserve detailed narration. A challenge that emerged during the data 
gathering process was the issue of gender. Interviewing women proved to be a rather difficult 
process as it involved in some places negotiating with their husbands before clearance was 
granted. In one instance the researcher had to throw away data he got from one respondent in 
Triangle. That was when he learnt that the farm was officially in the wife‟s name although when 
the husband tried to show that the farm was his by offering to answer the questions himself.  The 
issue came to light when the wife produced a cane haulage receipts to me to show how much 
sugarcane they deliver to THZ per season. That is when the researcher discovered that the 
records were in the wife‟s name. The wife had let the husband answer the questions as she 
attended to other household chores. In Mkwasine when the researcher interviewed another 
woman farmer he learnt that husbands did not readily allow him access to interview their wives 
in their absence. This made it more difficult to gather women‟s perspectives compared to those 
of the men.  As a result the researcher was able to interview only three women out of my 
seventeen respondents.  
 
3.8.7. The nature of research assistants 
 
A common pitfall that may affect the research process is the nature of field assistants and the 
manner in which they are recruited. If research concerned with understanding land reform is to 
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be successful, the issue of ownership and buy-in from the community is highly crucial. This 
means the researcher did not impose himself into the community with his research team. In such 
agricultural research settings, this pitfall was viewed by the informants as an „urban bias 
syndrome‟. The, researcher therefore went an extra mile to interpret his research as a 






























Despite the retention of extensive plantations by THZ in order to produce sugar and bio-fuel for 
export, the government bowed to popular demand for land in the sugar estate and subdivided it 
for the resettlement of black farmers. This chapter examined changes in land ownership and 
tenure system in Mkwasine Sugar Estate in the first decade of Zimbabwe‟s independence and 
after the year 2000 and beyond. The chapter addressed the following question „Who currently 
owns what and does what with it in Mkwasine after land reform? Drawing from descriptive and 
qualitative data from a stratified random sample of 45 resettled farmers in the estate, the chapter 
argues that the linking of the farmers in Mkwasine to Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe‟s mills at Hippo 
Valley and Triangle was a good strategy of incorporating them in the lucrative commercial 
activity while also meeting their production constraints. Results from the study indicated a 
departure from sole ownership of the estate by THZ as the whole estate is compulsorily acquired 
by government under the FTLRP for the resettlement of black farmers. Gender imbalance in land 
allocation is reflected by 31.1 % of sample being women who benefited against 68.9% men. The 
elitist nature of the land reform in estate is evidenced by the professional backgrounds of the 
beneficiaries which show that 26.7 % of the sample are former THZ employees, 35.6 % come 
from civil service and the remaining 37.8% hail from the security services such as army and 
police. Freehold tenure gave way to leasehold tenure as all agricultural land in Zimbabwe was 
nationalized under the FTLRP. The transition undermined the resettled farmers‟ capacity to 
access loans and credit from financial institutions due to lack of collateral security. Despite a 
decline in sugar production in the initial years of land reform the farmers‟ contribution to total 
sugar output increased after the intervention of the European Union and the Successful Rural 
Communities (SusCo) project that witnessed the resettled farmers‟ contribution to total annual 
sugar production from 17 % in 2011 to 33% in 2016).To address excesses of corruption, gender 
disparity and tenure insecurity the chapter recommends a land audit in the estate as well as new 





When negotiating for independence in 1979 with the Conservative British Government of the 
then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, Zimbabwe‟s two liberation movements- the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (ZAPU) agreed that the 
new government of Zimbabwe would acquire agricultural land through a „willing seller willing 
buyer (WSWB)‟ basis as stipulated in the Lancaster LHC which ushered independence for the 
country in 1980. ZANU and ZAPU were the two political parties that waged an armed struggle 
that culminated in the Lancaster House negotiations. The WSWB method of land acquisition was 
to be evaluated after the first decade of independence (Moyo, 1995). The British government 
agreed to assist the newly independent Zimbabwe financially, convinced that an orderly and 
planned programme of land resettlement would promote political stability and allow people to 
normalize their lives as quickly as possible (Palmer, 1990). The costs of resettlement, as it was 
envisaged in Zimbabwe, would involve both the purchase of land from white farmers and the 
development of the necessary infrastructure to help the new „settlers‟(resettled black farmers) to 
establish themselves (Palmer, 1990). Britain, thus duly pledged 20 million pounds towards 
improvement of the resettlement in 1980 (Palmer, 1990). 
 
The post-independent government of Zimbabwe thus, inherited an agricultural sector which had 
been developed into a distinctively dualistic structure made up of the Large Scale Commercial 
Farming (LSCF) sector (formerly white areas) and the Communal Areas (CAs) previously called 
„Tribal Trust Lands. (Mumbengegwi, 1986). The economic, industrial and mining interests 
remained wholly owned by foreign capital and local whites under monopoly conditions (Moyo 
and Yeros, 2005). At the time, the country‟s economy was ranked the second most industrialized 
in Sub Saharan Africa, following South Africa (ibid, 2005).  
 
Moreover, agriculture remained the most important sector, accounting for 40 per cent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employing 70 percent of the population (Stoneman and 
Cliffe, 1989). The commercial sector accounted for 75 % of gross output, 95% of marketed 
surplus, nearly 100% of agricultural export earnings and 33% of the national wage employment 
(Mumbengegwi, 1986). The agricultural sector by then contributed 60% of local manufacturing, 
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while 20% was absorbed back into agriculture (Economic Report on Africa, 2002). This dynamic 
agricultural sector in the 1980s led to Zimbabwe‟s renowned image as the „bread basket‟ of 
Southern Africa. 
 
Due to the LHC restrictions, the government was caught in a dilemma of satisfying the 
expectations of both the white farmers and the black peasants (Mumbengegwi, 1986). On the one 
hand, the government sought to prevent the flight of private white capital by preserving 
commercial plantations inherited at independence with minor adjustments hence the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme of 1982 in Mkwasine (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996).  Moreover, it sought to 
address the needs of the landless blacks who saw the essence of political independence as the 
satisfaction of their land hunger and the reversal of the discriminatory elements of colonial 
agricultural policies (Mumbengegwi, 1986). 
  
An analysis of the land policy formulated immediately after independence in the early 1980s also 
clearly depicts this dilemma. In the Growth with Equity policy statement of the early 1980s, 
agriculture and rural development were singled out as top priorities in the government‟s 
development plans (Mumbengegwi, 1986). However, the challenge was that of balancing its two 
contrasted set of objectives. On the one hand were objectives that were oriented towards 
maintaining the status quo of reassuring the commercial farmers of their traditional role of 
producing food for the nation and contributing to economic growth through the export of 
agricultural produce. On the other hand were the restructuring transformative objectives which 
were designed to redress the imbalance between the two sub-sectors and transform the structure 
and character of agriculture in Zimbabwe (Mumbengegwi, 1986). According to Mumbengegwi  
these objectives aimed at achieving an acceptable and fair distribution of land ownership, and 
elimination of discriminatory practices in output pricing, input provision, marketing, credit, 
extension, infrastructure and the provision of other back-up services, and therefore, raising 
peasant incomes through productivity-raising measures. 
 
This chapter therefore examined the transformation of Mkwasine Sugar Estate in the first decade 
of Zimbabwe‟s independence and after the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme 
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implemented in the year 2000and beyond to firstly; establish the socio-economic factors that 
influenced land access by the beneficiaries in the estate under the government‟s land resettlement 
programme; secondly to establish land sizes allocated to the beneficiaries as well as the transition 
of landholding from freehold to leasehold tenure in the estate. Lastly, the chapter also seeks to 
establish the production trends of the resettled farmers as well as labour dynamics in the estate 
after land reform. 
 
The first two decades of Zimbabwe‟s independence witnessed the government being seized with 
balancing between preserving the sugar estates in the south eastern lowveld due to their export 
potential and meeting black people demands for land. Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) - a South 
African multinational firm and a few local white farmers continued to hold to large enclaves of 
sugarcane plantations in Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwasine sugar estates during that period. 
The retention of the vast sugarcane enclaves by the sugar estate was meant to encourage the 
agro-industrial concern –THZ, to produce agro-fuel (ethanol) from sugar for the domestic and 
export markets (Moyo, 2011). Earnings from sugar and its byproducts contributed immensely to 
the national economy through foreign currency savings on fuel imports as well as foreign 
currency generation through exports (Scoones et al. 2010). 
 
The first attempt by the post-colonial government to transform Mkwasine Sugar Estate was the 
establishment of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme in 1982. This was followed by the „A2‟ sugar 
scheme introduced in the year 2000 and beyond. These two land redistributive exercises 
significantly reconfigured the sugar estate as the number of sugarcane out growers in the estate 
increased to approximately 450 black farmers. 
 
4.2.1. The Chipiwa Settlement Scheme (CSS) in Mkwasine 
 
In 1982, the government resettled 191 small-scale farmers in Mkwasine under the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme (CSS)as cited in Mlambo and Pangeti, (1996) and Jackson and Cheater, 
(1994).Under the CSS the government acquired approximately 2000 hectares from THZ on a 
willing seller willing buyer basis and the beneficiaries of the scheme popularly referred to as 
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„settlers‟ were allocated 10 hectare sugarcane farms under the government‟s initial land 
resettlement programme in the sugar industry after independence. The major thrust was to 
involve black players in an industry that previously excluded them during the colonial period. 
 
The prospective beneficiaries were required to apply through the local district offices of the 
Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement in Chiredzi Town. The applicants had to have 
sugarcane farming experience or at least a Master Farmer‟s Certificate (MFC) to be considered 
for land allocation under the scheme. The MFC was equivalent to a monthly attendance for an 
agricultural course at either Alvord Training Centre in Masvingo or Domboshawa Training 
Institute, a few kilometers outside Harare. Financial capacity and material resources by the 
prospective applicant in the form of movable and immovable were also considered. 
 
However, as pointed by Jackson and Cheater (1994) and Watts (1994) there were some 
beneficiaries who subverted the land allocation process which resulted in some farmers with no 
sugarcane producing experience benefiting. Despite the relative success of this scheme in the 
initial years of resettlement the Chipiwa Scheme soon ran into problems due to the sub-economic 
land sizes of their plots and insecurity of tenure after failing to get their title deeds at end of 
paying back loans advanced to them by THZ. 
 
Under the Chipiwa Scheme, THZ through Mkwasine Estate shouldered the costs of providing the 
settlers with the necessary infrastructural requirements to carry out sugarcane production on their 
farms. THZ was required to put up core houses for the settlers, prepare the land, install irrigation 
works and plant the first crop for the settlers (ibid). In addition to providing accounting services 
as well as assisting the settlers‟ with purchasing agricultural inputs, THZ also assisted them with 
harvesting and transporting their sugarcane to THZ processing mills at Triangle and Hippo 
Valley. For the assistance in settling up in their farming ventures, the settlers were expected to 
repay the cost of these provisions over a 15 year period from their cane proceeds after which 
they could acquire freehold title to their farms. The settlers were bound by the offer to plant 
sugarcane only even after they had obtained title to the land. 
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4.2.2. The A2 sugar scheme under the FTLRP 
 
Land challenges in Zimbabwe‟s sugarcane estates of Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwasine in 
the south eastern lowveld were part of the broad national challenges as the country tried to 
reconcile the constitutional provision of protecting private property with the high expectations of 
land reform from the land hungry black people. Having waged a bitter armed liberation struggle 
against the British government which cost a lot of life and millions of dollars in infrastructure, 
the political crisis was eventually resolved through the Lancaster House Constitution (LHC) 
signed by Britain and the Zimbabwean nationalists agitating for political independence. 
 
Apart from the above redistribution thrust in the first decade of independence, sugarcane farming 
in the estate remained largely under THZ ownership and control as well as a few white out 
growers linked to the estates.  The preservation of the entire three sugar estates was encouraged 
by the state so that sugar and bio-fuel could be produced domestic and export markets. Because 
of that, the second decade of independence which spanned from 1990 to 2000 witnessed no land 
redistribution in the sugar estates to the chagrin of a war veteran movement demanding 
participation in commercial sugarcane production. 
 
Increasing pressure for land across the country by the war veteran movement culminated in mass 
occupations of commercial farms across the country, which resulted into the Fast Track Land 
Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). The FTLRP compulsorily acquired and officially transferred 
land by the government for resettlement purposes. Under the FTLRP, approximately 16 000 
hectares of land in the three sugar estates were compulsorily acquired and subdivided into 20 
hectares farms that were redistributed to over 800 beneficiaries known as A2 farmers (Scoones et 
al. 2010; Moyo, 2011 and Tongaat Hulett, 2012). 
This dramatic transformation of Mkwasine Estate has not been subjected to a detailed analysis 
although Soones et al (2010) and others have done much to nuance some land and agrarian 
reforms that have unfolded in the agricultural sector in general and the sugar industry in 
particular. This study therefore gives a comprehensive analysis of those reforms as the sugar 
industry currently looms large in the economic development of Zimbabwe due to increased 
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demand for sugar and its by-products. To understand the importance the government attaches to 
the industry an analysis of the reconfiguration of the estate becomes necessary. 
4.3. Results 
 
This section presents both descriptive and qualitative findings on land ownership and tenure 
system changes as well as production trends by the resettled farmers after the reconfiguration of 
Mkwasine Estate. For descriptive data the results show significant differences between access to 
land in Mkwasine and some socio-economic characteristics of both the Chipiwa Settlement 
Scheme and A2 farmers that influenced that access hence 3.3 and 3.4respectively. Table 3.5 
shows the contribution of the resettled farmers to annual sugar output. 
4.3.1. Socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries 
 
Gender and marital status: Table 3.3 shows 31.1 % of the sample from both the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme and the A2 scheme are women and 68.9 % were men. Of these farmers in the 
estate 91.1% were married and 8.9 % were widowed. There is a significant difference (p< 0.005) 
between access to land access and gender and in the estate. On the other hand there is no 
statistical significance between marital status and access to land (p>0.005) 
Sugarcane farming experience and professional history of the farmers: The table shows over 
twenty percent of the sample (26.7%) has sugarcane farming experience and the remaining 
73.3% do not have. Those with sugar farming experience are former THZ employees, 35.6% are 
working in the civil service and the last 37.8% being security service personnel from the police 
and army. The results indicate a statistical significant difference p<0.005 between access to land 
and sugarcane farming experience by farmer and There is no statistical significant difference 
between professional background and access to land in the estate.  
 
Land size and tenure: Table 3.3 shows26.7% had 10 hectare farms each and 73.3% had 20 
hectares. The former belonged to the Chipiwa group of farmers and the latter were A2 farmers 
resettled under the FTLRP. The results highlight a statistical significant difference (p<0.005) for 
both for both groups of farmers between access to the land and land size on one hand and 
between access to land and land tenure on the other. As indicated before the initial arrangement 
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was that the Chipiwa group of farmers was entitled to freehold tenure after paying back the loans 
advanced to them by THZ upon resettlement. The A2 farmers were allocated land on leasehold 
in 2000 and beyond under the FTLRP which nationalized all agricultural land in Zimbabwe. That 
development rendered freehold tenure ineffective leaving both groups of farmers in the estate 
with no collateral security in the event of securing loans with financial institutions. 
 
Table 3.3: Access to land and access and socio-economic characteristics 









Gender Female 2 12 14(31.1%) 1.593*** 
 
Male 10 21 31(68.9%) 
Marital status Widowed 1 3 4(8.9 %) 0.006 
 Married 11 30 41(91.1%) 





12 0 12 (26.7%) 1.609 
Civil service 0 16 16 (35.6%) 
Security service 0 17 17 (37.8%) 
Land size 10 hectares 12 0 12 (26.7% 45.000*** 
20 hectares 0 33 33(73.3%) 
Land tenure Freehold 12 0 12 (26.7%) 45.000*** 
 Leasehold 0 33 33 (73.3%) 
liberation war 
veteran 
Yes 4 17 21 (44.4%) 1.169 
 No 8 16 24 (55.6%) 
N=45 
4.3.2. Biographic characteristics of the farmers 
 
Age: The farmers‟ ages in the sample ranged from 49 to 60 years. Table 3.4 below shows the 
mean average ages of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers was 53.83 years and for the A2 
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farmers was 54.15 years. There is a significant mean difference of between age and access to 
land (p<0.005) in the estate.  
 
Education: Table 3.4presents the education level of the farmers in number of years spent in 
school. Both groups of farmers (i.e. the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and A2 farmers) are 
therefore well educated. In Zimbabwe one requires 11 years and 13 years to complete Ordinary 
and Advanced Level Certificate of Education. The findings show a statistical mean difference of 
p<0.004 between education level and access to land in Mkwasine Estate. It indicates the mean 
average of the number of years spent in school is 15.33 years for those resettled under the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and 14.58 years for the A2 farmers who accessed land in the year 
2000 and beyond.  
Table 3.4: Biographical characteristics of farmers 
 
Variable Access to land T-test 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme  A2 farmers 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 53.83 2.38 54.15 2.88 3.963*** 
Education 15.33 0.78 14.58 2.59 2.179*** 
Value of  
assets 
35 000.00 0.00 21 666.67 9574.27 4.789*** 
Annual income   13457.16 2420.78 8296.12 4452.20 4.946*** 
SD=standard deviation 
 
Value of farmers’ assets: Table 3.4 shows a significant mean difference of p< 0.005 between 
the value of the farmers‟ assets and access to land. It shows US$ 35 000 as the mean average of 
the value of assets for the Chipiwa group of farmers and US$21 666.67 for the A2 farmers. This 




as compared to the latter who were resettled latter in the year 2000 and beyond. The results 
therefore show the capacity of both groups of farmers to accumulate from below over time. 
 
Annual income: The results highlights a significant mean difference of p<0.005 between 
farmers‟ annual income and access to land. The farmer‟s sources of income include on farm and 
off farm activities. On farm sources of income means income from sugar production whereas off 
farm income include sources such as spouse earnings, pension as well as remittances from 
children. All these sources of money go a long way in meeting the farmer‟s production as well as 
subsistence costs and this implies that farmers who have more of this off farm income do better 
than those who have less income. 
 
4.3.3. Qualitative responses from interviews and focus group discussions 
 
From the late 2000s, the state had set up District Land Committees (DLCs) to take over the land 
allocations under the FTLRP process. The DLC structure included the District Administrator 
(DA), the Rural District Council (RDC) Chairperson, the District Chairperson of the War 
Veterans Association, traditional leaders (headmen and chiefs), an officer from the President‟s 
office, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and 
officials from the departments of Social Welfare, Health, Veterinary and Agricultural Research 
and Extension (AREX) (Moyo et al 2009:148).The District Administrator chaired the committee. 
The main responsibilities of the DLC are the identification of land for settlement, beneficiary 
selection and attending to land disputes among the newly resettled (Moyo et al 2009:148). 
 
The land redistribution exercise in Mkwasine under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme of 1982 was 
an orderly exercise as THZ undertook to offer credit and technical support to the resettled black 
farmers. However, accessing land in the sugar estate under the FTLRP was not a smooth process. 
Matondi (2012) stated that while land acquisition was backed by legislation, actual land 
allocation had no legal backing apart from an administrative offer letter that confirmed a right to 
the land after the allocation. In practice, some beneficiaries of land reform had offer letters while 
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others did not over the farms they were operating. According to Moyo et al (2009), the 
government ended up accommodating more beneficiaries than the guidelines provided.  
 
Despite the authority structure put in place to oversee the land redistribution process in the estate 
there were challenges that bedeviled it. Interviews and focus group discussions highlighted some 
problems some farmers were currently facing in the estate. Some farmers called for the 
finalization of land reform in the sugar estates as it would end being moved from one farm to 
another (Informal conversation with Mr Matake at Mkwasine Country Club on 13/09/15). There 
was an emergence of what were called „A5‟ farmers with the assistance of Lands Officers in 
Chiredzi and Masvingo who were seizing plots with ready to harvest sugarcane crops. 
Sometimes this wave of takeovers was spearheaded by war veterans who had been Promised 
Land by the ZANU PF in the sugar estates during the 2013 general elections. This election 
promise had not materialized by then. The following biography by Mr Mhungu highlights the 
farmers‟ concerns on what was happening; 
 
This happens mostly during the time of harvesting. Now that the cane cutting season is 
upon us, these culprits (A5 farmers) would go around reaping where they did not sow 
Greedy people must not be allowed to harvest where they did not sow (Conversation at 
Mkwasine Country Club). 
 
Conflict of interest on the part of officials from line government ministries was cited in the 
allocation of land as these officials allocated themselves the best farms where there were 
irrigation equipment, homesteads and larger hectares at the expense of the ordinary people who 
were supposed to be the real beneficiaries of land reform (CSFAZ official on 17/11/15). Corrupt 
government officers and other culprits involved in the land scam should be exposed as they were 
obstacles to the transparency that was expected in the exercise of this critical nature and 
magnitude Informal conversations also revealed that some farmers particularly the A2 farmers 
had multiple farms registered in different names, for example; wife using maiden names or son 




It was also alleged that some government officials did not have land sizes stipulated in their offer 
letters because they had grabbed some extra hectares from their neighbours. (Informal 
conversation with Mr Matura on 16/09/15). To nip the problem of corruption in the bud and the 
collapse of the sugar industry that was imminent if corruption went unchecked, the farmers 
recommended a land audit by an impartial and independent board in the sugar estate. This would 
be followed by the re-planning of the estate. 
 
During the land allocation exercise, there was a rush for land in the estate from those in the know 
particularly officials from the land and agriculture ministries as well as THZ officials. Some of 
these who met the criteria got farms through the system. However, there were also others who 
subverted the system and jumped the queue as highlighted by the following biography; 
I heard of the redistribution programme from the Fields officer of Mkwasine Estate who l was 
reporting to! By the way l used to work for the company and rose through the ranks from 
general worker, to field clerk and later foreman up to Senior Fields Supervisor. I applied 
through the District Administrator‟s office. The DA knew my Brother, a retired major 
general. In fact they fought side by side during the liberation struggle. I think my sugarcane 
farming experience contributed a lot to my success of getting the plot (Interview 12/06/15). 
 
Being related to a high ranking government official or being connected to someone in a position 
of influence was enough to get land in the estate. Connectedness entailed blood, kinship or 
political relationships as highlighted by the following narrative; 
 
I heard about the resettlement program from my uncle who works at the provincial office of 
the Ministry of Lad Resettlement. By the way this is confidential information l am sharing 
with you! He actually approached me over a drink and asked if l was interested in sugarcane 
farming. I had not the slightest dream of being a sugarcane farmer all my life! After a while l 
received an offer letter through the post informing me that l had been allocated the plot that I 
am currently utilizing. (Conversation with A2 farmer at Mkwasine on 3/06/15). 
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Political discourses were also instrumentalized by some people outside the war veteran 
movement to acquire farms in the estates. War collaboration was another dynamic that was 
considered. Besides carrying a gun in the liberation struggle, people claimed to have participated 
in various ways like providing food and clothing as well as cover to the liberation fighters 
against the colonial forces. Some such claimants successfully got the farms. 
 
I also participated in the liberation war in my own way! We fed the liberation fighters and 
clothed them! We provided them with cover against the Rhodesian Forces! All this we 
did, so that we get our land back! Now that we have the land, why is that the government 
stipulates these conditions? There were no set criteria for participation in the war of 
liberation! We all participated without discriminating each other!(Conversation in 
Mkwasine on 9/06/15) 
Yet, party political affiliation was another factor that was considered in the land allocation 
exercise in the estate. Political patronage in a way influenced access to land. Security of one‟s 
tenure was guaranteed by one‟s political affiliation as highlighted by an A2 farmer who was 
donning ZANU PF party regalia at Mkwasine Country Club. 
 
I had retired to Zaka Communal Lands after almost 25 years as a stores clerk with 
Triangle Sugar Company. I heard of the land redistribution program at our ZANU PF 
meeting in the village. A message had been sent from the provincial structures of the 
party that each one of the seven districts in Masvingo Province had to submit 6 names; 
that is three males and three females to the party provincial office. These would be sent 
to the Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement through the District Administrator‟s 
office in Chiredzi for sugarcane plot allocation in the sugar estates. As an active cadre 
who worked hard for the party, l was nominated in our cell. My name went through the 
village, ward and up to the district levels where l was one of the six finalists submitted 
by the district. After four weeks, my five colleagues and l received our offer letters 
from the ZANU PF provincial chairperson who had come to address a political rally in 




These informal conversations established that some applicants used their political as well as 
social connections to acquire the much sought after sugarcane farms. This resonates with one 
major criticism of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was highlighted by Alexander 
(2003:104) when he points out that; 
“…land allocation under the FTLRP required an extreme attack on institutions of the state, in 
very sharp contrasts to the government‟s response to the allocations in the 1980s when it had 
sought to strengthen and insulate a modernizing bureaucracy. In the year 2000, the judiciary was 
severely undermined as ruling after ruling was ignored. The police force was increasingly 
politicized; purged by critics and prevented from carrying out their duties … civil servants came 
under tremendous pressure to support ZANU-PF and came under violent attack if they did not. 
The ministries in charge of agrarian policy were meanwhile marginalized from control of land 
policy in favor of an alliance led by ZANU PF and War Veterans” 
 
The issue inheritance of inheritance also surfaced in the ownership of land. There are women 
who took over the ownership and control of sugarcane farms after the death of their husbands; 
 
I am a widow of 44 years. I work as a nurse at Mkwasine Clinic. I inherited the 
sugarcane plot from my late husband who passed on in 2005. I am not sure of the 
process my husband went through to acquire the plot!  He used to work as mechanic at 
Mkwasine Workshop. Around the time the plot was acquired, I heard my husband 
discussing the issue with a friend who had visited us. The coming few days I saw him 
busy filling in some forms. In a month‟s time my husband showed me an offer letter 
which indicated that he had been allocated a plot. It is this plot that I am currently 
running. (Interview wih Mrs Mutero on 13/06/14) 
 
Although the above dynamics show a significant deviation from the criteria originally set by the 
Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement in the allocation of land in the estate, there were cases 
in which some rudiments of the criteria were met during the exercise. These included among 
other things financial capacity and evidence to owning some material assets by the applicants as 
exhibited in the following biography; 
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I applied for this piece of land just like anybody. I knew of this resettlement programme through 
The Herald. Although l did not have the requisite sugarcane farming experience, I had the 
financial and material resources to undertake the farming operations. You may have experience 
but if you do not have capital then you are doomed. (Interview with A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 
13/06/15)  
I was a headmaster of a high School. I am retired now. When l heard about the land redistribution 
program by a friend, I went to the District Lands Office in Chiredzi to get more information. 
There l was given some forms which l took home to fill. I submitted them the following week and 
after three weeks l got an offer letter for the plot I am currently farming. I attached my bank 
statement as well as certified copies of my title deeds as well as life assurance policies as proof of 
financial and material assets (Informal conversation at Mkwasine Country Club on 13/06/15) 
The scrutiny of the Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement (BIPA) agreement between the 
Government of Mauritius and the Government of Zimbabwe also showed that some farms under 
this agreement had been allocated to some A2 farmers and that some farms were claimed to be 
under this agreement when in actual fact they were not, hence the need for a new land audit to 
establish the authentic beneficiaries of this agreement. Those who are genuine Mauritius farmers 
must be protected by the agreement and those who are not covered by the agreement must be 
removed from the farms (CSFAZ official on 17/11/15). 
 
4.3.4. The Successful Rural Communities Project (2011-2015) 
 
Interviews and focus group discussions established efforts by THZ and the resettled farmers to 
rehabilitate sugar production which had declined in the initial years of land reform in the estate. 
The following biography highlights this; 
 
During the initial years farmers faced daunting challenges. This greatly affected the production 
capacity of the resettled farmers (Interview with the CSFAZ official in Mkwasine) 
 
Lack of farming skills by some of the newly resettled black farmers and inputs as well as post-
settlement support also contributed to the sharp decline. In response to this, THZ embarked on a 
comprehensive farmer rehabilitation programme called the Successful Rural Communities 
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Farming (SusCo), Project in 2011. The major goal of the SusCo) protect was the rehabilitation of 
the resettled farmers‟ fields to pre-Fast Track production levels. This was going to be done with 
the support and expertise of Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe so that the resettled farmers increased 
their supply of sugarcane to the processing mills. Under the SusCo facility THZ chose a 
Zimbabwean financial institution (the African Banking Corporation- BancABC) to provide funds 
loans to the resettled sugarcane farmers. The project ran for five years. 
 
Under the SusCo facility, direct cash withdrawals from the bank by the resettled farmer were 
limited to employee wages and farmer allowances under the supervision of the SusCo project 
management team. Crop establishment costs and maintenance costs of the planted sugarcane 
would be recovered when the farmer harvested the following season. 
The SusCo project was a timely intervention. It came at a time when most of the farmers were at 
the point of giving up! Quite a number of farmers were utilizing part of their plots with a sizeable 
number having completely giving up leaving their farms fallow (ibid) 
4.3.5. Annual sugar output by THZ and resettled farmers’ contribution 
 
The SusCo intervention had very positive results for the farming community in the lowveld. 
Besides, THZ continuing to own vast enclaves of sugarcane plantations through its Triangle and 
Hippo Valley operations after losing the whole of Mkwasine Estate to the government for the 
resettlement of A2 farmers under the FTLRP, there was an annual increment in the resettled 
farmers‟ contribution to total sugarcane output as shown by Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 shows that THZ produces the bulk of the sugar through its Triangle and Hippo Valley 
operations. The combined output for the two operations in 2011 was 83% with the resettled 
farmers only contributing 17%. The table is further graphically presented by Figure 2 which 
specifically focuses on the resettled farmers‟ contribution to total sugar output over the years. 
Table 3.5 shows that the resettled farmers‟ annual contribution has been increasing since 2011. 
Because of the increasing contribution by resettled farmers there is a drop in THZ‟ contribution 




Table 3.5: Annual group contribution to total production, 2016 
Season  Group Sugarcane 
(tonnes per 
yr) 
(%) Contribution by 
group  
Reasons  
2011 Triangle  1 455 818 47 Effects of poor farming practices-
cell phone farming 
Hippo 1 070 700 36 
R/ farmers   527 112 17 
Total  3 053629 100 
2012 Triangle  1 439 255 36 SusCo programme rolled out by 
Tongaat –massive plough outs 
Hippo 1 100 787 37 
R/Farmers 843 328 27 
Total  3 386 370 100 
2013 Triangle  1 473 752 33 The SusCo programme began to 
bear fruits 
Hippo 1 082 205 34 
R/Farmers 1 009 284 33 
Total  3 565 241 100 
2014 Triangle  1 289 175 39 Momentum by farmers is 
growing up 
Hippo 1 000 908  29 
R/ Farmers 1 168 311 32 
Total  3 458 394  100 
2015 Triangle  1 310 143 40 A slight decline due to water 
shortage in 2014 
Hippo 1 028 879 31 
R/Farmers 1 008 999 29 
Total  3 348 021 100 
2016 Triangle  1 315 422 39 Despite a reduced irrigation 
regime, momentum is high 
among farmers Hippo 1 028 973 29 
R/Farmers 1 138 668 32 
Total   3 483 063 100 
R/Farmers= Resettled farmers 
Source: Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe Annual Report, 2016 
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As indicated by Table 3.5, the decline in sugar production in the estates in the initial years of the 
industry‟s reconfiguration was attributed to a variety of reasons. Figure 2 below shows that in 
2011, the farmers contributed only 17% of the total sugar output despite the vast plantations 
allocated to them. Failure to effectively utilize the land by the farmers was attributed to effects of 
poor farming methods such as cell phone farming, lack of sugarcane farming skills as well as 
inputs. As already established by the study the majority of the beneficiaries 73.3% are formally 
employed elsewhere and engage in sugar production as a part-time activity. They manage their 
farms through proxies, either through relatives or supervisors who run the farms on their behalf.  
 
 




 of November 2011 the government launched the Successful Rural Farming 
Communities project to rehabilitate sugarcane production in resettled farmers‟ fields to pre-
resettlement levels(The Herald 5 November,2011 page1). The project was funded by the African 
Banking Corporation in conjunction with THZ and was rolled out in earnest in 2012. This 
development witnessed massive pull outs of sugarcane by the resettled farmers and replanting. 































2011 to 27% in the year 2012. In 2013, the SusCo programme began to bear fruits. Due the 
massive pullouts the previous year and access to production inputs such as fertilizer and 
herbicides, the resettled farmers stepped up their production and raised their productivity by a 
further 5% from 27% in the previous year to 32% of the total sugar output. The production 
momentum by the resettled farmers was maintained if not increased. The resettled farmers had 
now established themselves in the industry and demonstrated that they could do better if they had 
access to production inputs like fertilizers and herbicides  
 
Despite the drought challenge that threatened the sugar industry in 2014 the farmers 
demonstrated a lot of resilience. Considering that water is the life blood of the estates, the 
farmers‟ operations were seriously curtailed culminating in water rationing in the sugar estates. 
The water rationing resulted in a slight decline (3%) in production by the farmers to 29% of the 
total output in 2014 only to rise to 32% in 2015.The sugarcane farmers proved their mettle 
increasing their production to 33% of the total output in 2016. This was against the backdrop of a 
reduced irrigation regime due to water challenges which had spilled into 2015. The momentum 
was still high among the resettled farmer. 
4.4. Discussion 
 
There was gender disparity in the allocation of land in Mkwasine Estate yet gender is a critical 
factor that has to be taken into consideration when allocating critical productive resources. The 
findings also point to the exclusion of more than half the country‟s population in the allocation of 
national resources. According to Zimbabwe‟s 2012 population census conducted in 2012, fifty 
two (52%) are females (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012). These confirm Adeniyi (2010)‟s 
assertion that the development of African communities is biased towards men when allocating 
production resources. In agreement with that Quisumbing and Pandolfelli (2008) also point out 
that women are often disadvantaged in both statutory and customary land ownership.  
 
According to Sharaunga (2015) over 80% of rural women depend on agriculture for survival 
hence, women‟s empowerment in agriculture is a major dimension of their empowerment. They 
play a critical and potentially transformative role in agricultural growth in developing countries 
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yet they face persistent obstacles and economic constraints limiting further inclusion in 
agriculture (Alkire et al., 2012). The process of empowerment in agriculture is, therefore, more 
relevant for rural women since they have previously been denied access and control of the assets 
and capabilities crucial for making strategic choices in agriculture (Malhotra & Schuler, 
2005).The current gender composition in Mkwasine Estate therefore needs policy intervention to 
increase women access to and control over land. 
 
Muromo (2015) points out that the prospective beneficiary of a sugarcane farm had to have 
experience in sugarcane farming when applying to a land resettlement committee which was 
chaired by the District Administrator. The applicant had to attach a business proposal together 
with academic as well as professional qualifications to his or her application form. Financial as 
well as material resources in the form of movable and immovable property also formed part of 
the requirements. Above all, experience in sugarcane farming was an added advantage. 
 
The statistical significance difference between land access and experience in sugarcane farming 
implies that other dynamics came into play during the land allocation exercise yet experience is a 
critical factor which could have been given serious consideration when allocating this critical 
resource. The following biography highlights; 
Where do they expect me to get sugarcane farming experience? I left this country in 
1975 to Mozambique to join the liberation struggle! Since then I have been in the bush 
fighting! How could I acquire a farming certificate together with financial as well as 
material assets in the bush? These are the injustices that we fought against! (Interview 
with Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe official in Mkwasine on 
14/6/15). 
 
Participation in the war of liberation influenced land access as highlighted in the following 




We made sure that all the war veterans who fought in the war of liberation were 
considered ahead of other applicants for plot allocation. After all, it is land that we went 
to war for! We also recommended those people who also took an active role during the 
land occupation period in the year 2000 and beyond (Interview: 8/07/14). 
 
War veterans appealed to broader liberation discourses and interpreted their role as more of 
leading a revolution rather than mere facilitators of a state led land reform process. This was 
reflected in their rhetoric whenever they were given a chance to talk in public especially 
particularly at the farmers‟ fortnightly meetings which in most cases ended up being ZANU-PF 
political meetings. The following biography also highlights how war credentials were 
instrumental in accessing land.  
 
We came here through the struggle and we took over the land because the white 
farmers were racists. Moreover the large pieces of land (100 hectares) they owned 
were too large for one person! No matter how the white farmers resisted, we told them 
that this was our soil! We went to war for it. They contested in courts of law but it did 
not work. Now look-one former white farm owned by one man is now supporting five 
families! These racists! (Conversation with Mr Bwanya at Mkwasine on 10/06/15).  
 
Agricultural land is a crucial piece of all land use types and is arguably the most important asset 
in primarily agrarian rural societies (Machingura, 2007).In Mkwasine Estate it is lacking in both 
ownership and size due to the high demand for land because of the lucrative nature the 
commercial activity. Zimbabwe‟s land redistribution programme is perhaps the most crucial and 
most bitterly contested issue in academic and political circles surrounding the country. There 
have been heated debates on the collapse of domestic banks due to liquidated properties as the 
government compulsorily acquired agricultural land.Failure by government to compensate 
ousted landowners and chronic shortages of material and personnel needed to carry out the 
resettlement programme in an orderly manner impacted negatively on the land redistribution 
exercise. 
As an institution, land tenure plays a major role in the performance and development of the food 
sector by influencing the land ownership and use patterns as well as the productivity of the land. 
The land ownership issues go well beyond small sizes of plots. There are a number of means 
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through which people in Africa have access to land; they may own it outright, they may have 
land allocated specifically to them through their lineage or village head, or they may acquire land 
through marriage. The perceived lack of security of tenure by the resettled farmers in Mkwasine 
Estate is the most important factor in explaining the relatively low investment in the estate. 
Farmers‟ fear of expropriation over land on which they have invested deters investments. The 
insecure leasehold tenure system constrains the farmers from producing to their highest potential.  
 
In addition to the Chipiwa group of farmers failing to get their title deeds, they also ceased to get 
the input support they used to get from THZ at the expiration of their loan period. This meant 
they faced new challenges in accessing bank loans because financial institutions require security 
of tenure as collateral. This group neither has offer letters nor 99 year leasehold certificates given 
to their counterparts (the A2 farmers). This has left these farmers to look for other schemes 
sponsored by the government through its agricultural bank-Agribank as well as from the 
Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) schemes being availed by the 
government. Unfortunately, most of the sugarcane farmers in the estate have not benefited from 
these schemes (Interview with a Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe 
(CSFAZ) official on 17/11/15). The CSFAZ pointed out that if government could speed up the 
processing of the 99 year lease agreement, they could get loans from financial institutions and 
the agreement would guarantee the existence of the industry. 
 
There are currently uncertainties around the issue of tenure security for both groups of farmers 
who have been bundled under leasehold tenure. The implications to the estate are largely 
negative pointing to a slow investment or reinvestment drive due to reluctance among the 
farmers to improve the existing irrigation infrastructure as they are not sure whether they would 
not be moved from the farms that they have been allocated. Also all the farmers hid behind the 
guise that they did not have capital to improve their farms, which resulted to some existing 
infrastructure not being maintained or serviced. The farmers appealed to the government to 
finalize the freehold tenure issue and to speed up the process of issuing the 99 year lease 
agreements so that they can use these as collateral to secure funding from banks. Because of this 
insecurity there have been cases of farmers being moved from one farm to another for no 
apparent reason have been reported (Interview with Mr Gapare- A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 
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10/09/15).Farmers indicated that this affected their production as they are sometimes told to 
move to another farm when their sugarcane crop was still in the fields  
 
Since the Chipiwa farmers are not beneficiaries of the FTLRP they were supposed to get their 
title deeds soon after the repayment of their loans but this was affected by the nationalization of 
all agricultural land under the FTLRP. The CSFAZ submitted that the uncertainty of land tenure 
vis-à-vis accessing of bank loans and various agricultural facilities provided by the government 
was a major setback and a threat to the sugarcane farming community. One has to have title 
deeds or have an offer letter in order to access a bank loan or ASPEF facility and the Chipiwa 
farmers are neither of these. 
 
The Chipiwa group of farmers had 10 hectares and the A2 farmers had 20 hectares of sugarcane 
plantations respectively. According to Scoones et al. (2010) 30 hectares were considered viable 
for sugar production under irrigation conditions, but however due to high demand for land in the 
estate some farmersended up having far much smaller pieces of land.As noted earlier on (Moyo 
et al., 2009) planners accommodated more beneficiaries than the guidelines provided for. 
 
Limited access to large farmland definitely affects the scale of sugarcane production (Jackson 
and Cheater, 1994; Watts, 1994). This has also implications on the adoption of agricultural 
technology by smallholder sugarcane farmers. The issue of land size as a possible constraint to 
sugarcane production comes about because of the concern that new technological improvements 
and adoption of new crops being biased against small farmers (Djauhari, et al., Undated). Jayne 
et al. (2010) noted that farmers with larger holdings of land are more motivated to grow more of 
commercial crops. Since most smallholder farmers own small pieces of land, it limits their 
farming activities, which ultimately reduces their profit (Simalenga et al., 2000).   
 
Closely linked to the issue of land size is sub-economic farming by the Chipiwa group of farmers 
due to the 10 hectare plots they were allocated at the time they were resettled. The district lands 
official indicated that for sugarcane growing to be viable, a farmer has to be on more than 20 
(twenty) hectares of land (Interview with Chiredzi District Lands officer on 14/11/15). At the 
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time of resettlement the Chipiwa group of farmers was divided into blocks of between six and 
eight sharing one irrigation water pump as they were under overhead irrigation system. It was by 
paying up this long term loan to THZ from their sugarcane proceeds that the farmers were 
purchasing and owning the farms. The loans have since been paid up and when they were about 
to get their title deeds, this was stopped because land reform nationalized all agricultural land 
(CSFAZ official on 17/11/15). 
 
The success of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme of 1982 in the initial years of resettlement was 
due to adequate support from the government and the core estates of Hippo Valley and Triangle 
Limited which formed the „consortium‟ that managed the scheme. The Chipiwa group of farmers 
had what was called the „Planters‟ Agreement‟ which governed the relationship between the 
individual farmers and the consortium, the later represented by Mkwasine Estate (Mlambo and 
Pangeti, 1996). Under that arrangement Mkwasine Estate provided staff and facilities to the 
farmers at subsidized rates. It also undertook to do the following for the Chipiwa farmers; control 
and distribution of water, control of cane cutting programmes, control and coordination of cane 
haulage system, full payment for cane deliveries by rail, supply of diesel for cane haulage, 
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides and liaising 
with planters and their committees on matters essential to the smooth operation of the schemes 
(Interview with THZ official on 15/11/15). 
 
Due to rampant theft of aluminum irrigation pipes, high maintenance cost of irrigation pumps 
and motors, and the ever-escalating electricity charges and power cut offs, it was cheaper to 
convert to furrow irrigation. The Chipiwa Scheme with assistance from the European Union 
Fund then embarked on a massive flood conversion exercise requiring plough out and 
redesigning of field layouts, cane replanting and construction of night storage dams. To date 
more than 1800 hectares had been ploughed out and redesigned for furrow irrigation and 800 
hectares are under flood irrigation (CSFAZ official on 17/11/15). 
 
The Chipiwa farmers also managed to buy haulage tractors of their own and have employed 
personnel to maintain the tractors. This reflects the commitment by farmers to reduce total 
dependence on THZ. All they are asking for is to have their hectares increased from ten to 
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twenty hectares. New farmers (A2) farmers resettled under the FTLRP) without as much 
experience in sugarcane as them are on more than 20 hectares of land and this to them defies 
logic. The farmers indicated that the ten hectares they currently own are no longer viable 
considering the costs of water, inputs, transporting cane and maintaining irrigation equipment. 
The Chipiwa farmers complain of unfair treatment as the pioneers in the land reform drive. They 
felt they should have been considered under the FTLRP since the ten hectares of land they got 
way back in 1982 were theirs because they fully purchased them. They argued that their farms 
needed to be increased to twenty hectares for them to peacefully co-existence with the A2 
farmers. (Interview with a CSFAZ official on 17/11/15). 
 
The CSS farmers did not benefit from the FTLRP because the government regarded them to have 
already benefitted from the land redistribution programme exercise when they got their 10 
hectare sugarcane plots in 1982. Freehold tenure which characterized agricultural land ownership 
in the colonial era spilled into the post-independence hence the 12 farmers under the Chipiwa 
Settlement Scheme. This group of farmers expected to get freehold tenure for the land they are 
farming after finishing the payment of loans advanced to them by THZ on the inception of the 
scheme. However, freehold was rendered ineffective and replaced by leasehold tenure when 
government nationalized all agricultural land under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in 
the year 2000 and beyond. 
 
Some A2 farmers who were on allocated land on formerly contested properties indicated that 
their operations were adversely affected because of movements (Interview with Mr Mangwiro. 
11/09/15). During the judicial contests, some crops were left unattended resulting in many crops 
wilting and many farmers losing out. Irrigation equipment such as pumps was removed at some 
farms. Many farmers claim to have lost a lot of money due to these contests because the money 
they were supposed to get in 2003 from what they had sold was held by the courts as some cases 
were still pending. As a result, the farmers were not able to payback whatever they had borrowed 
and the loans incurred huge interest rates. This was a huge setback as most of these farmers were 




Scoones et al. (2010) points to the elite nature of the land beneficiaries in the sugar industry this 
is supported by Moyo (2011) and Moyo and Nyoni (2013) who also out that land reform in the 
sugar estate was a way of meeting the middle class aspirations for land particularly in the context 
of declining living standards, wages and job opportunities in the post structural adjustment 
period.The results show 26.7 % are are former employees of Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, with 
35.6% coming from the civil service and the rest 37.8 % coming from the security services of the 
army and police. 
 
Land to such people was part of a portfolio of interests including formal employment to the 
beneficiaries. Incorporating and enlisting civil and security services personnel was also an 
essential political strategy during the redistribution exercise, as the political project required 
compliance and investment on a massive scale. Offering land as an alternative compensation to 
the absence of meaningful salaries was important but it also brought a number of highly skilled 
technicians, managers and business people into the sugar industry. 
 
Giving civil and security services workers land was a way cushioning them against falling 
incomes. But serious questions could also be asked about what the government is doing to the 
general high unemployment levels in the country given the fact that land redistribution could 
have been used to create jobs for the already unemployed. What is the rationale of adding 
something to those who already have something at the expense of those who do not have 
anything? 
 
Availability of implements is critical to the farmer as they determine timing and the rate of land 
preparation (Chiremba and Masters, 2004). This can affect the profitability of the smallholder 
farmer operations as it affects the total land to be cultivated and timing of farm operations 
(Anneke and Todd, 2011). The procurement of tractor power by the sugarcane farmers in the 
estate has been a priority for many of them. Those who found it elusive are left with the option of 
hiring from either THZ or those farmers who have the equipment. The use of animal draught 
 100 
 
power is not possible as ploughing out and discing requires a lot of traction power which animals 
cannot provide. 
 
Age was not considered when allocating land in the estate yet it is of critical importance.Age 
plays a critical role in agricultural production as age can affect the probability of a farmer being 
successful in farming (Dlova et al., 2004). The higher the age of the farmer, the more stable the 
economy of the farming unit, because it is assumed that older people have relatively richer 
experiences of the social and physical environments surrounding farming (Hofferth, 2003). The 
older farmers are usually regarded more experienced and assumed to be more technically 
efficient than the young.  However, Hofferth, (2003) noted that older farmers are believed to be 
more conservative than young farmers. Kuwornu et al. (2012) added that older farmers are more 
likely to be credit constrained; this might be because young farmers are still agile and more 
receptive to new technologies. It might be expected that the farmer's age would therefore 
constrain the adoption of technology in sugar production as drip irrigation and centre pivots. 
 
Education provides a theoretical foundation for informed decisions. The behaviour and decisions 
of a farmer depend partly on his or her level of formal education (Najafi 2003; Muneer, 2008). 
According to Dlova et al. (2004) the higher the level of education, the more successful the farmer 
is. When farming is the main source of income, higher education should enable the farmer to 
appreciate the advantages of new better paying crop enterprises (Najafi 2003), thus increasing 
farmers' education would certainly contribute to higher rates of adoption of new practices and 
engage in new more paying crop enterprises. 
 
One of the dynamics that emerged after land reform was how resettled farmers sourced and 
managed labour. Before the land reform, THZ depended on permanent and casual labour from, 
outlying districts and across as the country, in the case of specialized and technical skills in the 
sugar processing plants. Permanent labour comprises both skilled farm supervisors and general 
labourers who work on the farmers‟ sugarcane plantations. Informal conversations established 
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that 2 to 3 permanent workers are employed by each farmer for such tasks as irrigation and crop 
guarding while the rest is done by labour hired on a temporary basis.  
Temporary labour is required on a seasonal basis, for such tasks as weeding, fertilizer application 
as well as cane cutting. methods of remunerating labour varies from paying cash,  or giving 
grocery items like mealie-meal, sugar, soap, flour, cooking oil to clothing items as highlighted by 
Mr Chaminuka of Mkwasine; 
When we started we had to source our labour from those workers who had been 
retrenched by the company. In most cases we supplied most of the labour as a family. We 
sometimes enlisted the help of relatives and payment terms could easily be negotiated. 
With time locals from the surrounding communities could be engaged payment could be 
done in kind in the form of grocery and clothing items (Interview: 13/06/15). 
Each farmer is now responsible for recruiting his or her own labour. All the resettled farmers‟ 
labour force included mostly family labour and members of the extended family although there 
were instances where labour was sometimes drawn from a pool of labourers who had been left in 
the compounds by THZ. Artisans in the estates who work as mechanics, electricians, plumbers 
and diesel fitters are sometimes hired from the nearby Chiredzi town or individuals who decided 
to work on their own after quitting THZ employment. Family labour was critical in sustaining 
operations on the sugarcane farms especially in the initial years when funding for the resettled 
farmers particularly the A2 farmers was not available. 
 
In farming communities, labour and power shortages at the household level have an immediate 
and dramatic impact on agricultural production. The importance of family labour in farm work 
and the lack of mechanization in agricultural production imply that the availability of family 
labour is a prerequisite for a household to increase farm size (Takane, 2008). Smallholder 
farmers typically use family labour, with each member of the household old enough to 
participate in farming operations contributing (Mudhara et al., 2002). The shortage of labour will 
affect the planting and harvesting activities of sugarcane. Due to the reduced availability of 
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labour, households often change their cropping pattern to less labour intensive crops (Bishop-
Sambrook, 2003).   
 
Claims by by Scoones et al (2010) that the amount of labour employed per farm has increased 
over time could not be verified by the study as most of the resettled farmers do not have records 
of workers they employed over the years. However, informal conversations suggested a decrease 
in the number of employees as the resettled farmers cited high wage bills and welfare costs as 
compromising their earnings. 
4.5.  Conclusions 
 
The chapter established that the land reform exercise dramatically reconfigured the land 
ownership structure in Mkwasine Estate when the whole estate was compulsorily acquired under 
the FTLRP to resettle black farmers. It also found out that Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe needs the 
resettled farmers and vice versa. THZ needs sugarcane from the resettled farmers to fully utilize 
its two processing mill while on the other hand, the resettled farmers want an assured market for 
their produce. Without being linked to THZ processing mills, it could have been impossible for 
the black farmers to enter the capital intensive sugar industry due to large amounts of capital 
involved. Only large companies like THZ can invest in the expensive infrastructure 
commensurate with sugar production because they have the financial capacity. 
 
The study found out that there is gender disparity in participation in this commercial activity. 
More men than women benefited in both the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme that was introduced in 
1982 and the A2 Scheme introduced in the year 2000 and beyond. There is need for policy 
intervention by government to ensure that national resources are equitably distributed across 
gender. 
 
All agricultural land was nationalized under the FTLRP rendering freehold tenure ineffective. 




land unlike the A2 farmers who were allocated land estate free under the controversial FTLRP. 
As a result there was slow investment and or reinvestment drive in Mkwasine due to 
uncertainties around land tenure. There was also reluctance among farmers to improve the 
existing irrigation infrastructure as they are not sure that they would not be moved from those 
farms. Because of tenure insecurity, most farmers hide behind lack of capital to improve their 
farms, resulting in some existing infrastructure not being maintained or serviced or repaired. 
 
The land reform programme is yet to be finalized in the estate. The study recommends the 
government to speed up the process of issuing the 99 year lease agreements so that farmers are 
not moved from one farm to another for no apparent reason. It also recommends that law 
enforcement agencies be deployed immediately to protect the interest of farmers from farm 
disruptions caused by the emergence of  the so called „A5‟ farmers who are hopping from one 
„ready to harvest farm‟ to another. The study further recommends that the Ministry of Lands 
investigate the operations of its Provincial officers in Masvingo and District Officers in Chiredzi. 
To avoid the collapse of the sugar estate, chapter strongly recommends that a new land audit by 
an impartial and independent board should be carried out immediately in Mkwasine and that this 
must be followed by re-planning in the estate. The study recommends that these corrupt officers 
and other culprits be exposed and weeded out as they are obstacles to the economic turnaround 
of this country. 
 
The study also established that some A2 farmers had multiple farms registered in different names 
for example, wife using maiden names or son or daughter‟s name but belonging to one family or 
one person. It was also alleged that most A2 beneficiaries do not have the number of hectares 
cited in their offer letters and that land officers who have farms grabbed some extra hectares 
from their neighbours. 
 
It also found out the issue of sub economic farming in the estate. There is a glaring disparity 
between the land sizes of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers and the A2 farmers. The study 
found out that for a sugarcane grower to earn a living that farmer has to be on more than twenty 
hectares of land. It was disturbing to note that the Chipiwa Group of settlers was still on ten 
hectares of plots. Hippo Valley Estate and Triangle Limited established the Chipiwa Settlement 
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Scheme with the approval of the government. This was done in phases from 1982 to 1989 and 
consisted of 191 small scale farmers with an average of 10 hectares each and a homestead. The 
former have half the land sizes of the latter yet they have more sugarcane farming experience 
producing higher yields than the former. 
 
There is need to standardize the land sizes in the sugar estate for all the farmers. It recommends 
that any farm which is less than twenty hectares is sub economic and therefore not sustainable. 
The Chipiwa Resettlement Scheme has skills developed since 1982 and these should not be 
thrown away. The study recommends a new land audit for all the A2 farms and a re-planning 
exercise in the estate to ensure that the Chipiwa Group together with other resettled farmers get 
at least 20 hectares each to ensure viability. This should form the basis of setting minimum land 
sizes for the newly resettled farmers. Farmers with excess unutilized and unproductive hectares 
must have it cut down to an agreed average size so that no farmer is on less than 20 hectare. 
Equally no farmer should be in possession of land 20% in excess of the agreed average. This 
should form the basis of setting maximum land sizes for the new resettled farmers. 
 
The study notes that most new farmers do not have expertise in sugar production although they 
are willing to learn. Only the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers had sugarcane farming 
experience before they got their farms but the A2 farmers did not have. It recommends that 
government with other stakeholders must seriously consider setting up sugar technology training 
institutes equivalent to master farmer programme to improve sugar production and sector 
knowledge. There is also need to host training workshops to equip the new farmers with 
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TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN TONGAAT HULETT ZIMBABWE AND THE 




Redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe after independence created tensions and conflicts 
between former white owners and the newly resettled black farmers. The core estates continued 
to control the processing and marketing functions after land reform while the resettled settled for 
the production of raw sugarcane. In Mkwasine Estate the structural changes in land ownership 
and tenure systems reconfigured the management dynamics of the sugarcane plantations as black 
farmers operated side by side with Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ). The centrally managed 
estate paved way to individually run subdivisions by the resettled farmers. This transition from a 
centralized system to decentralized units caused some contestations over input accessibility, 
milling levies, water charges as well as the distribution of the proceeds from sugar proceeds 
between THZ and the resettled farmers. Using descriptive data collected from a sample of 45 
farmers in the estate as well as secondary data, this chapter examined the tensions and conflicts 
between THZ and the resettled sugarcane farmers in the estate. Findings from the study indicate 
that all the farmers in the estate were linked to THZ‟s processing mills at Hippo Valley and 
Triangle. Of the sample 26.7 % of the black farmers got input support from THZ while 73.3% of 
the farmers provided their own inputs. All the farmers (100%) in the estate received extension 
support from THZ. There was no uniformity in water payment arrangements to the Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority by farmers as 26.7 % pointed out that that they paid their water bills 
once at a time and 73.3 % pointed out that they were given monthly bills. Agro-industrial capital 
for the farmers has gradually increased with 55.6 % owning the basic farming equipment like 
tractors ploughs and discs and 44.4% hiring this equipment from other farmers who have it or 
from THZ. The study recommends the resolution of struggles over input accessibility, water 
charges and power cut offs by the relevant stakeholders for the sustenance of the sugar industry. 
It also recommends the standardization of water payment arrangements because all farmers in 





Although there had been white out growers linked to the Mkwasine Estate during the colonial era 
the proportion of tensions and conflicts between the white out growers and THZ has not been as 
apparent as now. The newly resettled black farmers are experiencing different challenges from 
their white predecessors. Firstly, in the colonial era white farmers enjoyed economies of scale 
from the large landholdings (approximately 100hectares each) they owned and managed whereas 
the land reform beneficiaries were allocated fairly smaller farms ranging from 10 to 20 hectares 
each (Jackson and Cheater, 1994; Watts, 1994). Secondly, the freehold tenure system which 
assured security of tenure in colonial period was replaced by, a 99 year leasehold tenure given to 
the black farmers following the FTLRP which nationalized all agricultural land. Thirdly, the 
relationship between the core sugar estates and the black farmers was severely strained by the 
compulsory acquisition of land without compensation. 
 
The operational arrangement of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and A2 farmers with THZ is 
very similar to that of white out growers and core sugar estates during the colonial although these 
land reform beneficiaries‟ landholdings are far much smaller than their predecessors. Unlike the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers where THZ was responsible for the management of water 
(Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996), road maintenance and coordination of the haulage system of 
sugarcane from the fields to the rail loading zones en-route to Hippo Valley and Triangle 
processing mills tensions and conflicts became more apparent with the introduction of A2 
farmers under the FTLRP.  
 
Questions on the equity of the nucleus estate out grower model as provided for in the Hippo 
Valley Act of 1957 and the Sugar Control Act of 1962 have always been raised since the colonial 
period. These two legal statutes provided the basis of operational relations between THZ and out 
grower in the estate. The provisions of the statutes which allowed a lot of THZ leverage over out 
growers in the estate spilled into post–independence land reform since the two pieces of statutes 




The post-independence reforms in land ownership and tenure system as discussed in the previous 
chapter caused some serious tensions and conflicts between Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) 
and the black sugarcane farmers in Mkwasine. Besides reconfiguring the land ownership 
structure and tenure system, land redistribution in the Mkwasine Estates also altered the structure 
and orientation of the management of the sugarcane plantations in the estate. The transformation 
from a single command structure to decentralized farm units created operational challenges for 
the resettled farmers and THZ as they interacted on a day today basis. 
 
Mkwasine Estate has no processing mill of its own and is 50 and 70 kilometres from Hippo 
Valley and Triangle mills respectively Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996).The future of the estate looks 
hazy since it is not clear whether the THZ would continue coordinating things like water 
conveyance, sourcing agro-inputs, electricity, servicing roads, providing health services and 
collection of refuse among other things. These issues have not been subjected to detailed 
analysis. The objective of the chapter is therefore threefold; firstly, to examine the areas of 
contestations between THZ and the resettled black farmers and secondly to discuss tensions and 
conflicts which have emerged thereof and lastly to suggest how the tensions and conflicts can be 
resolved for the benefit of both parties and the sugar estate. This comprehensive analysis of the 
operational dynamics that unfolded in the sugar estate is necessary for one to appreciate the 
challenges being faced by the resettled farmers in the estate in an industry which that is central to 
foreign currency generation in the country. This is against the rising demand for sugar and its 




The study established that the major causes of tensions and conflicts emanate from input 





5.3.1. Contestations between THZ and the resettled farmers 
 
Table 4.1: Land access and some socio-economic variables 
The following table shows some socio-economic variables where contestations between farmers 
and THZ mainly rose from. 










THZ loan & 
credits 
Yes 12(26.7%) 0 45 40.367*** 




Owning 12 13 25 13.091*** 







12 0 12 45.000*** 
Monthly 0 33 33 
N=45 
5.3.1.1. Access to THZ loans and credit: 
 
Table 4.1 shows that 26.7 % of the sample have an input scheme arrangement with THZ and pay 
back through deductions from their cane sales to the company and over seventy percent (73.3%) 
are not benefiting from the THZ input scheme. As earlier discussions indicated the agreement 
that the farmers under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme entered into with THZ stipulated that it 
offers them post settlement until a time they had fully paid back the loans it had advanced them 
upon resettlement. There is significant difference (p<0.005) between access to land and access to 
THZ loan and credit facilities. 
 
5.3.1.2. Farming implements ownership by farmers 
 
Table 4.1 shows that 44.4 % of the farmers own farming equipment and 55.6% hire it when they 
are ploughing their fields and planting sugarcane. These findings suggest a significant difference 
(p<0.005) between access to land and farming implements ownership by the farmers in the 
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estate. All the farmers in the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and a few A2 farmers own tractors and 
the rest either hire from THZ or fellow resettled farmers. 
 
5.3.1.3. Water payment arrangement to ZINWA 
 
There is no uniformity in water payment terms. Table 4.1 shows 73.3% of the samples are 
required to pay monthly bills while the remaining 26.7 % pay once in a while. The Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority (ZINWA) through its water storage reservoirs supplies THZ and the 
resettled farmers in the sugar estates. There is a significant difference between access to land by 
the beneficiaries and water payment arrangement. These two stakeholders complained that 
ZINWA was charging exorbitant fees on raw water and pointed out that that the recent 
percentage increase (2015) was not justified. The increase from $US190 000 per mega litre to 
$US1 900 000 per mega litre resulted in raw water becoming very expensive thereby making 
farming unviable. There is statistical significant difference between access to land and water 
payment terms to ZINWA. 
 
5.3.1.4.Extension support from THZ 
 
Both groups of farmers, which are the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and the A2 farmers, get 
extension support from THZ as well as the Zimbabwe Sugar Association (ZSA). Extension has 
been defined as systems that facilitate the access of farmers, their organizations and other market 
actors to knowledge, information and technologies, facilitate their interaction with partners in 
research, education, agribusiness, and other relevant institutions and assist them to develop their 
own technical, organizational and management skills and practices (Birner and Anderson, 2007; 







5.3.1.5. Power cut offs 
 
Lack of constant power supply by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) was 
adversely affecting operations the sugar estates. The sugarcane crop relies on irrigation and 
failure by ZESA to provide power continuously affects the irrigation schedules resulting in low 
yields because of inadequate water supply. Hippo Valley Estate and Triangle Limited generate 
electricity from bagasse which they bank with ZESA. Triangle Limited generates 31 megawatts 
from six turbines. Despite THZ banking its electricity with them, ZESA cuts off electricity to the 
millers due to current power shortages in the country. 
 
The resettled farmers indicated that they are subjected to long periods of power cuts. They blame 
both the government and THZ for failing to provide them with adequate electricity, water and 
transport. They also allege THZ is not paying them competitively since it is the only buyer of 
their sugarcane. There is deep mistrust by the resettled farmers and THZ as they doubt the 
authenticity of weigh bridge statistics for their cane deliveries to the mills as well as their sucrose 
content tests in THZ laboratories. These allegations could not be confirmed due time but THZ 
officials insisted that everything was above board. 
 
5.3.1.6. Growing other crops 
 
Some farmers grow other crops on parts of their plots as plough out. Instead of leaving the field 
fallow for three months before putting the next crop of sugarcane, the farmers prefer to put 
another crop to improve their cash flow earnings. Some farms appear to be underutilized because 
some farmers got fallow lands and were growing sugarcane gradually due to financial 
constraints. Farmers argued that they sometimes grow other crops to improve their cash flow as 
sugarcane takes twelve months to be harvested and within those twelve months, farmers find it 
difficult to buy fertilizers and pay for their water and electricity bills. They said this was the main 








Sugarcane is perishable. It must be processed within five days at the latest; otherwise it becomes 
stale hence fast transportation needed. Farmers should therefore have their own transport in the 
form of peri-loaders or be served by an efficient transport system, otherwise they risk suffering 
huge losses in the event of sugarcane turning bad. For those farmers who do not have transport of 
their own, and they hire transport from fellow resettled farmers or from THZ. There are also 
haulage companies which offer transport services during harvest periods. Farmers in Mkwasine 
which is 50 and 70 kilometres from Hippo Valley and Triangle respectively, transport their 
sugarcane by rail. Rail transport is provided by the National Railway of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and 
the farmers‟ transport charges are based on tonnes per kilometer rates. Sugarcane harvested in 
Mkwasine is initially transported to the three loading zones in the estate from where it is later 
transferred onto rail wagons by cranes to the processing mills. This a major source of conflict as 
highlighted by the following biography;  
Transport charges eat huge chunks of our profits. In most cases our sugarcane is not timeously 
transported to the processing mills. By the time it gets to the mill it will have lost quality. We are also 
not sure with the authenticity of the figures we are finally given since our sugarcane passes through 
many stops on its way to the processing mill (Interview with CSFAZ official in Mkwasine on 9/8/15) 
At maturity the cane is manually cut and put into five tonne stacks. Cane cutting is done by 
casual labourers who in most cases happen to be the farmer‟s relatives who are temporarily hired 
during the harvesting season. A ticket bearing the resettled farmer‟s name and out grower 
number is assigned to each stuck for records and accounting processes. These stack tickets are 
submitted to a weighbridge official when the sugarcane is delivered to the mill. In cases where 
the stacks are ferried by long trailers and rail wagons, a wagon or trailer plan is drawn at loading 





The sugar stacks are bound by chains and transported by special tractors with long trailers and 
peri-loaders to the processing mills. The peri- loaders are used in cases where the sugarcane 
fields are close to the processing mills since they can only carry one stack at a time. Where long 
distances are covered the sugarcane stacks are first transported to loading zones situated in 
strategic places in a sugar estate where they are later loaded onto huge truck trailers or rail 




When these sugarcane stacks arrive at the processing mill they are weighed before they pass 
through the weighbridge where the tonnage of each farmer is recorded and sent to the accounts 
department. The juice from the crushed sugarcane goes through laboratory tests for sucrose 
content which determines the amount to be paid to individual farmers. Skepticism abound from 
the resettled farmers on the weighing and sucrose testing processes their sugarcane go through. 
As A2 farmers we rely on the figures we are given at the weigh bridge and the content levels we 
get from the mill‟s laboratories. The officials who man these gates are THZ employees. We do 
not have our own representative who confirms the figures. The same applies to laboratory tests 
for sugar content! We are not sure of the results since the juice tested is a mixture of sugarcane 
juice from different farmers. (Interview with Mrs Tatira of Mkwasine 11/6/15)  
5.3.2.3. Laboratory tests 
 
As highlighted in the above biography the farmers are skeptical of the sucrose texts carried out 
by THZ laboratories 
5.3.3. Tensions and conflicts in the estate 
 
One of the most pressing issues has been the pressure for more land from THZ by prospective 
beneficiaries. The Shangaan people who live in adjoining communal lands claim an 
autochthonous ownership to the sugar estates and therefore demand to have been considered first 
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when land allocation was rolled out in the estate. They also indicated that they should be 
restituted for the land that was forcibly taken from their ancestors to pave way for sugarcane 
farming. While a few chiefs and some politicians from their side were allocated land under the 
„A2‟ sugarcane scheme, most of the beneficiaries are outsiders from elsewhere in the country. 
The following biography with Chief Gudo –who is an A2 farm beneficiary, summarizes the local 
people‟s sentiments; 
Our forefathers used to occupy this area and were forcefully moved beyond Mkwasine River by 
the colonial government to pave way for sugar production. My great grandfather used to reside at 
the foot of that small hill near Mkwasine Secondary School! There are our ancestral graves on 
that hill. When land redistribution started here l thought the lands officials were going to consider 
the original inhabitants 
In 2014, there were high profile invasions of the sugar estate by angry villagers and some war 
veterans who argued that the promise by the ZANU-PF leadership of giving them land for 
sugarcane farming during the 2013 harmonized general elections had not materialized (Newsday 
May 24 of 2014 page 1). That culminated in the complete takeover of the estate from THZ. The 
lucrative nature of the sugar farming activity has attracted politically connected elites from the 
more distant areas with some powerful politicians trying to assert themselves in the distribution 
process  
There is intra-conflict and tension between the Chipiwa group of farmers and the A2 farmers 
with the former alleging unfairness for being barred from benefitting from the FTLRP process as 
they argue to have paid for the 10 hectare plots they already possessed. There is also tension 
between the A2 farmers with THZ with the former resenting the contempt with which previous 
estate owners (THZ) has been treating the resettled farmers. Over the years, THZ regarded the 
resettled farmers as depending on them for survival or at least that is how the resettled farmers 
viewed the relationship that existed between themselves and THZ. 
These allegations resonate with those of other out growers globally who are locked in a 
monopsonic contractual relation with powerful companies. Informal conversations with insiders 
indicated that from the onset, THZ expected the A2 farmers to fail and tries to sabotage the land 
reform effort by any means possible. However the negative perception by THZ seems to have 
changed with time as it has realized that the land reform exercise is irreversible. It realized the 
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need to accommodate these land reform beneficiaries in order to optimally utilize the crushing 
capacity of its processing mills at Hippo Valley and Triangle. 
 
There are also conflicts amongst the resettled farmers over water usage. Some farmers 
complained that those farmers who were higher up the canal system diverted most of the water to 
their fields depriving those down the system of the precious liquid. It was revealed that some 
farmers at times exchange harsh words with each other and in extreme cases, exchange blows 
(Interview with Commercial Sugarcane Farmer Association of Zimbabwe official in Mkwasine 
on 15/10/15).Tension also arises when fire spread to other farmers‟ fields when harvesting the 
cane. Sugarcane is burnt before harvesting to make the harvesting easier. Fire breaks have to be 
properly cleared to prevent fire from spreading of the fire to other people‟s fields during the 
burning process (ibid). 
 
The THZ staff houses and compounds which had accommodated former THZ employees are 
major points of conflict, as farmers fought over the ownership of these. There are also conflicts 
over how former THZ country club facilities, shops, butcheries and beer-halls are going to be 
distributed to those who were willing to run them. 
The way accommodation is allocated is chaotic. No one is responsible for the allocation of houses 
in the former THZ compounds. As a result you don‟t know who is staying in the next house. We 
need a social services committee to dispense community development services as THZ used to do 
(Informal conversation at Mkwasine Country Club on.7/08/15) 
Given the location of the estates, there is constant through traffic of visitors and relatives of the 
labourers from the adjoining communal lands for fishing and sometimes, illegal hunting. Issues 
of security, crime, occasional violence in the residential compounds due large populations of 
single men, often on extremely poor or no pay also abound. Theft of sugarcane from the resettled 
farmers‟ fields is common as a vigorous illegal trade in fresh sugarcane develops. Disputes over 
pay, protests about the condition of housing and lack of services and complaints about the safety 





The provisions of the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme stipulated that THZ provide the resettled 
farmers with production inputs and credit for a specified period while the A2 farmers had no 
such agreement. The agreement assured the beneficiaries of post settlement support up to a time 
they had fully paid back the loans advanced them by THZ upon resettlement (Jackson and 
Cheater, 1994; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). This arrangement was affected by the FTLRP 
programme which nationalized all agricultural land. As a result the Chipiwa group of farmers 
failed to get their title deeds because of the development. After the FTLRP both groups of 
farmers could not access credit from financial institutions because of insecurity of tenure yet 
access to credit can significantly increase the ability of the farmers with no or little savings to 
acquire needed agricultural inputs to invest in future production, expand farming or diversify into 
producing new crops (Peacock et al., 2004). 
 
Smallholder farmers cite the lack of capital and access to affordable credit as the main factor 
behind the low productivity in agriculture (Salami et al., 2010). Yet the package of financial 
services available to smallholder farmers in developing countries is severely limited, especially 
for those living in remote areas with no access to basic market infrastructure (Kloeppinger-Todd 
et al., 2010). While in Mkwasine Estate in 2015 THZ launched the SusCo project to hundreds of 
previously unbankable farmers to rehabilitate sugar production it has so far ceased because the 
project was a five year one. 
 
Banks and other finance institutions often perceive the cost of making small loans to 
smallholders as too high. There are also high administrative costs per unit of currency when 
lending to disperse farmers, alongside the small amounts of money borrowed that is, the costs 
outweigh the revenues (Fairtrade Foundation, 2013). Also because of the lack of collateral and/or 
credit history, most smallholder farmers are by-passed not only by commercial and national 




The A2 farmers on the other hand sourced their own inputs from the open market. This practice 
often affect the profitability of the farming venture as inputs can either be supplied late into the 
season or after they have expired (Duffy, 2013).Only a few out of the over 400 farmers in 
Mkwasine Estate got fuel for agricultural purposes from the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 
(NOCZIM) in 2015It seems the government has neglected the sugarcane after the land reform. 
Thegovernment must take a kin interest in the sugarcane crop due its economic importance in 
terms of foreign currency generation. 
 
The government should not leave the farmers at the mercy of THZ through its operations at 
Hippo Valley and Triangle sugar estates for input support. These estates are in business to make 
money and not to be a Good Samaritans.Hippo Valley and Triangle Limited cannot continue to 
help the resettled farmers with loans and inputs at no premium as is being suggested by the 
authorities. The new farmers should be provided with inputs for some time until they have 
acquired enough resources to stand on their own. 
Both groups of farmers get extension support from THZ. Extension service is a good indicator of 
farmer‟s knowledge of agricultural information (Davis, 2008). It entails systems that facilitate 
the access of farmers, their organizations and other market actors to knowledge, information and 
technologies facilitate their interaction with partners in research, education, agribusiness, and 
other relevant institutions and assist them to develop their own technical, organizational and 
management skills and practices (Christoplos, 2010).In the estate THZ provides this in order to 
ensure high quality cane to its processing mills.The role of THZ extension officers involves the 
determination of the sustainability of development initiatives in the long run (). THZ extension 
services encourage farmers to adopt new cane varieties as well as new technologies in place of 
traditional methods The more intensively a farmer is exposed to its activities, the more prepared 
and willing he should be to adopt new practices (Swanson, 2006;Anderson et al., 2006; Feder et 
al., 2010). 
 
The Chipiwa Scheme used overhead irrigation in the initial years of resettlement but with time, it 
was realized that due to rampant theft of aluminum irrigation pipes, high maintenance cost of 
pumps and motors and the ever-escalating electricity charges and power cut offs, it was cheaper 
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to convert to furrow irrigation. The Chipiwa Scheme with the assistance of the European Union 
and the Successful Rural Communities project then embarked on a massive flood conversion 
exercise requiring plough out and redesigning of field layouts, cane replanting and construction 
of night storage dams. 
 
The near or collapse of some irrigations schemes in African countries can be attributed to a lack 
of funding and poor management and maintenance of infrastructure (Bembridge, 2000). Besides 
lack of funding alsolack of security of tenure is another factor that contributes to the erosion of 
existing institutional arrangements pertaining to the routine maintenance of the irrigation 
infrastructure in Mkwasine Estate(Moyo (2011). Maintenance of infrastructure is an important 
 domain in which institutional weaknesses impact negatively on productivity Rehabilitating the 
irrigation infrastructure, providing effective extension services and facilitating access to 
information are public interventions that will undoubtedly be of benefit to smallholder irrigators 
(Van Averbeke and Mohamed, 2006).  
 
The results also show that the number of farmers with tractors is more than those who do not 
have. Producing for the market requires production resources, which include land, labour and 
farming capital (Baloyi, 2010). Availability of implements is critical to the farmer as they 
determine timing and the rate of land preparation (Chiremba and Masters, 2004). This can also 
affects the profitability of the resettled farmers‟ operations as it affects the total land to be 
cultivated and timing of farm operations. 
 
While farmers in Triangle claim to be charged monthly for their water use, the farmers in Hippo 
Valley pay a lump sum once in a while. As a result farmers in Triangle Limited were appealing 
for the standardization of payment terms as the discrepancy was negatively affecting them 
because of their limited financial resources and also taking into account that the crop is harvested 
after twelve months. Cash flow in this case will be a problem. 
 
Both THZ and the resettled farmers complained that ZINWA was charging exorbitant fees on 
raw water.  They argued that the recent percentage increase was not justified. The increase was 
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from $190 000 per mega litre to $1 900 000 per mega litre resulting in raw water becoming very 
expensive thereby making farming unviable. 
 
The A2 farmers in the estate have water rights and are the once being charged monthly for water 
use. These farmers complained that they could afford to pay monthly bills for water. The farmers 
under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme pay a lump sum once in a while. The A2 farmers at 
Triangle Limited were appealed for such a scheme as the ZINWA scheme impacts negatively on 
new farmers because of limited financial resources and also taking into account that the crop is 
harvested after twelve months. Cash flow in this case is a problem 
The farmers also allege that the government is not taking them seriously as other crops are being 
funded under different schemes in the national budget but nothing is put aside for sugarcane 
(Interview with Mrs Chauya -A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 10/06/15).Sugarcane was being funded 
under livestock and „other crops‟. Farmers in Mkwasine are not relieved to learn this but ask why 
sugar cane is classified under „other crops‟ (Interview with Mr Chaminuka-A2 farmer in 
Mkwasine on 13/05/15). This only shows that nobody has really sat down to consider the 
importance of sugar in the country yet about 70% of dietary consumption at household contains 
sugar. 
There is no law or regulatory authority overseeing the activities of the stakeholders in the estate. 
The sugar estate would continue to have problems until such a time all the stakeholders in the 
estate come together and form a council that represent the views of both THZ and all the 
resettled farmers. The CSFAZ as has been observed only represents sectional interests of the 
resettled farmers. Farmers‟ associations are essential institutions for the empowerment, poverty 
alleviation and advancement of farmers and the rural poor (Penunia, 2011). Farmers‟ 
associations reduce transaction costs such as transport, search, negotiation and administration 
costs faced by farmers (Chikazunga, 2013) and enables knowledge sharing through networking, 
peer to peer training and good practice demonstrations which can yield widespread and 
significant benefits (Kumwenda et al., 2013). Economically, farmers‟ associations can help 
farmers gain skills, access inputs, form enterprises, process and market their products more 
effectively to generate higher incomes (Robbins et al., 2004; Penunia, 2011). By organizing, 
farmers can access information needed to produce, add value, market their produce and develop 
 122 
 
effective linkages with input agencies such as financial service providers, as well as output 
markets (Poole and Frece, 2010). Robbins et al. (2004) also noted that collective activity might 
also help farmers to obtain credit. 
 
An all-inclusive Sugar Council therefore set up, that draws its composition from government, 
resettled farmers, THZ millers, financiers, marketers, research and development and other 
stakeholders would, therefore eliminate fragmentation and partisan representation of the sector 
and increase the bargain and lobbying leverage of the sector to government. It is this council that 
should convince the government that their project is very important to the nation. There is no 
substitute for sugar and yet nobody pays attention to where it comes from. The Sugar Council is 
expected to drive the industry‟s adaptation strategy in line with global trends Together with 
government the Sugar Council should commission a policy study that would answer the 
European Union requirements to avert losses in export of the product that are emerging as a 
result of trade liberalization and in price reductions that were introduced in 2006. 
 
Also, investors and development partners such as non-governmental organizations may also 
come in to provide the legal and institutional frameworks to enhance transparency and to clarify 
privileges and responsibilities of the stakeholders in the sugar industry. One way of doing it 
would be to support farmer organizations in the sugar restates to ensure that the resettled 
farmers‟ voices are heard and that their interests are served in the long run. Banks should give 
A2 farmers repayment terms that coincide with the sugarcane income cycles. 
 
Lastly, the government has the key to the formulation of the legal and institutional environment 
that promotes the growth of the sugar industry as a whole. The government has the legislative 
tool as well as the political muscle at its disposal to create an even playing field for all the 
players in the industry. Provision of post-settlement support, creation of markets for sugar 
products and managing those markets are among some of the things the government should delve 
into. 
 
The sugar industry needs tremendous government support and intervention. There is therefore 
need to declare sugarcane as a strategic crop and not treat it as any „other crops‟. This is because 
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the government has an imbedded interest in the crop due foreign currency earned or saved by the 
industry. The government should desist from exercising distant interest and urgently address the 
challenges being faced by the sugar industry. Historically, as noted in Chapter 2, the Lowveld 
region used to be a country within a country because white sugarcane growers were self-
sufficient. The core sugar estates as they were and the white farmers then, did not need much 
government assistance but things have since changed. These are now new farmers who have 
smaller pieces of land than the white farmers in the colonial era. They cannot stand on their own 
and so government has to assist until such a time that they are self-sufficient. THZ is a private 
company and when it sources inputs from suppliers it does so for its operations only not for the 
resettled farmers. The resettled farmers must therefore benefit from government inputs schemes 
so that they are not left at the mercy of THZ. The company charges commercial rates for any 
service rendered to the resettled farmers on full cost recovery basis in addition to a premium. 
 
The government should also increase the size of land given to the resettled farmers. According to 
Scoones et al (2010) any land size less than thirty (20) hectares per farmer are sub economic and 
therefore not sustainable. Also the resettled farmers with excessive, unutilized and unproductive 
landholdings must have it cut down to an agreed average size so that no farmer is on less than 20 
hectares. Equally no farmer should be in possession of land 20% in excess of the agreed average 
so that many more farmers can be accommodated. This should form the basis of setting 
maximum land sizes for the newly resettled farmers. 
 
The resettled sugarcane farmers need government support when accessing loans and inputs and 
there is need for a vote for sugarcane inputs in the national budget. The resettled farmers need 
access to fertilizers, fuel and chemicals through institutions like Grain Marketing Board and 
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) just like other crops covered under the 
Government Input Programme. Loans given to sugarcane growers should be in harmony with the 
crop cycle and allow growers to harvest and sell and should design a facility for farmers based 
on a twelve months and not six months payback period. The farmers cannot afford to pay 
monthly water bills because the crop is harvested after twelve months.  Sugarcane farmers 




The government with other stakeholders must seriously consider setting up sugar technology 
training institutes to improve sugar production and sector knowledge. Most of the beneficiaries 
do not have expertise in sugar production although they are willing to learn. It should also break 
the monopoly of existing millers in the sugar industry by bringing in more players. A case for a 
milling company for the resettled farmers needs further research and support. 
 
The announcement by the Zimbabwe Government of E10 mandatory blending of anhydrous 
ethanol and unleaded petrol was a move in the right direction as it strove for the use of locally 
produced products thereby creating a market for the sugar industry. As the policy position taken 
rolls out evenly, starting mandatory blending, the local oil industry will embrace this in their 
operations and the product will be warmly welcomed on the market. What this essentially means 
is that all fuel that will be consumed in this country will have a local component derived from a 
percentage of ethanol that is produced in the country. 
 
The government may give tax concessions to the importation of cars that take ethanol blends 
while it must also encourage research of mechanisms to mitigate the adverse impacts on non-
compatible vehicles. Blending facilities need to be developed quickly while car manufacturers 
and assemblers need to start importing vehicles that take ethanol blends. This would also 
contribute to a cut in line with international oil prices. Where has been acquired there is need to 
compensate improvements made to the land. 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
From the above findings and discussion the study concludes that the resettled farmers in 
Mkwasine are not benefiting from government inputs. The Chipiwa farmers were once getting 
some of their inputs from THZ before the FTLRP but they said this ceased with the expiration of 
their loan repayment to THZ. The farmers indicated they approached government departments 
many times for assistance but nothing meaningful materialized. Only a few farmers out of the 
over four hundred in the estate got fuel for agriculture purposes from NOCZIM. 
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This has left sugarcane growers with no option except to get their inputs from the parallel market 
at a very high cost. The farmers appeal to the government to seriously consider funding them. It 
seems government has forgotten that it has settled A2 farmers in the Lowveld to grow sugarcane. 
Government should have taken an interest the moment it settled A2 farmers in the Lowveld. 
Farmers are left at the mercy of Hippo Valley and Triangle Limited, yet these are private 
companies who are in business to make money and not to be good Samaritans. 
 
The study therefore recommends that the government be responsible for the resettled farmers and 
provide them with inputs for some time until the farmers have acquired enough resources to 
stand on their own. There should be an allocation for sugarcane inputs in the national budget for 
resettled sugarcane farmers so that they access fertilizers, fuel and chemicals through institutions 
like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) 
just like other crops covered under the Government Input Programme (GIP). 
 
Having noted the importance of THZ as a service provider to the resettled farmers in Mkwasine 
Estate and considering the limited hectares that most individual farmers have, the study 
recommends that THZ remain with the 30% of its original landholding for it to be able to sustain 
itself and to provide services to the farmers. This 30% of the land is equivalent to 1 465 hectares 
and will form the basis of the core estate concept. Also loans given to sugarcane growers should 
be in harmony with the crop cycle and allow growers to harvest and sell. The study recommends 
that banks design a facility for farmers based on a twelve months and not six months payback 
period. 
Government must also realize that there are a lot of emotions attached to the land reform. Hippo 
Valley and Triangle Limited cannot continue to help farmers with loans and inputs at no 
premium.  Government should be responsible for the new farmers and provide inputs for some 
time until the new farmers have acquired enough resources to stand on their own. Currently, the 
resettled farmers are accessing inputs like fertilizers and chemicals and all other services 
connected to the production of sugarcane from either THZ or the open market but they were 
accessing these at a very high crippling cost. Farmers were very bitter that sugar was not being 
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taken seriously. There was bitterness and sadness that other crops were being funded under 
different schemes or in the national budget but nothing had been put aside for sugar cane. 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Officials in Chiredzi indicated that sugar cane was being 
funded under livestock and other crops. 
 
The study also concludes that linking the resettled farmers to THZ‟s processing mills at Triangle 
and Hippo Valley was a way of overcoming some of the traditional problems which include 
input accessibility farm equipment ownership and so on. The problems extend to lack of capacity 
by small farmers to adopt new technologies such as drip irrigation and centre pivots. The 
smallholder farmers are usually been reluctant to adopt these technologies themselves because of 
the costs and risks involved.  
 
On the other hand, the study concludes that THZ stands to benefit from the partnership with new 
farmers as it does not have to invest on the resettled farmers‟ land, hire labour or manage large-
scale farming operations which may tax it. Land preparation, canal construction and maintenance 
of loading zones costs in the sugarcane plantations are met by the farmers themselves. In the 
same vein, THZ shades off responsibilities associated with hiring labour such as the provision of 
social amenities like housing education and entertainment. Overall, THZ avoids conflicts over 
landownership as well as labour issues which have been plaguing the sugar industry since the 
early days of independence.  
 
Cost advantages for THZ are also possible. Sugarcane production requires a lot of labour and 
careful attention, which makes smallholder production by resettled farmers more efficient than 
estate plantations. This is due to the fact that the smallholder pays lower wages as compared to 
large firms such as THZ. Another advantage is that it is easier for the A2 farmers to get some 
services from the government at sufficiently lower rates of interest thus keeping operating costs 
down. This would result in THZ avoiding huge financial risks if it were to provide those services 
itself. The core estate –out grower model thus adopted in the three sugar estates promotes good 
public relations for THZ by presenting a progressive image exuded by partnering with local 
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This chapter examined the two procurement formulas used by Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) 
to procure the resettled black farmers‟ sugarcane in Mkwasine Estate after land reform in 
Zimbabwe. It attempted to answer why different formulas are used for farmers in the same 
estate. Methodologically, data was drawn from interviews and focus group discussions. The 
chapter argues that the inconsistencies in the two formulas are the sources of mistrust between 
THZ and the resettled farmers. This has culminated into tensions and conflicts between the two 
parties in the estate. Linking the farmers to THZ‟s processing mills offers a guaranteed market 
for their sugarcane. A fair pricing formula could enable the sharing of costs and benefits between 
the farmers and THZ. The arrangement was viewed as guaranteeing success where the majority 
of farmers lacked the requisite skills and capital. Empirical evidence from the study established 
inconsistent pricing of the farmers‟ sugarcane by THZ. The farmers are subjected to two pricing 
formulas namely the Milling Agreement (MA) and the Cane Purchase Agreement (CPA). 
Twenty six (26.7%) of the sample are under an MA and 73.3% under a CPA. The difference 
between the two agreements is that in the former the farmers share revenue with THZ as they 
partake from the proceeds from the byproducts of sugar whereas in the latter formula the farmers 
do not get anything. The study recommends the harmonization of the two formulas for the 




The world over, the biggest challenge to a nucleus estate-out grower arrangement, has been the 
establishment of trust between the core estate on one hand and the smallholder farmers on the 
other (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). This challenge also applied to Mkwasine Estate after the 
introduction of black farmers under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme in 1982 and the A2 scheme 
in the year 2000 and beyond. The resettled farmers and Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe were mired in 
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deep contestations over the inconsistent pricing formulas by THZ in procuring the resettled black 
farmers‟ sugarcane. However the resettled farmers in Mkwasine Estate continue to produce 
sugarcane, despite these contestations with THZ management over the pricing formulas as there 
is currently no alternative buyer for their sugarcane. Their success depends on the willingness to 
meet the specifications and conditions set by THZ. However crop quality, consistency, and 
standards are often the most contentious factors between the two parties in such an arrangement 
(Jackson and Cheaters, 1994; Watts, 1994). 
 
Sometimes it is easy for the contractor to manipulate the above aspects in order to push down the 
price offered for produce. For example, if the yield for a crop in a particular year is unusually 
high, the contractor may raise its quality standards so that it can reject those which it does not 
want (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). The processing firm can also delay collection times for 
produce and then lower the price if the value of the produce decreases. However the processing 
firms do not usually however get away with this manipulation indefinitely. Companies and 
governments have therefore tried to counter the volatility of the market and find ways to stabilize 
the price. 
 
In Mkwasine Estate the black farmers allege unfairness in the pricing formulas as there are 
separate formulas for the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers and A2 farmers who were 
resettled in the year 2000 and beyond. Tensions have arisen between the farmers and THZ as a 
result of the variations in the two formulas being offered by the same company to sugarcane 
farmers on the same estates. The chapter also discusses the marketing of sugar as well as the 
benefits accruing from the sugar operations to the farmers themselves, THZ and the nation at 
large 
 
The objective of the chapter is therefore threefold; firstly, to highlight the inconsistencies of the 
two pricing formulae after land reform; secondly, to establish markets for Zimbabwe‟s sugar 
including its byproducts and lastly, to establish the benefits accruing from sugar production in 






The following subsections show the inconsistencies in the pricing formulas offered to the 
Chipiwa Group of farmers and the A2 farmers in Mkwasine. 
 
6.3.1. Milling agreements 
 
There are two formulas used by THZ to procure sugarcane from the resettled farmers namely the 
Milling Agreement and Cane Purchase Agreement. Table 5.1 shows that 26.7 % of the sample is 
under the Milling agreement (MA). These farmers are from the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme. The 
remaining group 73.3% is under the Cane Purchase Agreement (CPA) which was created for the 
A2 farmers who were resettled under the FTLRP. There is a significant difference (p<0.005) 
between access to land and type of milling agreement by farmer with THZ. 
 
Under the MA pricing model, THZ pays a farmer on cash received price of the sugar sold. In 
addition to that the farmers also get proceeds arising from the sale of byproducts from sugar such 
as molasses and ethanol. This model recognizes the increasing demand of the sugarcane crop due 
to its multiple uses in different commodity market on the global market and allows the farmers to 
benefit from these. Consequently, the quantity of each byproduct per tonne of sugarcane supplied 
by a farmer to THZ is calculated and its price determined. The overall effect of the MA is that it 
allows farmers to share profits with THZ. 
 
On the other hand, the CPA formula allows THZ to pay a farmer an estimated average price of 
sugar upon delivery of sugarcane until the final price is determined. The final price is determined 
after the production costs of both the farmers and the millers are deducted from the selling price 
of raw sugar. This price excludes proceeds from byproducts of sugar. The CPA is tantamount to 




The CPA was designed for the A2 farmers resettled under the FTLRP, whereas the MA was for 
white farmers and some few black farmers who were resettled before the Fast Track Land 
Resettlement Programme.  
 
Table 5.1 Farmer group and milling agreements 
Variable Access to land 
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6.3.2. Milling levies 
 
THZ levies both groups of farmers for processing their sugarcane. All the farmers indicated that 
the milling levy charged by THZ‟s processing mills at either Hippo Valley or Triangle was too 
high and as a result eat into much of their earnings. They further allege that the exorbitant charge 
was meant to derail the gains of land reform in the estate. The following biography highlights the 
farmers‟ sentiments; 
THZ charges a milling levy of 26% of the revenue of each farmer‟s total delivery to its 
processing mills. We have always been making representations on behalf of our members to the 
government that the 26 % milling charge charged by THZ is too exorbitant. Resources permitting 
it would be advisable for the government to assist farmers to set up their own processing plant.” 
(Interview with CSFAZ official: 12/07/15). 
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The current milling rate implies that THZ is enjoying over a quarter of each farmer‟s proceeds. 
Assuming uniform productivity per hectare this translates to 26% of each farmer‟s land 
allocation. This means that THZ receives approximately 5 hectares‟ proceeds from each resettled 
farmer as milling levy. The levy will be over and above the loading and transport costs charged 
by THZ. What this really means is that for every 20 hectares allocated to each farmer THZ 
indirectly owns 26% of it. This translates into THZ indirectly owning slightly above 5 hectares 
from each A2 farmer on the estate and approximately 2.5 hectares, from each farmer under the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme. This effectively leaves the A2 farmer with approximately 15 
hectares and the Chipiwa Group of farmers with 7.5 hectares respectively.  
 
Closely linked to this complaint is that the weighbridges at both THZ‟s processing mills at 
Triangle and Hippo Valley which records all sugarcane deliveries to the mills are manned by 
THZ officials and so are the sugar laboratories which test the sugar content of the farmers‟ 
sugarcane. As farmers they have no representation at these key points, leaving them to rely on 
statistics compiled by Tongaat-Hulett Zimbabwe to determine what they receive from their 
sugarcane. The following biography captures the sentiments of the farmers with regard to these 
issues. 
“We need to be represented at these key points otherwise we are working for nothing. How the 
sugar is content of our members‟ cane be distinguished from the rest of the cane from THZ‟s 
plantations considering that these cane stacks might crushed at the same time.” (Interview with 
CSFAZ official: 12/07/15). 
6.3.3. Transport charges: 
 
Table 5.1 shows 55.6 % of the sample own tractors and as a result transport their sugarcane to 
the loading zone and 44.4% hire transport services from either THZ or other farmers in the 
estate. From the loading zones the cane is transported by either road or rail to the processing 
meals at either Hippo Valley or Triangle. Rail transport is provided by the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe whereas road transport is provided by some various transport firms. There is a 
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significant significance (p< 0.005) between access to land and transport ownership by the 
resettled farmers. 
 
Short distances in the estate are covered by tractors while longer distances from Mkwasine to 
either Hippo Valley or Triangle are better done by road or rail transport. For those farmers who 
do not have transport of their own, they have to pay lot money towards the transportation of their 
sugarcane to the processing mills. Transport costs include all activities associated with fuel 
procurement, servicing and maintenance of tractors and vehicles. It also includes payment of 
hired transport firms and the National Railways of Zimbabwe for those whose sugarcane is 
transported by rail. In addition to all these transport costs the farmers also pay loading fees for 
cranes which load their sugarcane into truck and rail wagons at the estate‟s loading zones. 
 
6.3.4. Pricing of sugar 
 
After sugar has been processed and is ready for the market, its price is determined by the 
Zimbabwe Sugar Sales Board (ZSSB). The board is constituted by THZ and Commercial 
Sugarcane Farmers Association (CSFAZ) officials. Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe is represented by 
directors of Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates while the resettled farmers are represented by the 
CSFAZ on the ZSSB. The government has no direct intervention in the pricing of sugar except 
that they are informed of the determination by the ZSSB as a matter of courtesy (Interview with 
THZ official at Triangle on 15/10/15).To make matters worse there is no price control in the 
sugar industry in Zimbabwe but only price monitoring as indicated in the following biography; 
 
The ZSSB comprises of directors of Triangle Limited, Hippo Valley Estates, and the Commercial 
Sugarcane Farmers Association.  The Ministry of Industry and International Trade has no input 
on that. The ministry has no direct intervention in the pricing of sugar except that they are 
informed as a matter of courtesy. There is no price control in the sugar industry but only price 




The CSFAZ submitted that to arrive at the price of sugar, a weighted average of resettled 
farmers‟ production costs per tonne is worked out first. The next step is that THZ‟s milling 
companies at Triangle and Hippo Valley also work out their milling costs per tonne. The selling 
price per tonne is then determined after the resettled farmers‟ production costs and THZ‟s 
milling costs have been added together and THZ‟s margin has been added. The resettled farmers 
and THZ would then share the difference between total costs and total sales (Interview with THZ 
official at Triangle on 15/10/15). 
 
The resettled farmers‟ contention was that more costs were incurred in the growing stage of the 
crop than at the milling stage. The deep distrust between the resettled farmers and THZ on these 
price derivations with farmers alleging the former was not paying them a fair price for their 
sugarcane. They pointed out that the difference between the producer price of sugar, which was 
then pegged at “US$11 000 per tonne, and the retail price which was $96 000 per tonne” was 
unfair and unjustified (Interview with CSFAZ official at Triangle on 17/10/15). It was confusing 
then to hear from farmers and THZ complaining about the price of sugar when they were the 
ones who determined the price. 
 
6.3.5. Benefits from byproducts 
 
Table 5.1 shows that 26.7% of the sample benefits from byproducts proceeds and 73.3% do no 
yet the two groups are operating in the same estate. There is strong association between farmer 
group and benefitting from byproducts from sugar (0.000***). All the farmers who are under the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme are under the MA which entitles them to sharing revenue with THZ.  
6.3.6. Marketing of resettled farmers’ sugar 
 
Sugar pricing varies in accordance with market demand and supply. Several competitor brands 
also enter the Zimbabwean market from the region and across the world. Sixty five percent 
(65%) of the sugar produced in Zimbabwe is for the domestic market and the remainder is 
exported to the SADC region, United States and to the European Union (Tongaat Hulett 
Zimbabwe, 2015). Exports to EU are duty-free and quota free subject to the „safeguard clause‟ of 
the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). Zimbabwe was 
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a net importer of sugar until 1963, when it raised its exports and exported 63 000 tonnes of sugar 
(ibid). This signifies an industry that has grown significantly. As at December 2014, sugarcane 
production by THZ and over 800 resettled black  sugarcane farmers in Triangle, Hippo Valley 
and Mkwasine was  estimated to be  300 000 tons of sugar (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2011). 
This entire amount was sold on both the domestic and foreign markets. 
Both the internal and external markets for Zimbabwean sugar have historically been heavily 
controlled in different ways and by different market forces. For the external market, the major 
factors are the constantly fluctuating world sugar prices, the major sugar buyers who issue quotas 
to the various producers and exporters of cane sugar, competition on the international market 
mainly from beet sugar and artificial sweeteners, the problem of trying to maintain supplies to 
these markets and the problem of transporting sugar to the markets. For the internal market, the 
main pressures are the local sugar prices which have been traditionally monitored by 
government, the increasing demand for sugar brought about by increases in per-capita incomes 
since independence as well as increases in population and industrial expansion. 
 
6.3.6.1. The domestic market 
 
The domestic market has been growing steadily since the first 10 tonnes produced by 
MacDougal in Triangle in 1937(Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). Currently, Zimbabwe consumes 
between 350 000 and 400 000 tonnes of sugar per year (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2015). The 
expansion of the domestic market has been a result of both the increase in the Zimbabwean 
population and a rise in personal and industrial demand for sugar and its related product as well 
as the implementation of the decreed agro-industrial wage rates in 1985 (Mlambo and Pangeti, 
1996). The demand for higher wages in the sugar estates in recent years has also fueled the sugar 
price on the domestic market. The THZ workers argued that the US$173 per month they are 
currently paid was below what their colleagues in South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland 
were earning. Although some resettled farmers use family labour, this development between 
THZ and its workers has a bearing on the relations between the resettled farmers and their 
workers who would expect their salaries to be reviewed in relation to their THZ counterparts. 
However, THZ indicated that it could only afford a US$10 increase while negotiations for a 
further salary increase continued. 
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6.3.6.2. The export market 
 
The country„s sugar exports are handled by the Zimbabwe Sugar Sales Private Limited (ZSS 
PVT LTD). All Zimbabwean sugar exports go through the Port of Maputo in Mozambique with a 
sugar terminal holding capacity of 120 000 tonnes. The ZSS PVT LTD is a company jointly 
owned by the Zimbabwe Sugar Association and Swaziland (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996; Tongaat 
Hulett, 2015). Like most primary commodities, Zimbabwe‟s sugar prices are also prone to 
periodic fluctuations given that most primary commodities produced in developing countries are 
processed and in some cases financed by the rich developed countries. This makes the 
commodities vulnerable to changes in the consumption patterns of the peoples in the 
industrialized countries and other changes in the global market conditions beyond the control of 
the producers. 
 
Price fluctuations for sugar, like those for most agricultural commodities, are also partly the 
result of the fact that the production cannot be controlled to match the demand. The farmer, 
unlike the industrialist, cannot reduce or expand production at short notice to ensure that 
production does not outstrip or fall short of demand. Responses to changed market conditions by 
agricultural producers normally take a long time so that by the time the crops are reaped, the 
market conditions may already have changed. 
 
In an attempt to minimize the effects of fluctuations, most sugar producers prefer to sell their 
produce through bilateral and/ or special arrangements under which they supply specified quotas 
to assured markets at a mutually agreed and guaranteed price. In 1965 Zimbabwe entered into a 
number of controlled market arrangements with various countries when it acceded to the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) established by Britain and its sugar producing colonies 
in 1951 (Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). Under the CSA, British colonies could export their sugar 
on preferential terms. However, Zimbabwe‟s participation in the CSA was ruined after the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the colonial government which wrecked its 
trade relations. The CSA was terminated in 1973 when Britain joined the European Community 
(EC)‟s sugar protocol under the First Lome Convention implemented in 1976. (Interview with 
THZ official in Triangle: on 5/11/15). 
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All African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that had been covered by the CSA were 
incorporated into the Lome Convention through this protocol. Under this convention, ACP 
countries export an agreed quantity of sugar annually to the EC at prices prevailing for EC beet 
sugar. The prices of EC‟s beet sugar are usually higher than world market prices because their 
prices are guaranteed by the Community Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
 
6.3.7. The wider economic benefits 
 
Apart from the inconsistencies in the pricing models applied to resettled farmers‟ sugarcane, 
there has been a general improvement in their economic well-being since their linking to THZ. 
This claim is supported by the latest vehicle models the farmers drive in the estate. Farmers are 
driving vehicles that were sometimes seen parked at social occasions such as funerals, sporting 
events and so on, by researchers. From informal conversations with some farmers, it was 
established that some of them had invested in residential properties in the nearby Chiredzi Town 
and some invested in faraway urban centres such as Harare and Bulawayo. There were other 
farmers who boasted of having managed to send their children to school up to university level. 
 
The above benefits from sugar also extend beyond the narrow economic well-being of the 
farmers. Literature on agriculture and development indicates ways by which sugar production 
can facilitate development. Firstly, it has been argued that the increased export of sugar and 
ethanol can lead to a virtuous circle of business growth. Macro-economic stability is enhanced as 
the balance of payments improves and export diversification reduces currency volatility. Also 
government revenue, in the form of company tax, income tax and other tariffs, charged on 
industry imports all increase allowing the government to invest in public goods like schools, 
roads and hospitals. 
 
According to Richardson (2010),  sugarcane mills either increase their own estate land, 
employing more people in the process or persuade out growers to provide more cane by raising 
the price they pay for the crop as higher value markets are targeted and production expands. 
Where smallholders are engaged as out growers like the case in Mkwasine, the direct benefit is 
that the producer base is widened thereby spreading the economic benefits to a larger section of 
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the society. The extra money disbursed to farm workers and A2 farmers will eventually find its 




The existence of two procurement formulas for farmers in the same estate implies unfairness on 
the part of THZ. It is unfair for some farmers share revenue with THZ while others are simply 
paid for their cane deliveries yet they are from the same estate. From the focus group discussion 
the farmers also indicated there was also no uniformity in the pricing formula at THZ‟s two 
milling companies at Triangle and Hippo Valley. While Hippo Valley claimed that it had 
recently started paying the A2 farmers for by-products like molasses and ethanol, Triangle 
indicated that the farmers would get payment for the byproducts once the modalities were 
worked out. Triangle indicated that the CPA would be amended to accommodate the new 
dispensation without elaborating why the company could not scrap it out and use one pricing 
formula for all the farmers. 
 
Since sugarcane from Mkwasine can either be processed at Triangle or Hippo Valley depending 
on the slots available at particular times, it means some farmers would be prejudiced while others 
benefit depending on where their sugar was delivered for processing. 
When we got land in the estate we thought we had made it into the lucrative industry, yet we 
didn‟t know that THZ was not happy with our entrance hence decided to manipulate the pricing 
formula that existed between them and our predecessors (the white out growers). In order to 
derail our efforts, THZ came up with two milling agreements; i.e. one for the established white 
out growers who continued farming although on reduced farm sizes and the other agreement for 
the black farmers (Interview with Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe 
official in Chiredzi on 14/10/15). 
 
Contrary to the claim that the MA was for white farmers 26.7 % of the sample who benefited 
from the MA were black farmers. These farmers belonged to the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme 
established in 1982. This group was incorporated into the estate without much controversy as 
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compared to the A2scheme which compulsorily acquired land from THZ without compensation. 
Coming up with a new pricing formula for these farmers by THZ could be viewed as was a way 
frustrating these farmers‟ efforts thereby sabotaging the whole land reform exercise by the 
government. 
 
Why do they offer two pricing agreements in the first place? This is strange! THZ was totally 
opposed to our incorporation in the first place! The government must intervene and stop this 
madness (Interview with Mr Mazambani- A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 12/09/15) 
 
And yet there are further more serious claims by the farmers as they pointed out in focus 
discussions that they are only paid for raw and sunsweet sugar from one season to next and this 
results to a low average price to the resettled farmers as compared to THZ and retailers who 
benefit from the sugar reserves when the demand is high since they have warehousing facilities. 
More than seventy (73.3%) pointed out that they should also benefit from refined sugar and other 
by-products as they supply more than raw sugar to THZ. The following is what Mr Mazambani 
continued to say; 
 
THZ only pays us for raw sugar while it gets more from refined sugars! We are also not 
benefitting from by products such as molasses, bagasse and carbon dioxide. We feel this need to 
be addressed as a matter of urgency because it is tantamount to daylight robbery. As farmers, we 
also need to benefit from the proceeds of our effort. 
 
One farmer alleged arrogance on the part of THZ whenever they tried to raise the revenue 
sharing issue. The following biography highlights this; 
 
When we raised this issue in one of our meetings, THZ were blunt enough to tell us that we could 
have the molasses if we wanted it knowing that we do not have the capacity to add value to it. 
This was meant to silence. However we fought on and enlisted the government‟s intervention 




From the focus group discussion some farmers indicated that they could overcome some of the 
problems they are currently facing if they had a processing mill of their own. They pointed out 
that the middleman role currently being played by THZ would be cut off; 
 
If we could have a processing mill of our own we could cut off the exorbitant milling charges we 
pay to THZ. The 26% milling levy of an A2 farmer‟s total tonnage delivered to THZ for 
processing is just too high and unsustainable! If the government does not have the money to assist 
us establish our milling plant, one way of going around this is that it should buy shares in THZ so 
that they can influence the company‟s decision making process in protecting its land reform 
initiative (Interview with Mr Makova –A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 20/09/15) 
 
In the context of rising demand for sugar products, sugarcane is being promoted for its multiple 
and flexible uses in different commodity markets. It is viewed as an alternative to fossil fuels i.e. 
as a source of bio-fuel, bio-electricity and bio-plastic. Sugarcane has long been used in multiple 
ways as medicine, condiment, decoration and preservative before taking hold as a bulk sweetener 
during the British Industrial Revolution (Mintz, 1986; Mackay et al. 2015). Before its 
transformation into sugar, the sugarcane plant has also provided the basis for molasses and rum 
produced from liquid sucrose as well a source of steam energy by burning the cane stalks 
(bagasse) left over after crushing. After the sugar is pressed from sugarcane, bagasse is the 
fibrous material that remains. The most common use for bagasse is the fuel to run sugarcane 
mills. It can also be processed into paper, replacing wood pulp. Bagasse is used to manufacture 
plates, cups and bowls, replacing Styrofoam.  
Molasses, the dark sweet liquid produced during the sugar refining process, has a number of 
uses. For human consumption, it is used in the bakery industry, the production of alcohol, and in 
pharmaceuticals. It is a common ingredient in cookies, cakes and baked beans, and is used in the 
production of rum and ale (Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe, 2011). For livestock, it is an energy feed. 
It increases the palatability of livestock feed and serves as a binder in feed pellets. 
Recently the exchange value of sugarcane has entered a new phase as both the variety and 
volume of raw materials produced by the sugarcane industry have increased markedly to include 
sucrose derivatives such as ethanol and other chemicals used for liquid fuel and plastics, more 
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intensive use of bagasse as a solid fuel for electricity and gas generation and the capture of 
„waste‟ from the milling process that is turned into fertilizer and animal feed (Mackay et al 
(2015). Even the cane straw – the tops and leaves that are and were previously burned away from 
the cane stalk before harvesting are now targeted for use with bagasse in electricity production. 
In the context of a rising demand for all forms of natural resources (food, fuel, feed, fertilizer, 
etc.), there has been a renewed effort to create and commercialize more and more revenue 
streams or to “optimize the return on every stick of cane” as the milling group Illovo puts it 
(Illovo, 2014), pointing out to the deepening multipleness of the sugar sector. 
 
There is also a greater degree of flexibility over which of these revenue streams takes precedence 
in the production process. It is no longer the case that all other raw materials are mere by-
products of sugar. Many processing mills are now increasingly engaging in arbitrage and „flex‟ 
from one harvest to another depending on the anticipated returns. 
 
This above observations lead to a major concern that potentially has important ramifications for 
rural communities and livelihoods in Zimbabwe: that is smallholder farmer exploitation. The 
resettled farmers in Mkwasine complained the government failed to provide the inputs promised 
to them, or that the inputs were delivered late in the season. Sometimes the quality of inputs is 
also substandard as some farmers complained that agro-chemicals were out of date. Following 
the harvest some contractors also failed to collect produce, instead leaving it to rot or collecting 
it later when the quality was not as good. This, along with arbitrary changes to quality 
parameters and suspect grading, may mean that prices paid to the resettled farmers are often 
much lower than expected. Similar complaints have been heard from contract growers in other 
parts of the country (AgriNews, May, 2013, pp. 6-7; SNV, 2007, p. 11). 
Of course, contract companies also complain about input diversion, side-marketing and side-
harvesting by small farmers (SNV, 2007). However, while the former have the power to 
withdraw contracts, for the latter there is very little recourse in the event that private contractors 
break the terms of the contract. As Dzingarai (2003) asserts, small farmers tend to be 
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unorganised and their grievances are often ignored because the terms of agricultural contracts are 
heavily weighted in favour of large agri-businesses. He writes: 
While acknowledging the inevitability of risk in growing perishable crops, the contracts 
are vague, if not silent, about what the role of the company should be in the event of 
problems arising. Thus the contracts do not commit the company to compensate the 
farmer when a proffered crop variety fails under severe or unfamiliar weather conditions 
(2003, p. 48) 
 
In such an event, the farmers in our study sites complained that they are still expected to pay-up. 
As Dzingarai notes, the company‟s expectations of small farmers are almost always clearly 
defined. One of the original resettlement farmers interviewed said, “The contractor is so hard-
hearted that he does not appreciate that there can be a drought” (Interview with CC, 15/02/12). 
Another from the neighbouring village said, “The problem is that even if there is a drought, or 
any other problem, the company still needs its money. They will take my property if I fail to 
pay” (Interview with MM, 07/03/12). 
 
The exploitative nature of some contracts can therefore lead to increased indebtedness, 
dispossession and the loss of wealth. In one case, a resettlement farmer lost the metal door to his 
house and a cultivator because poor rains meant that he was unable to repay the loans provided 
by contractors (Interview with PM, 20/02/12). The loss of agricultural tools and equipment, 
which can be expensive and are not easily replaced, both undermines the ability of the farmer to 





The chapter established that the price of sugar is determined by the Zimbabwe Sugar Sales which 
comprise of directors of Triangle Limited, Hippo Valley Estates, Zimbabwe Commercial 
Farmers and Chiredzi Sugarcane Farmers Association and that the Ministry of Industry and 
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International Trade has no input on that. The Ministry has no direct intervention in the pricing of 
sugar except that they are informed. The ministry is only informed as a matter of courtesy. The 
study therefore recommends policy intervention by government to regulate the activities of such 
an industry which contributes so much to the national economy. 
 
The study also established that there are two types of agreements that farmers enter into when 
selling their sugarcane to millers. These are called Cane Purchase Agreements and Milling 
Agreements. It recommends that Triangle Limited and Hippo Valley Estate harmonize these and 
come up with a single uniform agreement that is applicable to all cane growers regardless of 
race, colour, creed or farming history. 
 
The study further established that farmers are only paid for raw and sunsweet sugar from one 
season to another and this results in a low average price to farmers as compared to millers and 
retailers. The general feeling among farmers was that they should also benefit from refined 
sugars. The study therefore recommends the formation ofan all-inclusive Sugar Council (SC) 
that draws its composition from government, growers, millers, financiers, marketers, research 
and development and other stakeholders. This would increase the bargain and lobbying leverage 
of all the stakeholders.  
 
Also the National Railways of Zimbabwe must be put at the center of an integrated cane haulage 
model in the estate. The advent of the Tokwe Mukosi Dam means that sugarcane would be 
grown on a large scale throughout the lowveld and this also means that the distance from fields 
to the milling companies shall increase. That development implies a cheaper and more cost 
effective transport system is therefore necessary. 
 
The study was encouraged by Government‟s interest in one of sugar‟s byproducts namely 
ethanol but encourages Government to extend its interest to other by-products like bagasse which 
has a potential to solve energy deficit in the area. In other sugar growing economies sugar is no 
longer treated as the main product and has been substituted by electricity and other products. 
Because of the increased demand for sugar and its byproducts on the global market, the 
 145 
 
government can expand the sugar industry by introducing Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) 
arrangement and then change the ownership structure to a joint venture (JV) between the 
government and the resettled farmers and other stakeholders. In doing the BOT conversion to JV, 
due diligence and investment valuation, there is a need for rigour and creativity on the part of the 
government. There must be robust and creative valuation of the State‟s asset contribution to the 
project, such as the land, equipment, intellectual property, institutional memory, other state 
assets usable as security for loans, the partnership with Government as an asset and value 
enhancing instruments such as mandatory blending. 
 
Finally the study recommends the government to break the monopoly of existing milling services 
by THZ by bringing in more players. There is a case for another milling company for A2 farmers 
that needs further research and support. The study recommends that the anti-monopolies 
Ministry immediately investigates into this matter. The Ministry of Industry and Trade must be 
part of the board that determines the price of sugar because there is a huge gap between the retail 
price and the producer price. When the industry decides to review the price of sugar, the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade must be involved as an arbitrator and confirm price derivatives and not just 
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BEYOND SUGAR PRODUCTION: 
7.1. Abstract 
 
Land reform in Mkwasine Estate entailed access to some livelihood opportunities beyond sugar 
production. These opportunities include both „on farm‟ and „off farm‟ activities. Both activities 
play an important role in sustaining the resettled farmers who usually suffer from infrequent cash 
flows since sugar is sold once per year. These livelihood portfolios provide a vital source of 
income, which sustain some of the farmers who are struggling to make a living from their land. 
This chapter therefore examined the livelihood activities by resettled in Mkwasine beyond sugar 
production to argue that access to land by the beneficiaries opened other frontiers beyond 
sugarcane production. Although a sizeable number of the resettled farmers in Mkwasine Estate 
struggle to utilize land due to a number of reasons they are involved in a number of income 
generating off farm activities. Drawing from descriptive and qualitative data from a sample of 45 
farmers the study examined the diversification options that have been pursued by some farmers 
in the estate. These have not been subjected to a detailed analysis hence this study. Findings from 
the study indicate that farmers are straddling across sole trading, crop production, livestock 
farming, fishing and hunting as well as natural resource extraction to augment their families‟ 
income. The major off farm activity in the estate is formal employment outside the estate. Over 
seventy percent (73.3%) of the sample of the land beneficiaries are civil and security services 
officials who have no sugarcane farming experience while 26.7% are former THZ employees.  
The former have made limited investments on their land and this does not mean that they have 
completely failed. Some of them are doing far much better than those who are farming on a full 
time basis. While the former spent the greater part of their time on their formal employment, the 
latter are into full time farming. The study also established that both groups of farmers engage 
into off farm activities to boost their cash flows. The study recommends diversification of 
livelihood options to ease the cash flow constraints of the resettled farmers between the planting 




7.2.  Introduction 
 
When the government reconfigured Mkwasine Estate to redress the land ownership imbalance in 
the sugar estate, other diversification options to augment the resettled farmers‟ incomes were not 
given serious consideration. Neither the feasibility to pursue crops that used to be grown in the 
area in the past was fully explored nor a wide range of off farm activities like fishing, farming 
and hunting were explored. Cattle ranching currently occupies second place in the estate but is 
still largely controlled by THZ and some resettled farmers. 
 
In the event of plough out before the next sugarcane crop land should not be underutilized or left 
fallow as growing other crops improves the farmers‟ cash flow. Sugarcane takes twelve months 
to be harvested and within those twelve months farmers find it difficult to buy fertilizers and pay 
for their water and electricity bills. Instead of leaving the cane fields fallow for three months 
before putting the next crop farmers prefer to put another crop to improve their cash flow 
earnings Jackson and Cheaters, 1994; Watts, 1994). As a result some farmers have engaged in 
short life span crops (Muromo, 2015) as maize and sugar beans and other activities that help 
them to improve the constrained cash flows hence this study. 
 
The lucrative nature of the sugarcane crop due to its flexible and multiple uses on the global 
market as food and as an alternative to fossil fuels has attracted many players in the south eastern 
Lowveld culminating into the marginalization of other potentially viable livelihood options in the 
region. Before commercial sugarcane farming in the three sugar estates of Triangle, Hippo 
Valley and Mkwasine estates, Chiredzi District were originally dominantly inhabited by the 
Shangani people whose economic activities included hunting, cattle rearing and trading in such 
commodities as salt, dried fish, palm wine and clay pots (Saunders, 1980; Mlambo and 
Pangeti,1996). 
 
The livelihood activities by the resettled farmers after the reconfiguration of the sugar estate have 
not been subjected to any detailed analysis although Scoones et al (2010) and others have done 
much to highlight some outcomes of land reform in the sugar industry. This paper therefore 
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addresses this gap by examining how a changed ownership structure in the estate opened new 
economic opportunities to the land beneficiaries and allowed them access to some natural 
resources. The objective of this paper is therefore twofold; firstly, to understand why the 
resettled farmers engage in other activities beyond sugarcane farming, secondly to establish the 
livelihood activities pursued by the farmers in the sugar estate and lastly to suggest how these 
diversification options can be integrated into their livelihood portfolios to cushion the resettled 
farmers against risks that might be wrecked by infrequent cash flows as a result of seasonal 




This section presents the quantitative and qualitative finding of the chapter. 
7.3.1. The reconfigured sugar estates 
 
Table 6.1 shows that 26.7% of the sample was resettled in 1982 and 73.3 % in the year 2000 and 
beyond. The former belong to the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme and the latter to the A2 scheme 
.The former are doing full-time sugarcane farming and are resident on the estate while the latter 
take sugarcane farming on a part-time basis since they have full time employment in the civil and 
security services sector. While the former are responsible for the day to day operations on their 
farms the latter employ managers to supervise the operations on their behalf. 
 
Gender and sugarcane farming experience: Table 6 also shows 31.1% of the samples are 
women and 68.9 % are men who benefited from the land redistribution exercise in the estate. Of 
these farmers 26.7% had sugarcane farming experience before being allocated farms and 73.3% 
had not. There are significant statistical differences between gender, farming experience and 
access to land. 
 
Professional background and category of farmer: Table 6.1 shows the elitist nature of land 
reform in the sugar industry because 73.3% of the sample holds formal employment positions in 
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government departments. This formal employment leaves them with less time for sugarcane 
production 44.5% of the sample A2 Also the capital intensive nature of sugarcane farming 
requires people who have the financial capacity or access to financial resources. The table also 
shows 22.2% of the farmers are in the high producer category, 33.3% in the middle producer and 
44.5% in the lower producer category respectively. There is a significant difference between 
farmer category and access to land in the estate. 
 
Table 6.1: Socio-economic characteristics of farmers (Categorical variables) 








A2 scheme  
Year 
resettled 
1982 12 0 12 45.000*** 
2000 & 
beyond 
0 33 33 
Gender Female 2 12 14 1.593*** 
Male 10 21 31 
Sugarcane farming 
experience 





12  12 40.695*** 
Civil  16 16 
Security  17 17 
Category of 
farmer 
Low 0 20 20 14.318*** 
Middle 6 9 15 
High 6 4 10 
N=45 
 
7.3.2. Utilizing the acquired the land 
 
After the complete acquisition of Mkwasine Estate by the government there was not a complete 
break from Tongaat-Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) by the resettled farmers. Apart from the 
transformation of the land ownership structure in the estate, there was also an alteration of the 
management system of the sugarcane plantations. Prior to the resettlement of black farmers in 
the estates, THZ‟ management of sugarcane fields was centralized coordinated with clear top 
down command structures spanning from the General Manager (GM) at the top to general hands 
right at the bottom.  
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For the easy day-to-day management of farming operations the sugar estate was divided into 
„farming areas‟ of between 1500 and 2000 hectares of sugarcane fields under „Area Managers‟. 
The Area Managers reported to the Production Manager. Each „farming area‟ was further 
subdivided into smaller units called „sections‟ to facilitate effective management on a day to day 
basis. The sections under a Section Manager reported to the Area manager who in turn complied 
with the Production Manager‟s calendar pertaining to the planting and harvesting dates of the 
sugarcane in the estate. 
 
The entry of the black farmers in Mkwasine altered the centralized management system of 
sugarcane plantations in the estate. This orientation from centrally managed entity by one 
company to disaggregated units under individual ownership and control by the resettled farmers 
brought with it some changes in employment practices as well as provision of social services for 
the workers. Under the new arrangement, each resettled farmer was now responsible for all 
operations on his or her sugarcane farm. Depending on size, one original section found itself 
accommodating between 10 to 20 resettled farmers which illustrate the extent of fragmentation 
of the management system. 
 
The reconfiguration of the sugar estate also meant THZ relinquishing responsibility over the 
workers made redundant by the land redistribution exercise. After getting their retrenchment 
benefits, those workers who wanted to continue working for the resettled farmers entered into 
new employment contracts with the new owners. The compounds which used to accommodate 
labor for a single employer ended up accommodating workers of various employers with 
different management styles and remuneration packages. This meant conditions of service of 
workers (especially remuneration) who stayed in the same location varied. The resettled farmers 
secured their accommodation together with that of their employees in the former THZ 
compounds. The maintenance and provision of social amenities in the compounds shifted to the 




Unlike the old centralized management system, the resettled farmers individually manage their 
sugarcane subdivisions. Each farmer makes all the decisions affecting the day–to-day running of 
his or her sugarcane farm single-handedly as put in the following biography; 
 
Each farmer is responsible for the planning of day-to-day operations on his or her plot, 
such as weeding and fertilizer application. There are, however, areas where the A2 
farmers work hand in glove with Tongaat-Hulett Zimbabwe extension managers. Areas 
of convergence include irrigation water distribution, weed and cane disease control. Each 
farmer decides on who to employ and how many to employ! We only grow those cane 
varieties approved by Tongaat-Hulett Zimbabwe. Milling quotas for farmers are also 
regulated by THZ to avoid over and undersupply of sugarcane to the processing mills at 
Triangle and Hippo Valley.” (Interview with Mr Mazambani- A2 farmer in Mkwasine on 
6/07/15) 
 
The burden of managing farms on their own stretched some farmers to a limit especially those 
who had no prior knowledge about sugarcane farming hence the differentiated performance by 
the farmers as discussed in the following section. 
 
The following biographies have been loosely grouped into three broad categories already 
explained in Chapter 4. The high and middle producer categories are already accumulating from 
below. The last category comprises of the struggling low producer category which has not been 
doing very well on the farms and produce less than 70 tonnes per hectare. All the three categories 
comprise of farmers from both the Chipiwa Settlement and A2 scheme respectively. These 
farmers are either full-time sugarcane farmers or farming on part-time basis. However both 
groups engage in other non-farm activities beyond sugarcane production to augment their family 
income as highlighted by the following biographies. 
 
Mr Gobvu‟s main livelihood activity is sugarcane production which he sells to THZ for 
processing and marketing. He produces over 100 tonnes of sugarcane per hectare and therefore 
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falls under the high producer category. This farmer belongs to the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme 
who had sugarcane farming experience prior his resettlement. Apart from having a smaller land 
size than his counterparts (the A2 farmers) he is able to effectively utilize the acquired land as 
well as quickly making agricultural investments. He took advantage of new opportunities created 
by land reform in the estate. For example the departure of THZ and white out growers from 
Mkwasine opened avenues for the resettled farmers to start income generating projects. Some 
farmers in this category quickly took over some retail shops, butcheries and beer outlets left by 
THZ. 
 
Besides sugarcane production he also runs a grocery shop at Section R in the estate. He is doing 
very well as he produces 101 tonnes of sugarcane per hectare on average annually. This output 
compares favorably with yield figures by THZ in Triangle and Hippo Valley where up to 110 
tonnes per hectare are sometimes realized. He attributes the high output to his sugarcane farming 
experience as he once worked for THZ for over a decade in Triangle Estate as an extension 
manager. 
 
I came here in 2001, attracted by the prospect of better income from the lucrative sugarcane 
farming industry. I had served Triangle for close to eleven years and grabbed this option as a 
viable retirement strategy. I used my retirement package and a bank loan to establish this 
business. This shop used to be run by Triangle Trading Company- a subsidiary of THZ before we 
came here. Initially, I was not sure of the viability of this venture but now am confident that the 
business is making substantial income for my family. 
 
This business is helping quite a lot as it is supporting my farming operations as well. We recently 
bought a tractor and other agricultural equipment. The soil here is much better for intensive 
farming, especially for those farmers with better knowledge of agriculture. In terms of 
improvements, our business is doing well, and we are already planning to extend the shop to cope 
with demand that comes during harvest periods. Our farming will improve with time as we 
acquire more machinery. Despite the many economic challenges we faced since we came here, 




The biography above demonstrates how one farmer was able to take advantage of these new 
business opportunities. It also typifies numerous cases of how those who had access to financial 
resources or those who could utilize their banking connections to access loans could diversify 
into other things to supplement their incomes. These business opportunities contributed 
immensely to the farmers‟ operations as money generated from these was sometimes used to 
procure inputs. The narrative highlights how the farmer was able to make investments at a time 
when a large number of the new farmers struggled to establish their farming operations. 
 
Sugarcane is a capital intensive perennial crop. The need to augment the cash flows by the 
resettled farmers becomes necessary. There are quite a number of farmers who have ventured 
into business other than farming. These run stores, butcheries as well as second hand trading 
shops. With proceeds from this diverse range of livelihood portfolios, the farmers are able to 
acquire farming inputs, pay labour and meet their subsistence costs and finance their children‟s 
education as well as making investments on or outside the farms. 
 
Mr Sakala is also senior agricultural extension officer under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
stationed at the district offices in Chiredzi When the resettlement in the sugar estates was rolled 
out, he was in the know since his Ministry was a key play in the exercise. He falls under the 
middle producer category as he produces on average 85 tonnes of sugarcane per hectare.This 
category consists of farmers from both the Chipiwa Settlement and A2 schemes. These farmers 
have been able to reproduce themselves mainly through income from sugar production as well as 
formal employment as civil servants or other professions. Although farmers in this category do 
not have the financial endowment to make large scale investments, they have been able to 
manage their plots effectively, construct houses and acquire some tractors and other farming 
implements. They have generally relied on family labour in order to do most of their farming 
operations. 
 
Those who come from outlying rural districts such as Zaka, Bikita and Chivi generally have 
better access to extended family networks which are a vital source of labour. However, for those 
who come from areas further away, it was generally difficult to access labour from extended 
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family networks given the logistics involved and they had to make do with whatever labour they 
had in order to establish themselves. 
 
An important characteristic of people in this category is that they are largely formally employed. 
However they also engage in a wide variety of off-farm income generating activities although 
sugarcane growing remains a key part of their livelihoods. For example, some engage in petty 
entrepreneurial activities such as trade in household goods sourced through cross-border trade. 
Within this group are also those who have accumulated enough capital through livestock farming 
and commuter transport service to acquire farming equipment and to hire labour on a seasonal 
basis. Such people are already accumulating from below. The biography below highlights the 
dynamics that shaped the way farmers in this category have invested in their land and how off-
farm activities are a key part of their livelihoods. 
 
Mr Sakala claims he submitted his application for the farm like anyone and managed to get his 
20 hectare farm. He is of Malawian parentage and had this to say: 
 
I was born in Zimbabwe but my father originally came here during the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland in the 1950s. I have a family with four children. I worked as a section supervisor 
since 1980 in Hippo Valley. 
 
I have an Honors degree in Agriculture from the University of Zimbabwe. By virtue of working 
for the Ministry of Agriculture I was in the know when the scheme was introduced in 2001, and I 
also applied for a farm here. My academic qualifications were an added advantage and my 
application was considered. During the land invasions of white out grower areas in the year 2000 
in Hippo Valley, I actively participated and partnered war veterans who occupied white farms. 
Since l got a farm here in Mkwasine my life has changed significantly due to proceeds from this 
lucrative activity. Besides sugarcane farming I have also curved part of the dry land adjacent to 
my plot for livestock rearing as I am on the outskirts of the estate. The dry land used to be a game 
reserve but with the advent of land redistribution it was converted to a resettlement area after the 
some wild animals were moved to the Gonarezhou National Park. A number of A2 farmers who 




I am still in the process of clearing more land, as I want to expand my farming operations by 
diversifying into non-sugar crops. I use the income from livestock sales to buy agricultural inputs, 
pay school fees and buy food for my family in times of droughts. This place has a lot of potential, 
the only challenge we face here is access to inputs and government support. We hope the 
government can provide support in the long term (Interview with Sakala on 04/10/15). 
 
This biography indicates that some people in this category have invested in their land despite the 
challenges they faced after resettlement. A fundamental characteristic of people in this category 
is that they owned limited means to utilize the land when they were resettled. However, such 
people have taken advantage of new opportunities associated with the new land to acquire 
livestock, farming inputs, agricultural equipment and to hire seasonal labour. Off farm 
livelihoods such as dry land farming and livestock farming have also played important roles in 
the way people in this category have accumulated assets. This demonstrates the importance of 
off farm livelihoods to the way a large number of the farmers have been able to eke out a living 
in the estate. 
 
Farmers in this category have benefitted off farm activities with part of the money earned being 
also used to address immediate needs such as school fees and daily provisions. Since farmers in 
this category were generally aware of shocks on the market such as a fall in prices they also 
tended to use income from non-farm activities to sustain themselves when cash flows are 
constrained. Petty entrepreneurial activities such as cross border trade provided an additional 
source of income for some of them. 
 
For some farmers in this category engaging in other income generating activities is a way of 
spreading risks although this eats into much of their sugarcane production time. From the 
interview the farmer indicated that he intended to expand his agricultural production in future 
when the economic situation improves. Thus patterns of agricultural investments might change 
in future as the farmers access more help or have the financial resources to invest on their land. 
An important dynamic reflected by this biography is that farmers in this group are involved in a 
wide variety of off farm activities which are linked to their sugar production operations. 
Accumulation patterns in this group have thus been highly influenced by the presence of 
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opportunities to gain some income through formal employment and other income generating 
activities such as livestock farming and dry land farming. 
 
One of the most important aspects of the land reform which has received limited attention in 
literature is how the new farmers conceptualize land reform. Across the above two biographies, 
the new land acquired in Mkwasine was viewed as an asset that provided economic opportunities 
not only in the present but in the future. Thus, challenges in utilizing the allocated land which 
confronted the resettled farmers at the time of resettlement were viewed as temporary 
impediments to be overcome in the future. 
 
Another important factor reflected in the two biographies is that the farmers did not necessarily 
view the benefits of land reform as only about acquiring land to grow sugarcane but access to dry 
land farming, livestock rearing, game ranching and employment opportunities associated with 
the new land were all viewed as benefits of land reform. Therefore, land reform is 
conceptualized as a process which could enhance economic opportunities beyond farming. This 
biography of a farmer in this category demonstrates that although patterns of accumulation and 
social differentiation have emerged among the farmers, success and failure are relative concepts 
requiring an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of livelihoods that have emerged in the 
aftermath of land reform. 
 
Mr Chasakara is a war veteran and superintendent in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. He is an A2 
farmer in the low income category producing less than 70 tonnes of sugarcane per hectare. When 
the A2 sugar scheme in the estate started, it appealed to him as a lucrative retirement package. 
Farmers in this category have been able to reproduce themselves mainly through income from 
formal employment as civil servants or other professions. Not everybody who came to the 
Mkwasine Estate succeeded in their operations. Some people had applied for the land without the 
slightest idea of what sugarcane farming entailed. These people comprise of civil and security 
services personnel and urbanites across the breadth of Zimbabwe. Some of these people were 
experiencing loss of earnings due to the worsening economic situation in the country and applied 
for sugarcane farms in the sugar estate in search of the “peasant option” (Rutherford 
2002).Because of lack of sugarcane farming skills and capital, these people constitute the 
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struggling group of the resettled farmers in the estates which this study refers to as low income 
earners. 
 
Some of these people only benefitted from the sale of the first cane crop they inherited from 
THZ at the time the land was acquired. After getting proceeds from the first sugarcane sales they 
failed to reinvest onto the land. Instead of acquiring inputs and farming implements they used the 
money to buy residential properties in urban centres and luxurious vehicles. As a result their 
farms later on performed poorly and part of the land went fallow. The biography below 
highlights how some of the farmers in this category have survived in terms of livelihoods. 
 
I am a police officer who has risen to the post of superintendent over the years. I embarked on 
sugarcane farming to earn extra income in the face of falling wages due to harsh economic times 
facing the nation. After the war of liberation l joined the police as a constable and rose through 
the ranks. Before getting a sugarcane plot here I had a smallholding in Gokwe District where I 
grew cotton until the late 1990s when cotton growing became unprofitable due to poor prices and 
expensive inputs. I did not dream of sugarcane farming in my life. The activity requires a lot of 
capital and my pension and savings were not adequate. I looked to the government to provide us 
with post-settlement support but it was also struggling to meet its obligations. I am also thinking 
of starting a security company to guard the farmers‟ property here. I hope it is going to be a 
lucrative business. This will give me more income to utilize on my land (Interviewed at 
Mkwasine 28/09/15).  
 
The biography above highlights that there is a group of people who are struggling to sustain their 
livelihoods although they accessed land under the FTLRP. The fact that there are people who 
have land but who continue to live in poverty poses serious questions to the whole land 
resettlement programme. 
 
All in all, the above three biographies demonstrate that success in establishing oneself was 
dependent on many factors. Firstly, those who were formally employed and had access to loans 
and credit had a better chance of quickly re-establishing new farming operations after being 
resettled because they were able to hire labour. Secondly, being a pensioner after formal 
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employment enhanced one‟s chances to access inputs and other support services, which were 
largely accessed through funding from banks. Those who had the financial endowment before 
they were resettled were able to quickly take advantage of opportunities provided by the land 
reform as they were able to hire labour to work the land and to invest on it. 
 
7.3.3. Other livelihood activities 
 
Picturing the resettled farmers in Mkwasine as bonded to sugarcane production only would 
therefore be misleading. This supports Scoones et al. (2010: 166)‟s observation that “livelihoods 
in Africa are highly diversified and Zimbabwe is no exception”. The new land in Mkwasine 
Estate has brought with it greater benefits which were non-existent when the area was under 
Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe. 
 
7.3.3.1. Dryland and livestock farming 
 
Huge portions of wildlife conservancies around Mkwasine were converted to resettlement areas 
under the FTLRP despite relatively high climatic constraints. The semi-arid nature of the region, 
characterized by very low rainfall totals and high temperatures is not conducive to agricultural 
activity. The region lies within a region whose soil fertility and water economy are too poor to 
permit cropping except under irrigation or on a limited scale. This region was considered suitable 
only for cattle ranching. 
 
Some resettled farmers in the estate have also accessed land in the areas adjacent to the estate 
where they have established some homes. On this land they grow maize, sorghum and other 
small grains a variety of crops other than sugarcane. The area is watered by two our major rivers, 
which flow southwards (Chiredzi and Runde) and provide fresh water for domestic animals such 
as cattle, goats and sheep for subsistence and income. These activities go a long way in 






7.3.3.2. Hunting and fishing 
 
The newly resettled areas around the estates are located in an area rich in wildlife. Although the 
Zimbabwe National Parks has relocated some wildlife to the nearby Gonarezhou National Park, a 
wide range of hunting and fishing activities are undertaken. Trade in game meat although illegal 
is lucrative business in the area. It is largely a male activity undertaken through informal 
networks. In the early stages of resettlement, a large number of warthogs and other small game 
such as impala were snared and hunted with dogs. The meat was sold to other resettled farmers. 
The informal meat markets became a vital source of income for some farmers although this 
could not be sustained in the long term. 
 
The riverine ecosystems are also a source of fresh water fish and other wildlife, which are 
harvested by the farmers in the estate for own consumption and for sale. The new land has thus 
brought with it a wide variety of off- farm income opportunities providing the new farmers with 
more income options at a time when many of them were struggling to earn a decent living from 
the land. 
7.3.3.3. Natural resource extraction 
 
Mkwasine Estate has a wide variety of flora and fauna which are also accessible to the resettled 
farmers. They can harvest wildlife and other natural resources which are in relative abundance. 
Historically, such natural resources were formerly a preserve of the white landowners and 
foreign tourists who frequented the area during the safari hunting seasons. 
 
The pristine woodlands across the former white owned farms also provide a rich array of wild 
plants and timber which are harvested for both domestic consumption and for sale locally and in 
the nearby town of Chiredzi. The gathering of wild fruits and plants for sale at informal markets 
by the roadside is mainly undertaken by women. The trade in wild plants and fruits provided 
women with some income which supplemented their agricultural activities. The wide variety of 
flora in the around the sugar estate was not only exploited for economic gain, but one of the three 
farmers interviewed highlighted how some plant species with medicinal qualities were highly 
valued and conserved by the settlers. 
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Certain species, for example like gavakava (aloe-vera) commonly found in the area, are 
harvested to cure livestock diseases such as red water common during the summer season. Other 
plants are propagated and harvested to cure ailments such as headaches, stomach pains and 
fevers. An informant who is also into the selling of herbs  highlighted how „land reform‟ had 
created access to a wide range of plants with medicinal qualities which were no longer available 
in ecologically degraded communal areas.(Interview with Mr Gobvu at Mkwasine 23/10/15). 
 
This highlights that there are certain types of plants that people are compelled to conserve as they 
provide a vital source of alternative medicine in the absence of health care workers and clinics in 
the new area. The wide scale utilization of natural resources after land reform in the sugar estates 
has triggered fears of an environmental catastrophe among local authority structures such as the 
Environmental Management Authority and district council. Although these local authorities are 
tasked with policing natural resource utilization, they tend not to strictly enforce the statutory 
laws governing their utilization. There are various reasons for their failure to enforce the laws. 
Firstly, since councilors, being beneficiaries of farms themselves, and live among the resettled 
people, they have a better understanding of the challenges faced by people and why such people 
end up over exploiting certain natural resources in the area. This is highlighted in an interview 
with a councilor in the estate who observed that: 
 
I am against people who randomly cut down trees or engage in careless hunting of wild animals. 
We want to reserve these natural resources for future generations, however we should also 
understand that rural people have needs that they to address on a daily bases. If those problems 
are addressed, such as having access to alternative sources of energy or meat, then there will be 
less pressure on the environment‟ (Interview  with Mutemachani- a local councilor on 23/09/15). 
 
The above illustrates that local authorities are aware of the over exploitation of natural resources 
after land reform but are also faced with the dilemma of enforcing laws if there are no 
alternatives available for ordinary people. Interviews with ordinary people indicate that histories 
of colonial enclosure of land and natural resources influenced the trajectory of natural resource 
extraction. For example, the three informants above highlighted that „there was nothing wrong 
with them hunting wild animals as they have been historically barred from hunting while whites 
could hunt at will‟ (Interview with Sakala in Mkwasine on 04/10/15). Some oral interviews 
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indicated that wild animals such as warthogs destroyed the A2 farmers‟ sugarcane crop and 
hence they needed to be culled. They further argued that it was inevitable that after resettlement 
trees were bound to be cut as people needed to clear land to grow crops (Interview with Sikala at 
Mkwasine04//10/15). Thus, the dynamics of natural resource utilization after land reform are 
complex and require an in-depth understanding of why and how people exploit such resources. 
 
7.3.3.4. Informal petty trading 
 
Petty trading in household items and second hand clothing has become a major source of income 
for some A2 farmers and other farmers resettled in the area. The commodities ordered from 
Chinese shops from as far as Harare and grocery items from large retailers in nearby Chiredzi 
Town by the farmers‟ wives, apart from being a source of income for the farmers have also 
become a means of payment for labour by the farmers in the area. 
7.3.3.5. Cross border trade 
 
Another important off-farm activity closely related to the above in the sugar estate was cross 
border trade. Women from Mkwasine and the resettled area around it engaged in cross border 
trade as a way of supplementing family income. A wide variety of goods were imported and sold 
locally by mostly women traders. These products comprised, inter alia, mobile phones, solar 
panels, mobile phone solar chargers, TV sets and radios. The availability of mobile phone 
connectivity across the three estates and the wider area has led to an upsurge in the use of mobile 
phones among the A2 farmers and their employees. This has created a large market for mobile 
phones and associated gadgets such as solar chargers and solar panels in the newly resettled area 
since the new farmers are not connected to the electricity grid. 
 
The location of the three sugar estate closes to both road and rail infrastructure meant that it was 
relatively easy for women from the area to travel across Zimbabwe‟s borders in order to import a 
wide variety of household goods for resale. These goods were sold to A2 farmers and their 
employees as well. Female informants interviewed informally highlighted how they regularly 
travelled to Zambia, South Africa and Botswana where they exported locally made handcrafts 
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and embroidered clothes which were popular in those neighbouring countries and in turn 
imported goods for sale locally: 
 
We regularly go to Zambia or Botswana to sell locally made handcrafts or hand broidered clothes 
that are in demand in these countries. We started going to Zambia in 2004 because life here was 
difficult because of inflation. We sold goods there and in turn we brought back some foreign 
currency which was in demand in Zimbabwe. We also brought back foodstuffs such as cooking 
oil which were in short supply in Zimbabwe. When the economy stabilized in 2008, there was a 
new demand for electrical gadgets such as mobile phones, solar chargers and solar panels. We 
import these goods and sell them in the sugar estates and Chiredzi Town (Interview with Mrs 
Gava in Mkwasine on 20/11/15).  
 
This highlights how women have become actively mobile and engaged in income generating 
activities. Women are no longer bonded at family farms reproducing male labour as was 
historically the case in communal areas. They are now active travelers across borders exporting 
and importing products for domestic consumption and for resale. This new mobility by women 
has a bearing on ownership of assets at household level. Several women indicated that they now 
also owned various assets bought from income gained from cross border trade: 
 
I acquired leather sofas and paid school fees for my daughter after selling the goods I imported 
from South Africa. I also contributed money which we used to buy a ploughing disc. This year 
alone, I bought all the fertilizer for our plot. Cross border trading has helped me to augment the 
income realized by my husband from sugar production. It goes a long way in supporting my 
family since just staying at home as a house wife does not help anything (interview with Mai 
Banda in Mkwasine on 14/09/15). 
 
The role of women after land reform has changed from being the traditional housewives who 
offer support to their spouses as some women have been able to contribute to the family purse 
and acquire assets for the family in the process. Also unlike before, when ownership of livestock 
such as cattle was a preserve for men, in Mkwasine estate, land reform necessitated some women 
to own livestock and agricultural equipment such as ploughs and tractors. Ownership of such 
assets has empowered the women to have leverage over the control of family income and assets 
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and enhanced their ability to have a say in the way land is utilized and leverage over how the 




Land reform in Zimbabwe‟s sugar estates in the first decade of the country‟s independence 
(1980-1990) was constrained by the willing buyer willing seller (WSWB) clause of the Lancaster 
House Constitution which ushered independence for the country in 1980. The first attempt to 
reconfigure the sugar industry was when the government acquired approximately 2000 hectares 
in Mkwasine from THZ in 1982. That culminated in the settlement of 191 smallholder black 
farmers under the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme (Jackson and Cheater, 1994; Watts, 1994; 
Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996). 
 
In the second decade the reform was constrained by lack of financial resources despite the 
government‟s spirited effort to redistribute land (Moyo et al., 2009) as evidenced by the 
Compulsory Land Acquisition Act of 1992. The Act empowered the state to compulsorily 
acquire land it had had identified for resettlement purposes. The state was obliged to compensate 
the acquired land. Due to lack of financial resources there was not any reform in the sugar estates 
in general and Mkwasine in particular. The constitutional provisions of the WSWB clause in the 
first decade and lack of financial resources in the second decade together with the realization by 
the state of the strategic importance of sugar and ethanol as foreign currency earners restrained 
the government from disturbing the vibrant agricultural industry. 
 
However the land ownership structure across the three estates of Triangle, Hippo Valley and 
Mkwasine increased significantly when in the year 2000 and beyond 872 more black farmers 
known as A2 farmers were resettled across the three estates. Of this massive increase 
approximately 50% of the new farmers are in Mkwasine Estate alone (Moyo, 2011). These were 
linked to THZ‟s processing mills at Triangle and Hippo Valley. The arrangement required them 
to supply their sugarcane to THZ for processing and marketing. 
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The resettled farmers in the estate are very enterprising and engage in variety of livelihood 
portfolios. This does not however, constitute a process of de-agrarianization as the sugarcane 
plot remains a key part of the resettled farmers‟ livelihood strategies. It is also important to note 
that not everyone who acquired land had the aim of immediately utilizing it. Some people 
acquired land in the sugar estates for speculative purposes as a way of boosting their family 
incomes against the rising costs of living in urban centres. Such people remained in urban centres 
from where they directed farming operations to their farm managers or supervisors by cell 
phone. 
 
A major consideration to make when analyzing the livelihood activities by the resettled farmers 
in the sugar estate is the broader socio-economic context which obtained during and after the 
FTLRP. Due to the hyperinflationary environment caused by economic sanctions imposed by the 
West, sugarcane production ceased to be the only activity undertaken by the farmers as a large 
number of them diversified into a wide range of other non-farm activities which provide vital 
sources of income at a time when sugar sales were not on. Sugarcane is a perennial crop which is 
sold once per year, yet the farmers have subsistence and operating costs to meet on a daily basis. 
 
The above dynamic demonstrates that the livelihood dimension in the estate is rather complex 
and dynamic. A large number of the farmers particularly the A2 farmers in the sugar estate have 
struggled to utilize the land and are involved in a wide range of income generating activities 
since they did not get government support after resettlement. Such farmers are involved in 
diverse activities beyond sugarcane farming. Although some farmers have realized limited 
returns from their land, it does not mean that they have completely failed. Findings indicate that 
access to land brought with it many benefits beyond sugarcane farming. These opportunities play 
an important role in sustaining those farmers who lack the means to farm. 
 
The performance patterns of the resettled farmers after land reform in Zimbabwe had until 
recently, remained contested with critics of the land reform process particularly the FTLRP 
arguing that it had resulted in dramatic fall in agricultural productivity (Richardson 2005) and 
that the new farmers lacked the requisite farming skills. However, on the other hand some 
scholars (Moyo et al. 2009, Scoones et al. 2010 and Hanlon et al. 2012) opine  that the FTLRP 
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was not a total failure as claimed but that it broadened the producer base as the new farmers are 
utilizing the land and are already accumulating from below. 
 
Both groups of farmers in Mkwasine engage on both on-farm and off farm activities to boost 
their household income. This implies the need to boost the cash flows of the resettled farmers in 
the estate.Kinsey and Binswanger (1993) argue that the benefits of programs which involve 
large-scale human resettlement are unlikely to become apparent in less than a generation. This 
suggests that it might be too early to make generalizations about the success or failure of the land 
reform programme in Mkwasine given the fact that it is now a little more than a decade and half 
since its implementation. An analysis of the resettled farmers‟ performance on selected 
biographies of the farmers discussed above highlight how patterns of social differentiation 
influenced success or failure. Some farmers were more successful in their farming operations 
while others struggled and are thus more involved in off farm activities such as retailing, 




This chapter established how a changed ownership structure in Mkwasine Estate influenced 
management dynamics that resulted in a diverse range of livelihood portfolios. It also established 
how some resettled farmers have been able to fully utilize the land and tap from the opportunities 
created by the land reform process. The paper also established that quite a sizeable number of the 
resettled farmers are doing well and have invested in part of their land but at the same time 
straddle across a broad range of livelihood portfolios such as natural resource extraction, hunting 
and fishing, petty trading as well as cross border trading. There remains a group of low income 
earners who are struggling to survive yet they accessed land. Such farmers remain hopeful that 
the government and other private players would be able to provide them with the necessary 
support in the long term. 
 
These off farm activities have influenced accumulation patterns of the resettled farmers in the 
estate. Off-farm livelihoods activities have played important roles in providing alternative 
sources of income for a large proportion of the resettled farmers. Moreover, such activities have 
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enhanced the economic position of women, as income gained from cross border trade has been 
used to acquire assets which have given them leverage over the control of household income. 
 
Overall, the chapter established that land reform has allowed the resettled farmers‟ access to a 
wide range of natural resources which were previously inaccessible. These have provided 
alternative sources of income which have in turn influenced accumulation patterns among a large 
group of the resettled farmers. 
 
Having realized the economic importance of the livelihood activities discussed above, the study 
recommends the restriction of the resettled farmers to sugar production only and leave land 
adjacent Mkwasine to others. This would go a long way in providing employment to a wide 
section of society instead of availing opportunities to those who already have land. The 
government must also encourage all the farmers in the estate to take farming full time in order to 
boost production. By relinquishing their employment posts this would also create employment 
for the unemployed. Loans given to sugarcane growers should be in harmony with the crop cycle 
and allow growers to harvest and sell. The paper recommends that banks design a facility for 
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This study examined the transformation of Mkwasine Sugar Estate after land reform programme 
in Zimbabwe against the backdrop of tensions and conflicts between Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe 
and black farmers over sugarcane production and procurement prices. These contestations 
occurred after the estate was wholly acquired by the government for the resettlement of black 
sugarcane farmers. The major question addressed by the study was „Did the reconfiguration of 
Mkwasine Sugar Estate destroy the once vibrant sugar state?‟ Also linked to this main question 
were the following sub-questions: „Who currently owns what, who does what, who gets what and 
what do they do with it in the sugar estate after land reform?‟  
 
This study was prompted by heated debates peddled in academic and media circles on the 
outcomes of the FTLRP in the sugar industry. The transformation of Mkwasine Estate had been 
thinly covered by existing literature hence the study provided a broad sketch of the changes that 
occurred and the livelihood activities beyond sugar production that emerged in the estate in the 
aftermath of land reform. In doing so the study examined changes in land ownership, tenure 
system and operational relations between Tongaat Hulett Zimbabwe (THZ) and the resettled 
black farmers in the estate. 
 
The study started by historically reviewing the history of the sugar industry in Zimbabwe with 
particular reference to the out grower scheme in the south eastern Lowveld, from its in inception 
in the colonial era in the 1920s up to the post-colonial era, particularly the establishment of the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme in 1982 and the subsequent resettlement of A2 farmers in Mkwasine 
Estate under the FTLRP in the year 2000 and beyond. The resettlement thrust by government 
after independence significantly altered the land ownership structure of the agro-industrial 




Firstly it was concluded that there was gender disparity in land ownership in Mkwasine estate 
after land reform. More men benefitted from the land redistribution exercise than women yet 
gender is a critical factor that has to be taken into consideration when allocating critical 
production resources. This finding points to the exclusion of more than half the country‟s 
population in the allocation of national resources. Women are often disadvantaged in both 
statutory and customary land ownership.  
 
Many of the beneficiaries of land reform in Mkwasine do not have sugarcane farming experience 
giving credence to other criteria having influence the land allocation exercise. The majority of the 
beneficiaries hailed from the top echelons of the civil and security services sectors with war 
veteran credentials and political patronage having tilted the scale to their favour. The study also 
concluded that these beneficiaries lacked government support and intervention since they were 
not given input support like other crops covered under the government input support 
programmes. There is therefore need to treat sugarcane as a strategic crop and stop treating it 
under „other crops‟. This is because of government‟s imbedded interest in the industry due to the 
foreign currency it generates for the country. The government should therefore desist from 
exercising distant interest and urgently address the challenges being faced by both Tongaat Hulett 
Zimbabwe and the resettled black farmers.  
 
The government should note that historically, the white sugarcane growers were self-sufficient 
because they did not entirely depend on government assistance but things have since changed. 
Land sizes per farmer have been reduced and tenure system changed as freehold paved way to 
leasehold tenure. The new farmers cannot stand on their own because of their reduced farm sizes 
and tenure insecurity. The government has to assist them until such a time that they are self-
sufficient. THZ through its Triangle and Hippo Valley operations who when they source inputs 
would be doing it for their operations only and not for the resettled farmers. 
 
While the study fully supports the land reform it concluded that land disputes in Mkwasine are 
affecting the production of sugar negatively and there is need to resolve them once and for all. 
Some farmers with offer letters are being moved away from their allocated farms and being 
replaced with some with the help of corrupt lands ministry officials. There are also a lot of dirt 
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dealings happening in the estate such multiple farm ownership involving lands officials who 
should be exposed. 
 
The study also concluded that the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme farmers managed to pay in full the 
loans advanced to them by THZ and were expected to get their title deeds. This reflects the 
commitment of these farmers to land reform. However because of the nationalization of all 
agricultural land under the FTLRP these farmers did not receive their title deeds. This exposed 
them also to insecurity of tenure like the A2 farmers who started on leasehold tenure. 
 
The Chipiwa group of farmers is asking to have their hectares increased from ten to twenty. The 
new farmers (that is: A2 farmers) without as much experience in sugarcane as them are on more 
than twenty hectares of land. To the Chipiwa group this defies logic. According to the group the 
ten hectares they were allocated way back in 1982 are no longer viable considering the costs of 
water, inputs, transporting cane and maintaining irrigation equipment. Their claims were 
confirmed by THZ. The group is being treated unfairly as the first tenants in the estate. It should 
have been considered for resettlement under the FTLRP because the ten hectares plots its 
members owned had been fully paid for. The land size of this group‟s members need to be 
brought to twenty hectares for them to peacefully co-exist with their A2 farmer counterparts. 
 
Closely linked to land sizes was the issue of sub economic farming. The study concluded that for 
a sugarcane farmer to be viable under irrigation conditions that farmer has to be on more than 
twenty hectares of land. It was disturbing to learn that the Chipiwa group of farmers were still on 
ten hectare plots. THZ through Hippo Valley Estate and Triangle Limited established the 
Chipiwa Settlement Scheme with the approval of the government. This was done in phases from 
1982 to 1989 and consisted of 191 small scale farmers with an average of 10 hectares each and a 
homestead. 
 
The study also concluded that the two milling agreements for famers in Mkwasine are unfair. 
While the Milling Agreement was set aside for the Chipiwa Settlement Scheme, the Cane 
Purchase Agreement was designed for the A2 farmers. The study also concluded that the land 





Lastly, the study also concluded that shortages of sugar which sometimes occur on the local 
market were not as a result of low production but illegal exports by both consumers and 
producers. It further concluded that besides the reduction in the production of sugarcane by 
resettled farmers in their initial years of resettlement, their contribution has been rising in recent 
years culminating in more than more than enough for the local market with the excess being 
exported. THZ indicated that they exported 70% of the total production and 30% is for the local 
market. There is need for government to intervene in such matters of economic importance as it 




Basing on the above conclusions the study makes following recommendations; 
Gender 
 The study recommends the redressing of gender imbalance in participation in Mkwasine 
Estate. 
Land allocation 
 The study recommends a transparent land redistribution exercise to protect the interests 
of farmers from farm disruptions caused by the emergence of „A5‟ farmers who are 
hopping from one „ready to harvest farm‟ to another.  
 The study also recommends that the Ministry of Lands investigate the operations of its 
Provincial officers in Masvingo and District Officers in Chiredzi. 
 It recommends a new land audit for all the A2 farms and a re-planning to ensure that the 
Chipiwa Group together with A2 farmers get at least 20 hectares each to ensure viability. 
This should form the basis of setting minimum land sizes for the new farmers in the sugar 
industry.  
 Farmers with excess, unutilized and unproductive land must have it cut down to an 
agreed average size so that no farmer is on less than 20 hectares. Equally no farmer 
should be in possession of land 20% in excess of the agreed average. 
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 All sugarcane growers protected under BIPA‟s should have their rights protected. The 
study calls for a definite resolution of all cases before Ministries of Lands, Agriculture 
and Foreign Affairs in order to restore investor confidence in the sector.  
Land sizes 
 Having noted the importance of the THZ as a service provider to Mkwasine Estate and 
considering the limited hectares that most individual farmers have, the study recommends 
that the THZ remain with the 30% of its original landholding in the estate for it to be able 
to sustain itself and to provide services to the farmers. 
 The study also recommends that any hectarage which is less than twenty is sub economic 
and therefore not sustainable. The Chipiwa Resettlement Scheme has skills developed 
since 1982 and these should not be thrown away. 
Input accessibility 
 The government must declare sugarcane as a strategic crop and stop treating it under 
„other crops‟. 
 The resettled farmers need government support in terms of accessing loans and inputs. 
The study recommends that there be an allocation for sugarcane inputs in the national 
budget and that sugarcane growers have access to fertilizers, fuel and chemicals through 
institutions like Grain Marketing Board and NOCZIM just like other crops covered under 
the Government Input Programme.  
 Loans given to sugarcane growers should be in harmony with the crop cycle and allow 
growers to harvest and sell.  
 The study recommends that banks design a facility for farmers based on a twelve months 
and not six months payback period. 
Sugar skills 
 The study notes that most some resettled farmers do not have expertise in sugar 
production although they are willing to learn and recommends that government with 
other stakeholders seriously consider setting up sugar technology training institutes to 




Pricing and marketing 
 The Ministry of Industry and Trade must be part of the board that determines the price of 
sugar because there is a huge gap between the retail price and the producer price. When 
the sugar industry reviews the price of sugar, the Ministry of Industry and Trade must be 
involved as an arbitrator and to confirm price derivatives and not just be informed „as a 
matter of courtesy‟ leaving producers at the mercy of the millers. 
 The study also recommends that some investigations be done on who buys sugar from 
Zimbabwe Sugar Sales and the kind of transactions and remittances that are done at 
Triangle Limited, Hippo Valley Estate and Zimbabwe Sugar Refinery. And also 
investigate the criteria used in awarding export licences for sugar and to find out the 
benefits that accrue to the sugar industry/grower and to the nation. 
 Triangle Limited and Hippo Valley Estate should harmonize the issue of Cane 
Purchasing Agreements and come up with a single uniform agreement that is applicable 
to all cane growers regardless of race, colour, creed or farming history. Equally 
byproducts such as ethanol, molasses and so on should accrue to farmers on the same 
basis of equality. The study is encouraged by Government‟s interest in one of the sugar‟s 
by-products namely ethanol but encourages Government to extend its interest to other by-
products like bagasse which has a potential to solve energy deficit in the area.  In other 
sugar growing economies sugar is no longer treated as the main product and has been 
substituted by electricity and other products. 
 The study also recommends government to break the monopoly of THZ in the processing 
and milling of sugar by bringing in more players. There is a case for a milling company 
for A2 farmers in Mkwasine that need further research and support. 
Water charges 
 Sugarcane farmers cannot afford to pay monthly water bills because the crop is harvested 
after twelve months. The study therefore, recommends that sugarcane farmers pay quotas 
on agreed intervals to alleviate cash flow problems. 
Transport 
 Also the National Railways of Zimbabwe must be put at the center of an integrated cane 
haulage model. The completion of the Tokwe Mukosi Dam means that sugarcane would 
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be grown on a large scale throughout the Lowveld and this also means that the distance 
from fields to the milling companies shall increase, a cheaper and more cost effective 
haulage model is therefore necessary. 
Other 
 Finally, the study recommends the setting up of a regulatory authority governed by an act 
of Parliament that draws its composition from government, growers, millers, financiers, 
marketers, research and development and other stakeholders. This will eliminate 
fragmentation and partisan representation of the sector and increase the bargain and 
lobbying leverage of the sector to government. 
 
8.3. Further areas of study 
 
 This study only examined post-independence changes in the land ownership structure and 
tenure system in Mkwasine Estate. There is, therefore, a need for further investigation on 
how the reconfiguration of the estate has impacted on social and physical infrastructure 
provision in the sugar estate. 
 The study considered the linking of THZ‟s processing mills to the resettled farmers. 
However there is a case for the resettled farmers‟ own processing plant which requires 
further investigation on how it could be funded. 
 The study investigated livelihood outcomes beyond sugar production that emerged after 
land reform, however there is need to investigate how these activities can be 
mainstreamed so that they could be incorporated into the resettled farmers‟ way of life. 
